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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the influence of campaign finance on the interplay between
political power and electoral competition in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The thesis considers both the donation and expenditure sides of campaign finance: In the
context of U.S. state and federal legislative elections (1980-2014), I study how political
power affects the allocation of campaign contributions, and in the context of U.K. House
of Commons elections (1885-2010), I examine how campaign spending restrictions affect
political power via electoral behavior. The three papers which make up the construct
of the thesis answer the following questions:
(i) What is the financial value of incumbency status, and who generates it?
(ii) Who values legislative agenda setters, and why do they do so?
(iii) What are the electoral consequences of statutory limits on campaign expenditure?
I argue that campaign donors make their contributions to powerful politicians in
exchange for access to the policy-making process, and that the power of these politicians
is sustained, at least in part, due to these contributions.
In the first paper, I document that U.S. incumbent legislators enjoy sizeable financial
advantages compared to challengers, and I demonstrate that this advantage is the result
of donations from access-seeking industries. In the second paper, I show that U.S.
legislators who are institutionally endowed with agenda-setting powers are given special
treatment by campaign donors. I document that donors with vested economic interests
in regulatory policy place great value on agenda-setting legislators – in particular when
institutions provide these legislators with the authority to block new legislation. In
the final paper, I study the consequences of campaign spending limits in the context of
U.K. House of Commons elections. I show that unrestrained spending reduces electoral
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competition, promotes professionalized campaigns, and benefits incumbents and center-
right parties.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
A free and fair election process to select public officials is the defining feature that
separates representative democracy from other forms of government. Through periodic
elections citizens are given the opportunity to select, according to their free opinion, the
most qualified public officials, in terms of talent, experience, social skills, policy prefer-
ences, etc., to represent the will of the people. Elections may also serve to incentivize
public officials to exert effort on behalf of their constituents once they are elected.
In the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as in most other Western
democracies today, elections are generally free and fair in the sense that the admin-
istration of the electoral process is not inherently corrupt and that citizens are not
systematically disenfranchised or prohibited from running for public office on arbitrary
grounds. De jure, all citizens officially enjoy the same basic constitutional rights and
are politically equal according to the principle of one man, one vote.
De facto, however, political power and influence are by no means uniformly dis-
tributed among members of society. As discussed at length by classical elite theorists,
such as Michels (1915) and Pareto (1935), economic and political capital tend to be
concentrated in the hands of a few.
In the traditional pluralist view of representative democracy, political inequality
may not necessarily be a major cause for concern. According to Dahl (1961: p. 89), the
distribution of power in the U.S., and, by extension, other modern liberal democracies,
can be characterized by a “pattern of dispersed rather than cumulative inequalities”
in which every societal group “has access to some resources that it can exploit to gain
influence”. The decentralized nature of liberal democracies ensures that the advantages
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enjoyed by a group in one societal sphere will be offset by the disadvantages in another
sphere. All groups have the freedom to voice their concerns; if an issue is important
enough for citizens to care about strongly, they will unite and jointly put pressure on
the political system (Bentley 1908; Truman 1951).
The pluralist belief that all groups in society have access to some political influence,
albeit through different channels, rests on the assumption that all vital common interests
can and will be voiced through the pressure system. This idea was theoretically critiqued
by Olson (1965) in his discussion of collective action problems faced by large groups in
which everybody has a common interest in a public good, but no one is willing to
incur the cost of providing it. Similarly, the pluralist understanding of democracy was
empirically critiqued by Schattschneider (1960). In perhaps the most famous quote in
the literature on organized interests, Schattschneider claims that,
The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a
strong upper-class accent. (Schattschneider 1960: p. 35)
Schattschneider’s main argument is that the pressure system is biased in favor of
groups representing business interests and of the well-off, and against groups repre-
senting broader public interests and disadvantaged citizens (Schlozman, Verba, and
Brady 2012).
This thesis extends the literature on political power and special interest group pol-
itics building on the work of Schattschneider (1960). To use his metaphor, the goals
of this thesis are, at the very broadest level, to characterize who sings in the heavenly
chorus, and to understand why some voices ring out more clearly than others. The am-
bition is to improve our understanding of the interaction of special interest groups with
the insiders and outsiders of political elites. In the next sections of this introduction, I
outline how I intend to implement this in practice.
2.1 Campaign Finance and Political Elites
Special interest groups may try to seek influence in many different ways. The set of
possible activities ranges from irreproachable actions, such as drafting reports, and
producing objective, impartial analyses of policy consequences, to lobbying via various
networks and contributing to political campaigns; from the grey area of helping policy
17
makers to draft and amend policy proposals, to outright corrupt and illegal activities,
such as buying votes on a quid pro quo basis.
In this thesis, I focus on campaign finance. Campaign finance is by no means the
only way by which groups attempt to influence policy, but it is a tangible and quantifi-
able resource that elected public officials appear to value. In all likelihood, campaign
contributions represent only the visible tip of an iceberg of attempts to influence public
policy, suggesting that any documented effect of campaign finance may represent only
a lower bound on the true attempts at influence.
In the 2014 electoral cycle in the U.S., legislative candidates running for office at the
state and federal levels raised more than 1.3 and 2.1 billion U.S. dollars, respectively.1 In
2014, political parties at the national level in the U.K. raised more than 65 million British
pounds, and it may be presumed that this amount increased in the months leading up
to the general election in 2015. Individual candidates and local party organizations
solicited considerable amounts, as well.2
As dryly noted by Lewis (1998), such amounts are not raised in bake sales. Rather,
most of that money is donated by wealthy individuals, firms, labor unions, and interest
groups. Legislators apparently place great import on these contributions: They spend
hours on the phone soliciting donations and participating in other fundraising activities,
and generous campaign donors are given privileged access when scheduling meetings
with them (Kalla and Broockman 2015).
Whether or not campaign finance poses a fundamental threat to representative
democracy depends on the reason donors give money to political campaigns, and what
consequences their contributions may have. On the one hand, it might be cause for
concern if special interest groups, who represent partial, unbalanced or extreme pol-
icy preferences relative to the median voter, receive favourable political treatment by
elected officials in exchange for their campaign contributions at the expense of broader
public interests. The severity of the issue would be compounded if the advantages gen-
erated by these donations systematically reduced electoral competition and thus limited
the opportunity for constituents to electorally punish poorly performing public officials.
1Source (federal): http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?y=2014&f-core=1&f-fc=1&c-exi=1.
Source (state): http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?y=2014&f-core=1&f-fc=2&c-exi=1
2http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/general-election-2015-explained-
who-finances-the-parties-who-gets-the-most–and-how-much-does-the-campaign-cost-10186008.html
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On the other hand, campaign contributions to powerful legislators would be less of a
concern if the favored politicians were elected to office or appointed to their leadership
positions simply because they were more qualified than other candidates.
2.2 Research Question and Main Argument
To evaluate the quandary around the normative issues outlined above, one needs to
accurately understand how campaign finance influences the interplay between political
power and electoral competition. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a solid empir-
ical foundation upon which such an evaluation can be made. The fundamental research
question that I address in the thesis is:
How does political power affect the distribution of campaign contributions,
and how does campaign spending affect the distribution of political power
through electoral competition?
To answer such a wide and comprehensive question in a precise and meaningful way, I
narrowly define and operationalize the key concepts.
The main focus in this thesis is on formal political institutions. When I refer to
the distribution of political power, it denotes the allocation of political privileges as-
sociated with official positions. Obviously, power has many different faces, and, while
the approach taken in this thesis does not account for political power exercised through
informal institutions, it does reflect an important dimension of power and can be ap-
plied in a tractable, simple way. In particular, I am interested in how political power
is distributed among insiders and outsiders of the elite along two dimensions: Within
the group of candidates running for office, I examine the difference between incum-
bents and challengers; within the group of incumbent legislators, I am interested in
the difference between rank-and-file legislators and legislators, such as party leaders,
committee chairs, and majority party members, who are institutionally endowed with
certain parliamentary agenda-setting privileges.
Similarly, when I study how campaign spending affects electoral competition, my
main focus is on a political institution: The statutory legal maxima on candidate cam-
paign expenditure. Campaign spending may affect the distribution of power in a variety
of ways, but instead of trying to answer the question in general terms, I narrowly study
how ceilings on total campaign spending affect electoral behavior.
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This discussion leads to three specific questions that I address in Chapters 3, 4 and
5, respectively:
(i) What is the financial value of incumbency status, and who generates it?
(ii) Who values legislative agenda setters, and why do they do so?
(iii) What are the electoral consequences of statutory limits on campaign expenditure?
Geographically, I focus exclusively on the U.S. and the UK. Besides the obvious
value of studying each of these countries in its own right, I have chosen them as cases
in part due to the availability of necessary data, and in part because key aspects of
the campaign finance institutions in these countries have been implemented throughout
the democratic countries of the world. The disclosure requirements in the U.S. enable
me to study the inflow of money from donors to candidates (the contributions side
examined in Chapters 3 and 4), whereas the U.K. disclosure rules allow me to scrutinize
the outflow (the expenditure side explored in Chapter 5). Of course, there are many
systemic differences between the countries’ political institutions, but I do not claim that
the findings pertaining to one country can be generalized to the other. Rather, I study
the U.S. and U.K. political institutions as separate entities and only discuss the extent
to which any conclusions can be generalized.
The main argument presented in this thesis is simple: Campaign donors contribute
money to the insiders of powerful political elites in exchange for access to the policy-
making process, and the power of this elite is sustained, at least in part, because of
these contributions.
I empirically substantiate both the inflow and outflow sides of this argument. First,
I establish that campaign contributions flow to the insiders of powerful political elites
in Chapters 3 and 4. In these chapters, I study campaign finance in the context of U.S.
federal and state legislatures. In Chapter 3, I document that incumbent legislators enjoy
sizeable financial advantages compared to their challengers, and I demonstrate that this
advantage is, to a certain degree, a result of donations from access-seeking industries. In
Chapter 4, I show that legislators, such as party leaders, committee chairs, and majority
party members, who are institutionally endowed with agenda-setting powers, are given
special treatment by campaign donors relative to that given to other elected legislators.
I document that donors with vested economic interests in regulatory policy place great
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value on agenda setters – in particular when institutions allow these legislators to block
new legislation. Second, in Chapter 5, I turn to the claim that campaign finance helps to
sustain the power of political elites. In this chapter, I study the electoral consequences
of campaign spending limits in the context of U.K. House of Commons elections. I show
that unrestrained spending reduces electoral competition, and benefits incumbents and
parties, who have notable connections to businesses and wealthy individuals.
2.3 New Data
I base my empirical claims on data from various sources, as well as from the devel-
opment of two new datasets. The campaign finance data pertaining to U.S. elections,
upon which the claims in Chapters 3 and 4 are based, was obtained from two sources:
The data on campaign contributions in U.S. state legislative elections (1990-2010) was
collected by the non-partisan organization The National Institute on Money in State
Politics (NIMSP) via www.followthemoney.com. This data, which is a compilation
of candidate filings to authorities overseeing state-level campaign finance regulations,
contains information on donations to candidates in legislative races across all 99 cham-
bers. The data on campaign contributions in U.S. House elections (1980-2014) was
obtained from the non-partisan organization Center for Responsible Politics (CRP) via
www.opensecrets.org, as well as from official records from the Federal Election Com-
mission.
To assess the value of legislative agenda setters in Chapter 4, I collected a new
dataset on all committee chairs and vice chairs of all standing and joint committees
from 1990 to 2010 across all 99 state legislative chambers, as well as information on
the following leadership positions: Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, Pres-
ident Pro Tempore, party whips, and floor and caucus leaders from both parties. The
primary sources were the quarterly-published State Yellow Books (e.g. Leadership Di-
rectories 2014) and the web sites of various state legislatures. Based on name, party and
legislative district, I matched each committee chair, vice chair and party leader to the
unique state legislator identifier in the ICPSR dataset 34297 (Klarner et al. 2013). This
will enable future researchers to use the data in studies of committee and party lead-
ership in state legislatures. The number of leadership observations during the period
1990-2010 totals approximately 30,000.
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Studying campaign finance in the U.K. context proved to be more difficult. Whereas
U.S. campaign finance data extends back to the 1980s and 1990s at the federal and state
levels, respectively, and can easily be downloaded online, campaign finance data per-
taining to U.K. House of Commons elections has only been published in a digital format
since 2001. However, candidates have filed, and have documented with receipts, their
campaign expenses since the election in 1885 in accordance with The Corrupt and Ille-
gal Practises Prevention Act 1883. This act requires that all candidates running for a
seat in the House of Commons must disclose detailed information on campaign spend-
ing immediately after each general election. The dataset introduced and referenced in
Chapter 5 is based on these filings. Using archival material from the House of Com-
mons, I collected the longest spanning and most detailed dataset on campaign finance
ever collected: The dataset covers the spending of 99.7% of all candidates running for
seat over the past 130 years, in other words, it provides information on more than 61,000
individual candidate-years. I match each return in the archival material to the electoral
returns collected and used in a series of papers by Eggers and Spirling (2014a,b,c). This
will allow future researchers to link the campaign finance data to information on can-
didates and constituencies, including data on the political careers and parliamentary
speeches given by ministers and MPs.
2.4 Methodological Perspectives
The argument presented in this thesis claims causality: Political power and spending
limits cause campaign donors and candidates to behave in certain predictable ways.
However, assessing the causal effect of political power on the allocation of campaign
contributions, as well as determining the electoral consequences caused by spending
limits, are not trivial empirical matters.
The characteristics of powerful legislative candidates are apparently different from
those of other candidates, and some of those characteristics may, presumably, be corre-
lated with the ability to attract campaign contributions. It seems plausible, for example,
that incumbents possess some unique qualities that help them to win elections, but those
same qualities may also explain their ability to attract campaign contributions. Simi-
larly, legislators may be appointed to committee leadership positions because they are
particularly knowledgeable or have a policy-relevant network within a specific field, but
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this, in turn, may also help them to solicit contributions. Selection issues like these will
most likely induce bias in na¨ıve comparisons across candidates and other simple cross-
sectional studies of political power and campaign finance. Likewise, campaign spending
limits are not randomly assigned across constituencies, but determined by underlying
constituency characteristics that may also affect electoral competition.
The ideal way to study the effect of political power on campaign finance would be
to randomly assign politically powerful positions to candidates, and the optimal way
to study the electoral consequences of spending limits would be to randomly assign
different limits across constituencies. Luckily, from the perspective of a citizen, neither
of these approaches are practically feasible. Instead, I approach the randomization ideal
using natural experiments. The idea is to identify causal effects by exploiting exogenous
shocks that induce quasi-random variation in the treatment variables.
In Chapter 3, I use a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of
incumbency on campaign contributions. I exploit that incumbency status is almost as
if randomly assigned in two-party races where the outcome of the previous election was
determined by a razor-thin margin. In Chapter 4, I employ a difference-in-difference
design to identify the causal effect of institutional agenda-setting power on campaign
contributions. The basic idea is to compare within-legislator changes in campaign con-
tributions before and after the appointment to a leadership position, while differencing
out common changes affecting all legislators within a given year. In Chapter 5, I use an
instrumental variables approach to identify how spending ceilings affect electoral behav-
ior. In the first step of a 2SLS analysis, I exploit reforms of the spending limit formula
and shocks to formula inputs to predict within-constituency changes in spending lim-
its. In the second step, I estimate the impact of these predicted changes on electoral
behavior.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: The main body of the thesis
comprises Chapters 3, 4, and 5. These three chapters constitute three building blocks
that, taken together, form a coherent argument. However, each of the chapters is
composed of one paper, authored as a self-contained piece of research, and, as such, the
chapters can, in principle, be read as independent, self-standing articles. Finally, in the
Conclusion in Chapter 6, I integrate the findings from the three preceding chapters and
discuss the implications our understanding of the role of money in politics.
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Chapter 3
The Financial Incumbency
Advantage
In this article, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect
of incumbency on campaign contributions in the U.S. House and state legislatures.1
In both settings, incumbency causes approximately a 20–25% increase in the share of
donations flowing to the incumbent’s party. The effect size does not vary with legislator
experience and does not appear to depend on incumbent office-holder benefits. Instead,
as we show, the effect is primarily the result of donations from access-oriented interest
groups, especially donors from industries under heavy regulation and those with less
ideological ties. Given the role of money in elections, the findings suggest that access-
oriented interest groups are an important driver of the electoral security of incumbents.
1This chapter is co-authored with Andrew B. Hall (Stanford University). Both authors contributed
equally to the paper.
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3.1 Introduction
Incumbents possess many advantages over challengers in U.S. elections. The overall
“incumbency advantage” might reduce the incentives for incumbents to exert effort on
behalf of their constituents, or it might not, depending on its sources. If it is the result
of voters rewarding incumbents for effective representation, then it need not diminish
these incentives. On the other hand, if the advantage of incumbents stems from other
factors not directly linked to how they represent their constituents, it may well distort
their calculus while in office. In this paper we connect the advantage of incumbents to
the role of money in elections, and we trace incumbents’ financial advantage back to
the behavior of interest groups who desire access to those in office.
A large literature in political science studies the electoral advantage of incumbents
(e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002; Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr 2004; Cox and Katz
1996; Erikson 1971; Gelman and King 1990; Hirano and Snyder 2009), but our knowledge
of its sources remains incomplete. A separate literature studies the connections between
incumbents and access-oriented interest groups, offering theoretical motivations for the
ways interest groups support incumbents, both financially and otherwise (Baron 1989;
Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Wayman 1990; Snyder 1990, 1992). Finally, a third
literature studies the links between campaign contributions and electoral outcomes and
suggests that, on the whole, receiving and spending more money boosts vote share (e.g.,
Erikson and Palfrey 2000; Gerber 1998, 2004; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1978,
1990) and can help “scare off” opponents (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Goodliffe 2005). In
this paper, we connect these three literatures. We show that incumbency causes a
large increase in campaign contributions, i.e., that there is a large financial incumbency
advantage that precedes, and helps generate, the electoral incumbency advantage we ob-
serve. We demonstrate that access-oriented interest groups create a large fraction of this
financial incumbency advantage, and are thus an important driver of—and beneficiary
of—the electoral incumbency advantage.
Incumbents substantially out-raise challengers, on average, across all U.S. legisla-
tures (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Hogan 2000; Krasno, Green, and Cowden
1994; Jacobson 2009; Magee 2012; Moncrief 1992). But this does not necessarily imply
that incumbency, per se, delivers a financial advantage. Much of the observed advan-
tage might instead stem from the fact that incumbents differ from challengers in many
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unobserved ways, including in their underlying characteristics and those of the districts
in which they tend to sit.2 Simply comparing the average receipts of incumbents and
challengers cannot separate the pre-existing differences between incumbents and chal-
lengers from the differences that result from occupying political office. This is equally
true when investigating the kinds of donors that give to incumbents and challengers;
although interest groups favor incumbents with their donations,3 this could be driven
in large part by the preference of strategic donors for different kinds of candidates and
different types of districts, rather than because these donors care about access to office
per se. We must investigate alternative evidence.
We use a regression discontinuity design (RDD)4 (e.g., Lee 2008) in U.S. House and
state legislative elections to estimate the financial incumbency advantage, i.e., the in-
crease in contributions caused by the [as if] random assignment of party incumbency.5
We present evidence that party incumbency causes a substantial increase in campaign
contributions (approximately a 20–25% jump in the share of total contributions), and
we investigate the donor groups responsible for this pattern. We carry out tests that
show that strategic interest groups direct money to incumbents in exchange for access
(and not for some of the other reasons often put forward), and we show that access-
oriented interest group donors account for approximately two-thirds of the overall causal
financial incumbency advantage. Moreover, interest groups representing industries that
are heavily regulated or that underwent fundamental changes in their regulatory en-
vironment (e.g. energy, technology, healthcare and transportation), are more likely to
coordinate and target incumbents.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we explain our empirical strategy. Second,
we briefly describe the datasets we use to study the financial incumbency advantage.
Third, we present our results and use subgroup analyses to discuss potential causal
mechanisms. Finally, we conclude with a short discussion.
2Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) addresses this problem of causality by using a “sophomore surge” es-
timator. However, resulting estimates are likely to be somewhat downward-biased because of reversion
to the mean (e.g., Gelman and King 1990).
3This can be calculated using FEC data and National Institute On Money in State Politics data. Also,
see for example Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000).
4Our results do not depend substantively on the choice of incumbency-advantage estimator.
5We focus on campaign contributions rather than expenditures, although the two are inevitably highly
correlated.
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
A simple comparison of incumbent and challenger campaign receipts does not estimate
the causal effect of incumbency on campaign receipts, for obvious reasons. Those who
win an election are not directly comparable to those who do not. In addition, incum-
bents may be strategic in their decision to run for reelection. In a pooled analysis,
moreover, unobserved differences across districts with open elections, those with un-
contested incumbents, and those with incumbents running against challengers will be
confused with the effects of incumbency. Forms of bias like these threaten most esti-
mates of incumbency advantages. RDDs provide a solution to these selection problems
by focusing on close elections in which incumbency is “as if” randomly assigned to ei-
ther the Democratic or Republican party (see Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee 2008). If
the campaign contributions donated to the party in the next election cycle in districts
it barely won differ systematically from the donations the party receives in districts it
barely lost, this difference can be attributed to the impact of incumbency under weak
conditions.6
More formally, the RDD estimator is defined as
τRDD = limv↓c E[Yit+1(1)|Vit = v]− limv↑c E[Yit+1(0)|Vit = v] (3.1)
= E[Yit+1(1)− Yit+1(0)|Vit = c] (3.2)
where Vit is the forcing variable which determines whether or not treatment is assigned
(if vit ≥ c treatment is assigned). In the present setting, this forcing variable is the
Democratic vote share winning margin, i.e., the difference between the Democratic
share of the two-party vote and 50%, the necessary vote percentage required to win
office. When this variable is above zero, the district is “treated” with a Democratic
incumbent. Yt+1(1) is the potential outcome at time t + 1 if unit i is treated and
6The random assignment of incumbency at time t ensures that the districts that receive a Democratic
incumbent and those that receive a Republican incumbent have incumbents of equal quality as long
as Democrats and Republicans in close elections are, on average, of equal quality. This is the sense in
which candidate quality is accounted for. At time t+ 1 we do not want to constrain candidate quality.
If challengers are lower in quality in response to the random assignment of incumbency, this is part
of the causal effect of interest. It is downstream of the treatment. In addition, any fixed difference in
average quality between Democrats and Republicans would not affect our results since this would only
shift the intercepts at the discontinuity and not the gap that estimates the treatment effect.
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Yt+1(0) is the potential outcome at time t + 1 if unit i is not treated. In the present
setting, the outcome variable is a measure of Democratic campaign donation receipts in
the next electoral cycle, and each unit is a district. The identification of the treatment
effect rests on the key assumption that E[Yi,t+1(1)|Vt = v] and E[Yi,t+1(0)|Vt = v] are
continuous in v. In other words, the assumption states that the only variable that
“jumps” at v = c is the assignment to treatment – all other relevant variables must be
continuous around the cutoff such that for an arbitrarily small bandwidth around the
discontinuity, barely winners and barely losers are not systematically different from one
another in any way except for their treatment status.
Recent work has challenged the validity of the RDD assumption in the context
of the post-war U.S. House (Caughey and Sekhon 2011; Grimmer et al. 2012; Snyder
2005), presenting evidence that barely winners and barely losers are systematically
different from each other. In particular, they show that incumbents appear to have an
advantage in extremely close elections. However, Eggers et al. (2015) presents evidence
and arguments that this apparent sorting is likely the result of a fluke, which can be
controlled for econometrically, and not a violation of the RDD assumption. Moreover,
this sorting does not occur in state legislative elections, where there is strong evidence
for the validity of the RDD (Eggers et al. 2015). To be especially prudent, we also
go beyond Eggers et al. (2015) in checking for validity in state legislative elections
specifically. The Appendix reports an expansive battery of balance tests that find no
evidence of sorting. We also show that our results survive a variety of robustness checks,
including the use of covariates and the use of the “donut” RDD, and we focus primarily
on comparisons across RDD estimates, which would remove any fixed bias from sorting
even if it did exist. In addition, all empirical results are robust to the use of alternate
incumbency advantage estimators.7
To explore the overall financial incumbency advantage, we use OLS to estimate RDD
equations of the form
Yi,t+1 = β0 + β1Dit + f(Vit) + i,t+1 (3.3)
where Yi,t+1 measures the Democratic Party’s share of all donations in district i in
7In particular, we have replicated the main analysis using the Gelman-King estimator. Results are
substantively similar.
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election t + 1.8 This includes all donations from individuals and groups, excluding
candidate self-financing and party committee funds.9 The variable Dit is a binary
variable indicating the “treatment,” i.e., a Democratic victory in district i in election
t, and f(Vit) represents a function of the forcing variable, the Democratic vote share
winning margin in district i in election t.10 The purpose of this function is to extrapolate
to the discontinuity by accounting for the relationship between vote share and campaign
donations. We might expect, for example, that Democratic vote share in election t and
the Democratic share of campaign donations in the campaign for election t + 1 are
positively associated within the bandwidth, an association that biases observational
studies of the financial incumbency advantage.11 In the estimates presented below, we
employ local linear regression, fitting a linear relationship between the running variable
and the outcome variable within a small bandwidth and allowing the slope to vary on
either side of the discontinuity (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). However, the Appendix
shows that the results are highly stable across many bandwidths and many specifications
of the forcing variable. Finally, i,t+1 represents the disturbance term.
Two features of the RDD are worth mentioning. First, the RDD estimator is neces-
sarily local. Our estimated effects only speak, directly, to districts with close elections.
It is possible, for example, that incumbency causes a bigger increase in campaign con-
tributions in safe districts, where incumbents might be expected to have longer time
horizons and interest groups have more to gain from access.12 Nevertheless, the effect
8In cases in which the subsequent election is uncontested (which is rare since the initial election was
so close), the incumbent is credited with receiving 100% of donations, a fact which is literally true
because there are, indeed, campaign donations even in uncontested elections. All estimated results are
robust, however, to the exclusion of uncontested elections.
9This definition is not necessary to find the results, but is in keeping with previous literature (Snyder
1992).
10The vote share winning margin is defined as Vit = vtshit−50% where vtshit is the Democratic Party’s
share of the votes received by Democrats and Republicans in district i in election t (in percentage
points).
11At larger bandwidths, we might suspect that this relationship inverts. Once a candidate is particularly
safe, she may receive fewer donations. Again, this justifies the use of small bandwidths. It also
suggests the value of using a higher-order polynomial of the forcing variable, to account for possible
non-linearities in the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome, a strategy we pursue
in the Appendix.
12In such districts, there is no random variation in incumbency, and thus no unbiased way to assess the
effects of incumbency.
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of incumbency in competitive districts is, by itself, extremely important. Competitive
districts are those where incumbency status is likely to change, so the districts in our
sample comprise the districts most likely to be exposed to the effects we are studying.
Competitive districts are also those where campaigns are most salient (since both par-
ties have a chance of winning), making our focus on the financial effects of incumbency
in competitive races natural. As a result we are not overly concerned about the local
nature of the RDD estimator.
Second, the RDD estimator captures what is sometimes called the “party” incum-
bency advantage, because the winning candidate at time t is not required to run again
at time t+ 1 and may be replaced by a new co-partisan. As such we must be cautious
in couching all of our findings in terms of both the party and the individual (for further
discussion, see Erikson and Titiunik 2012; Fowler and Hall 2013). To be clear, our
estimates reflect the advantage in campaign contributions that accrues to the candidate
running in election t+ 1 when her party – either represented by herself or a predecessor
– held the office in the previous cycle. However, the party component of this overall
advantage, i.e., the amount of the advantage not accruing to the individual legislator
but instead to any candidate running from her party, is estimated to be zero in state
legislatures (Fowler and Hall 2013). As a result we have reason to believe the effects
we estimate reflect the personal incumbency advantage exclusively. Either way, the es-
timated effects are meaningful, as they point to the reaction of different donor types to
random changes in the identity of the party that controls a given seat in the legislature.
3.3 Data
To examine the financial incumbency advantage, we employ a large dataset on U.S.
House elections from 1980 – 2006 and state legislative elections from 1990 – 2010.
For data on state legislative election returns, we use ICPSR dataset 34297 (Klarner
et al. 2013). The dataset runs from 1967-2010, however, we only use elections from
1988 on in order to match the elections to data on campaign finance.13 Raw data on
state legislative campaign donations comes from The National Institute on Money in
13The first campaign finance observations are in 1990. Given our empirical setup, our first election
observations occur in 1988, so that we can observe how barely winners and barely losers in 1988
collect campaign contributions in their next election cycle.
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State Politics (http://www.followthemoney.org). This financial dataset provides dona-
tion records for all state political races from 1990 – 2010 at the level of the individual
donor. We keep all records pertaining to state lower or upper house general election
races, and discard all others. We are also able to separate individual and interest group
donors by the name formatting that The National Institute on Money in State Politics
uses.14 In addition, we use The National Institute on Money in State Politics codings
to categorize donations into industry categories. The main categories are: Agriculture,
Business, Construction, Energy, Finance, Government, Healthcare, Ideological, Labor,
Lawyers/Lobbyists, and Transportation. These categories come from state disclosure
requirements. We merge this financial data with the election dataset using the year,
state, chamber (upper or lower) and district number.15
The data on campaign spending at the federal level is provided by the United States’
Federal Election Commission and consists of information disclosed according to the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). FECA requires all candidates running for the
U.S. House to disclose all contributions made by political action committees (PACs)
and individual contributions worth more than $200. The analysis is based on the Post-
Election Cycle Summary Data Files which contains summary information about all
candidates who ran for a seat in the House from 1980 – 2006. 16 In addition, we use
the Federal Election Commission’s categorization of contributors. The main categories
are: Corporate PACs, Labor PACs, Unconnected PACs, Trade, Health and Membership
PACs (hereafter “THM”), Cooperative PACs, and individuals. Data on federal election
results and seniority are obtained from the replication dataset for Caughey and Sekhon
(2011). For details, see the online data Online Appendix to that paper.17
Our main outcome variable—the Democratic party’s share of total contributions—
is simply constructed by dividing the total amount donated to the Democratic party
14In personal correspondence with The National Institute on Money in State Politics, we have confirmed
that they intentionally never use commas in interest group names, so that researchers can separate
individual from group donors.
15The merge is imperfect due to discrepancies in district naming conventions between the two datasets
(e.g., in New England states with named and numbered districts), but where possible we have corrected
these errors. Such errors should reduce statistical power, but do not present a problem in the estimates
presented below.
16The data can be downloaded from http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/
PostCycleSummaryDataFiles.shtml
17http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/papers/RDOnlineAppendix.pdf
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in a given election cycle in each district by the total amount donated to both the
Democratic and Republican party in that district for that cycle. Similarly, we construct
the Democratic party’s share of contributions from a particular donor group (e.g. labor)
by calculating the total amount donated to the Democrats by the group and dividing
it by the total amount that the group donated to both parties.18 In order to compare
absolute amounts across years, we adjust the data to constant 1990 prices using the
standard Consumer Price Index published by Bureau of Labor Statistics.19
We construct our running variable as the difference between Democratic percentage
of the two-party vote at time t and 50, i.e., the distance between the Democratic vote
share and electoral victory. To do so, we drop any elections at time t in which a third
party secures either the highest or second highest vote total. Finally, we also exclude
observations in which the outcome variable is measured after a redistricting period. So,
for example, close elections for most U.S. House districts in 1990 are not used because
the donations received for the next election cycle (1992) occur in new districts.20
3.4 Results
Figure 3.1 illustrates how incumbency affects the Democratic Party’s share of total
contributions. The forcing variable, the Democratic win margin, is divided into 1
percentage-point bins, and each dot represents the average of the Democratic Party’s
share of total contributions in the next electoral cycle.21 There is a clear jump in cam-
paign receipts just at the cutoff; as the vote share winning margin approaches 0 from
below, the Democratic Party’s share of total contributions in the next electoral cycle
approaches between 35–40%, and as the winning margin approaches 0 from above, the
share of contributions approaches 60% of the total contributions.22 At both the fed-
18We do not consider any donations made to third party candidates in constructing this ratio.
19The Consumer Price Index can be downloaded from http://www.bls.gov/data/#prices. Series ID:
CUUR0000SA0.
20For the House, we use information on off-cycle redistrictings collected and organized for Caughey
and Sekhon (2011). For the state legislatures, we assume all redistrictings occur in years ending in
‘2’ before the 1990s. For subsequent years we use redistricting information collected, and generously
provided by, Carl Klarner.
21Binning reduces noise but does induce bias in the discontinuity. We never bin the data for any of our
statistical analyses.
22As one would expect, the party’s share of subsequent campaign contributions is increasing in the
party’s vote share (more qualified candidates attract both more votes and campaign contributions).
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eral and state level, incumbency causes a substantial jump in the party’s share of total
contributions in the reelection campaign. Interestingly, the effect size is quite similar in
both settings.
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Figure 3.1 – Binned averages of the Democratic share of con-
tributions in the subsequent electoral cycle.When the Demo-
cratic party crosses the threshold from barely losing to barely winning
the election, its share of the next campaign’s contributions increases
dramatically.
The statistical analysis is consistent with the figure. Table 3.1 presents the main
results from the RDD analysis using local linear regression to estimate Equation 3.3.
Specifically, we include a linear term of the running variable estimated separately on
each side of the discontinuity, using a variety of bandwidths as specified in the table.
On average, incumbency causes approximately a 20 to 25 percentage-point jump in
the Democratic Party’s share of contributions both at the federal and state level.23
Incumbency also has a substantial impact on the level of contributions. On average,
incumbency approximately causes a $275,000 jump in contributions in U.S. House elec-
tions and a $28,000 jump for incumbents in state legislatures (measured in constant
1990 dollars).24
23The only point estimate outside of this range is in the U.S. House with a 1 percentage-point bandwidth.
We suspect this estimate is slightly smaller (17%) only because of increased sampling variability. This
estimate uses the smallest sample size of any of the six reported.
24Table A.1 in the appendix shows the estimated effect on total contributions.
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Table 3.1 – RDD Results: Effect of Incumbency on the Demo-
cratic Party’s Share of Total Contributions, t+ 1
Dependent Variable:
Democratic share of total contributions, t+ 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democrat Win
(time t) 17.15∗ 20.62∗ 24.94∗ 23.05∗ 22.37∗ 20.04∗
(6.55) (4.46) (3.50) (3.59) (2.06) (1.60)
Constant 37.69∗ 37.88∗ 35.71∗ 38.69∗ 37.68∗ 39.20∗
(4.11) (2.97) (2.24) (2.61) (1.48) (1.12)
Observations 108 329 568 815 2421 4020
Level Federal Federal Federal State State State
Bandwidth Pct. 1 3 5 1 3 5
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using OLS with a linear
specification of the forcing variable estimated separately on each side of the discontinuity. ∗ p < 0.05.
In American legislatures, there is a substantial and causal financial incumbency ad-
vantage. The literature on the impact of campaign spending on electoral outcomes
suggests that money translates into votes, although the exact conversion rate is up for
debate. If money can be converted into votes then the electoral incumbency advantage
may stem, in part, from this financial advantage. Crude back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tions in which the dollar estimates obtained in this paper are multiplied by the estimates
of the effect of incumbents’ campaign spending on vote shares from the literature sug-
gest that the financial incumbency advantage can account for up to approximately 1.4
and 6 percentage point increases in the incumbent’s vote share in U.S. House and state
legislative elections, respectively.25 To understand why incumbents and their parties
have both of these advantages, then, we need to understand who generates the financial
incumbency advantage. What kinds of donors support incumbents and their parties,
25In Table A.2 in the appendix, we evaluate the importance of the financial incumbency advantage for
electoral outcomes by relating our estimates to estimates of the impact of campaign spending on vote
shares from the literature. The crude idea is simply to multiply the dollar estimates obtained in this
paper with the estimates of the effect of incumbents’ campaign spending on vote shares from the
literature. While the financial advantage occurs prior to the electoral advantage, it is still possible
that the knowledge of the electoral advantage in part drives donors to favor the incumbent’s party.
That is to say, when considering two outcomes from a single randomized treatment, the randomization
cannot buy us the identification on the relationship between the two outcomes. To make progress,
later we will consider estimates of the mapping between money and votes.
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and what factors vary this support? The next section probes these questions in order
to uncover the sources of the financial incumbency advantage.
3.5 Sources of the Financial Incumbency Advantage
Correlationally, incumbents in both federal and state legislatures have a sizable finan-
cial advantage (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Hogan 2000; Krasno, Green, and
Cowden 1994; Jacobson 2009; Magee 2012; Moncrief 1992). The existing literature pro-
poses many mechanisms behind this “financial incumbency advantage.” We focus on
the three popular theories to which our data can speak. Strategic contributors might
use campaign donations to buy access to the political system, making them more likely
to target incumbents because they have a higher probability of being in office after the
next election (Snyder 1990; Cassie and Thompson 1998). Incumbents might exploit
the direct benefits of being in office to attract contributors, e.g., the franking privilege
(Herrnson 1992; Levitt and Wolfram 1997). Or, incumbents might become more skilled
at fundraising and might be able to build valuable connections to potential contribu-
tors while in office (Cho and Gimpel 2007; Squire and Wright 1990). We test each of
these theories in turn, and we find strong support for an access-oriented theory of the
financial incumbency advantage. We find less support for theories that rest on in-office
experience or office-holder benefits.
Testing Theories of Interest Group Access
The first explanation is based on the differing attitudes of contributors towards in-
cumbents and challengers. Strategic interest groups ought to invest in the political
campaigns that give them the highest return in terms of political benefits. Access-
motivated interest groups — groups that care more about access to the political system
than ideology — will invest more in incumbents’ campaigns, for a variety of reasons.
Donations to incumbents may grant immediate access to those in office. Perhaps more
importantly, given the presence of an electoral incumbency advantage, incumbents are
likely to stay in office for a long time, providing a higher return to investment for interest
groups.
Snyder (1992: 17) presents a strong argument for why strategic interest groups should
target incumbents with their contributions:
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“...contributors must develop a relationship of mutual trust and respect
with officeholders in order to receive tangible rewards for contributions. A
contributor cannot simply buy a congressman’s vote on an important bill
with a $5,000 campaign donation. Large donations over several elections,
however, together with intelligent, informative discussions about matters of
concern to the contributor, may eventually yield considerable benefits.”
As Snyder (1992) shows, the desire for access differentiates these strategic groups from
other donors, like individuals and ideological groups, who care instead about supporting
the electoral bids of candidates with particular ideological positions. We might therefore
expect to observe differential responses to incumbency by strategic groups and other
donors, respectively.
If the jump in campaign contributions is caused by “investor” or access-motivated in-
terest groups who focus their contributions on incumbents, one would expect to observe
a difference in the treatment effect for different subgroups of contributors. More specifi-
cally, the effect on contributions from access-motivated or investor interest groups should
be greater than the effect for ideologically-motivated or consumption-based donors. Sny-
der (1990) shows that individuals and non-connected PACs can be seen as consumption
contributors because they contribute to promote a certain cause or ideology, while PACs
associated with corporations, unions, THM and cooperatives can be seen as “investor
contributors” because they tend to support candidates financially in exchange for access
to the political system in the event that the candidate is elected.
To investigate this theory, we estimate equations of the form
Dem Shareij,t+1 = β0 + β1Dit + β2Investor j + β3(DitInvestor j) + f(Vit) + i,t+1 (3.4)
where Investorijt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if donor j is an investor group
and all other variables are defined as before. At the federal level, we follow Snyder
(1990) and define consumer contributors as individuals and non-connected PACs, and
investor contributors as every other donating interest group. At the state level, we apply
a similar classification and define consumer contributors as individuals and ideological
interest groups, and investor contributors as every other donating interest group. As
Equation 3.4 implies, we reshape the data such that we have two observations for each
district-year: one observation pertaining to the Democratic Party’s share of investor
contributions and the other pertaining to the Democratic Party’s share of consumer
contributions.
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In columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.2, we formally test whether there is heterogeneity in
the treatment effect across contributions donated by investor and consumer contributors
at the federal level and the state level, respectively. The relevant quantity of interest
is β3 from Equation 3.4. For simplicity, we report results using a 5 percentage-point
bandwidth with local linear regression for this and all subsequent analyses. However,
as suggested by Table 3.1, all results are highly stable across bandwidths and specifica-
tions. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the interaction terms in
both columns demonstrate that party incumbency has a greater impact on campaign
contributions for access-motivated contributors. While consumer-motivated donors in
the U.S. House contribute 16.57 percentage points more of all their donations to the in-
cumbent party in the next election cycle, access-oriented interest groups—“investors”—
increase the percentage of donations they direct to the incumbent party by 40.52 points
(16.57 + 23.95 = 40.52). The effect for investors is more than 2.4 times as large as
for consumer contributors. This difference is even larger in state legislatures, where
the effect for investors is nearly 32 percentage points (9.52 + 22.03 = 31.55), 3.3 times
larger than the effect for non-investors.
This is not the same as saying that access-motivated contributors donate more, on
average, to incumbents, which could be driven in part by these contributors preferring,
e.g., higher quality candidates – rather, this is evidence that access-motivated contrib-
utors change their contribution patterns based purely on incumbency status in a way
other donors do not.
In the Appendix, we calculate the difference in these effects in terms of overall
dollars, rather than in percentages. In the U.S. House, investors direct $165,700 more
to the Democratic party after it wins a close election. The overall financial incumbency
advantage in levels in the U.S. House is $275,600, as the first column of Table 3 shows.
Access-oriented interest groups are therefore responsible for roughly 60% of the financial
incumbency advantage in the House. In state legislatures, this relationship is even more
pronounced. Here, the investor-specific effect is roughly $20,000, comprising 71% of the
financial incumbency advantage.
To evaluate this causal mechanism further, we obtain industry-specific estimates of
the financial incumbency advantage by reestimating Equation 3.3 (the baseline specifi-
cation from the previous section) using industry-specific outcome variables. Figure 3.2
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presents the estimated RDD effects for the different types of contributors at the state
and federal levels, respectively. The general pattern at both the federal and state level
appears to be the same: the effect is smaller for consumer contributors (non-connected
PACs/ideological groups and individuals) than for investor contributors.
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Figure 3.2 – Sensitivity of different interest group industries to
incumbency. Estimates are from separate RDDs where the outcome
is the share of contributions at t + 1 from that industry that flow to
the incumbent in the subsequent electoral cycle.
The access hypothesis also implies that, among strategic interest groups, those with
less ideological leanings ought to respond more strongly to incumbency. Labor unions,
though perhaps strategic, are also deeply linked to the Democratic party. Therefore,
they are unlikely to shift donations to the Republican party, even if the Republican can-
didate wins election. Corporations, on the other hand, are less beholden to one party,
and so should switch donations between the two parties more readily. The estimates pre-
sented in Figure 3.2 are consistent with this story: the jump in campaign contributions
to the Democratic party after a Democratic win is greater for corporate contributions
(approximately 50–70%) than for labor contributions (approximately 20%). Ideological
groups in state legislatures – groups that are formed for a single issue – likewise are
somewhat insensitive to incumbency because of their ideological leanings. Less ideo-
logical groups, who require access to state government in order to further their policy
goals, exhibit a high degree of sensitivity.
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Industries that are highly regulated, and industries that underwent significant changes
in their regulatory environment during the studied period, such as energy, technology,
healthcare, and transportation (Joskow 2005; Kearney and Merrill 1998), appear to be
particularly inclined to channel their resources towards incumbents in state legislatures.
In other words, the industries that have the most to win or lose from new government
regulation are the same industries that seem to coordinate and target their contribu-
tions towards incumbents. Though the classifications are coarser at the federal level,
the same general pattern is observed. Strategic interest groups still value access to the
incumbent, even when the incumbent is of the opposite party – evidence of the sheer
importance of access.26
Testing Theories of Office Holder Benefits
The second explanation for the financial incumbency advantage is based on the benefits
associated with being in office. Under this explanation, direct office-holder advantages
“that House members use to attract electoral support [...] also help them to raise
campaign money. Nonincumbents possess none of these advantages” (Herrnson 1992: p.
862). The franking privilege makes direct-mail solicitation easier for incumbents (Herrn-
son 1992; Jones and Hopkins 1985) and traveling benefits give incumbents an advantage
in attracting new contributors via personal visits (Shaw and Gimpel 2012), to pick two
examples. It is easier for a member of the U.S. House to exploit these direct bene-
fits in her own congressional district than outside it (Fenno 1978). For example, the
franking privilege can only be used to send mail to addresses in an incumbent’s own
congressional district, and in-state fundraising activities can more easily be disguised
as expenses related to a Representative’s district office than out-of-state fund-raising
activities.27 These observations generate a clear prediction for this theory.
If the observed jump in incumbent-party campaign receipts is caused by incumbents
26This “access” could take the form of donors asking for favors, but it could equally result from incum-
bents holding interest groups over a barrel, demanding donations in exchange for favorable political
actions. These opposite (but not mutually exclusive) possibilities should be investigated further.
27Members of Congress have not been able to send mass mail outside their districts since 1992 when
the provision that previously permitted this was ruled unconstitutional. See for example Glassman
(2007). In regressions not reported in the paper, we have tested for in-state vs. out-of-state effects
before and after 1992. Donors do appear slightly more sensitive to the geographical distinctions after
1992, but the differences are not statistically significant.
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who use direct office-holding benefits to attract more campaign contributions, then we
would expect the jump in campaign contributions coming from home-state contributors
to be far greater than the jump in campaign contributions coming from out-of-state
contributors.28 Indeed, were office-holder benefits the only cause of the financial incum-
bency advantage, we might imagine out-of-state donors to ignore incumbents almost
completely.
To test this, we estimate the equation
Dem Shareij,t+1 = β0 +β1Dit+β2Home Stateijt+β3(DitHome Stateijt)+f(Vit)+i,t+1
(3.5)
where Dem Shareij,t+1 is the share of donations in district i flowing to the Democratic
party in election t + 1 from either in state (j = 1) or from out of state (j = 0). The
variable Home Stateijt is an indicator variable taking the value one if donor j is in
district i’s state.29
The fourth column in Table 3.2 shows how the financial incumbency advantage varies
across home-state and out-of-state contributions.30 The coefficient of interest is β3 from
Equation 3.5, the interaction of the treatment with the home state indicator. As the
results show, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that in-state and out-of-state con-
tributors respond to incumbency in the same manner. Furthermore, the point estimate
on β3 is small, and out-of-state donors, who presumably do not gain from office-holder
benefits, still respond extremely strongly to incumbency. Indeed, incumbency causes
a 33.52 percentage-point gain in the share of all out-of-state donations a candidate re-
ceives, despite the fact that out-of-state donors are unlikely to gain from the incumbent’s
office-holder benefits.31
28We use the distinction between home-state vs. out-of-state contributors instead of in-district vs. out-
of-district contributors for a practical reason: postal codes cut across congressional districts but they
do not across state lines. This means that we can always identify the state of a contributor but not
always the congressional district. To avoid any misclassification, we focus on whether contributions
are coming from the same state as the Representative or not.
29Contributions from individuals are excluded from this analysis because FEC’s data do not contain
the addresses of all individuals who donated.
30In order to examine the heterogeneity across in-state and out-of-state contributors, we reshape the
data such that we have two observations for each district-year: One observation pertaining to the
Democratic Party’s share of in-state contribution and the other pertaining to the Democratic Party’s
share of out-of-state contributions.
31We cannot conclude from this test that office holding benefits do not matter at all; the home-state
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Table 3.2 – Heterogeneity in Treatment Effect Across Loca-
tions, Type of Contributors, and Seniority of Candidate.
Dependent Variable:
Democratic share of total contributions,t+ 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat Win
(time t) 16.57∗ 9.52∗ 36.53∗ 27.02∗
(3.04) (1.40) (5.04) (4.06)
Investor Contribution ×
Democrat Win (time t) 23.95∗ 22.03∗
(2.79) (1.28)
Investor Contributor -1.89 -7.06∗
(1.99) (0.88)
Home State Contribution ×
Democratic Win 6.43
(4.22)
Home State Contribution -9.37∗
(2.96)
Previously Held Office
× Democrat Win -5.05
(4.02)
Previously Held Office -4.59
(3.19)
Constant 36.03∗ 42.48∗ 30.31∗ 38.72∗
(2.04) (0.98) (3.27) (2.80)
Observations 1136 7967 713 568
Level Federal State Federal Federal
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The reported standard errors are the maximum of robust
and robust standard errors clustered by elections. All models are estimated using OLS with a linear
specification of the forcing variable estimated separately on each side of the discontinuity. The outcome
variables in all models are the Democratic party’s share of total contributions at t + 1 in percentage
points. All models are estimated based on a 5 pct. bandwidth. ∗ p < 0.05.
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Testing Theories of Experience
The third explanation is based on experience: “Fundraising aptitude is cultivated and
learned, not inborn” (Squire and Wright 1990; Cho and Gimpel 2007: p. 255). Over
time politicians learn certain skills and acquire knowledge that facilitate fundraising, and
challengers are disadvantaged because “this knowledge is often limited to incumbents”
(Cho and Gimpel 2007: p. 255). For example, political networking is probably more
effective in Washington D.C. than in a small congressional district far from the Capitol.
This means that compared to a challenger, it is easier for an elected politician who
spends a lot of time in Washington D.C. to develop a network of important lobbyists,
interest groups, corporations and individuals that could contribute to her campaign. If
the jump in campaign contributions is driven by incumbents who gradually become more
experienced and acquire skills, contacts, etc. over the period of time they are in office,
we would expect heterogeneity in the treatment effect across first-time incumbents and
more experienced incumbents.
To test this, we estimate the equation
Dem Sharei,t+1 = β0+ β1Dit +β2Held Office Beforeit + (3.6)
β3(DitHeld Office Beforeit) + f(Vit) + i,t+1
where all variables are defined as before and Held Office Beforeit is a dummy indicating
that the Democratic candidate in district i at time t previously held a seat in the U.S.
House. The coefficient of interest is β3, the interaction that tests whether the effect is
larger for previous incumbents. Again, we use a 5 percentage-point bandwidth around
the discontinuity.
The results presented in column 4 in Table 3.2 do not support the seniority hypoth-
esis, either. If seniority were driving the jump in campaign contributions, we would
expect a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term, β3
from Equation 3.7, which directly tests the prediction that the effect should be larger
effect is, of course, still large and positive. It is possible that home-state donors are responding to
office holding benefits while out-of-state donors are responding to other factors that in-state donors
do not care about. But we can certainly rule out that office holder benefits are the only large driver
of the financial incumbency advantage, since donors continue to reward incumbency even when they
cannot plausibly receive these benefits.
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for those who have held office before. However, the coefficient is negative, and we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that it is zero.
Carrying this idea further, we can also test for the effect of differing levels of seniority
on the financial incumbency advantage. To do so, we restrict the sample to only elections
in which: an incumbent is running for reelection at time t and, at time t+ 1, either the
same incumbent is running again having gained reelection at time t, or, if she lost at
time t, her replacement is running as an incumbent at time t+ 1.32 To put this another
way, the “treatment” group is the set of districts in which the senior incumbent wins
reelection at time t, and the “control” group is the set of districts in which a new junior
incumbent wins election at time t. The outcome variable is the incumbent share of all
donations at time t+ 1 – either the senior incumbent’s share, if the district is treated,
or the junior incumbent’s share, if the district is a control district.
Thus we estimate equations of the form
Inc Sharei,t+1 = β0 + β1Inc Winner it + f(Sit) + i,t+1 (3.7)
where Inc Sharei,t+1 is the share of all contributions that go to the incumbent running
for reelection in election t + 1 in district i. The variable Inc Winner it is an indicator
variable that takes the value one when district i reelects the incumbent candidate in
election t. The function f(Sit) represents the function of the (new) running variable,
the incumbent’s vote share (rather than the Democrat’s vote share like before). Again,
we use a 5 percentage-point bandwidth around the discontinuity.
We estimate this equation first using all incumbents. In this case, the question being
tested is: does an incumbent who wins reelection receive more money than a candidate
running as an incumbent for the first time? This is a different question from the original
RDD, in which we compared outcomes when one party had incumbency status vs.
32Typically selecting on the decision to run again induces bias in the RDD. Here, however, this selection
occurs both in the treated districts (selecting on the senior incumbent running again) and in the
control districts (selecting on the junior incumbent running again). As long as senior incumbents and
junior incumbents do not differ in this form of selection bias, the estimates will be unbiased. Even if
they do, the comparison across estimates will not be biased so long as the difference in the selection
effect is constant across levels of seniority among the senior incumbents. What is more, even if there is
such differential selection bias, it will bias us towards finding higher effects at higher levels of seniority,
which is not what we find.
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Figure 3.3 – Testing the experience hypothesis. The financial
incumbency is flat across levels of incumbent seniority. Each point is
an estimate from a separate RDD using the indicated seniority cutoff.
when the other party had incumbency status. In that case, the “treated” districts
had Democratic incumbents and “control” districts had Democratic challengers. In this
case, “treated” districts have representatives who have served at least one previous term
while “control” districts have first-time incumbents.
Next we subset the data to only incumbents with at least two terms of service at
time t who run for reelection at time t + 1, and then three, and so on.33 In each case,
we are testing the question: when an incumbent with x or more terms of seniority wins
reelection, does she get more money than a first-time incumbent running for reelection?
Under the experience hypothesis, the advantage to the incumbent should increase across
these estimates.
Figure 3.3 plots the estimated effect across levels of seniority. For each level of
seniority on the horizontal axis, we reestimated the RDD using only elections in which
33When comparing across RDD estimates, we are performing a somewhat-observational study. Seniority
is, of course, not randomly assigned. Nevertheless, we suspect the comparison is informative. It is
hard to propose a source of selection bias that would make the effect appear flat across levels of
seniority. For example, incumbents in close elections may be lower quality than other incumbents.
This would not flatten out the effects across levels of seniority unless incumbents in close elections
became increasingly low quality over time.
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one incumbent with at least that level of seniority was running.34 If experience is
valuable, we should see the effect increase across levels of seniority. Instead, the line
is flat. Indeed, the effect is very small even for one-term incumbents, suggesting that
almost all of the gain in campaign contributions occurs in the very first reelection
campaign.35
3.6 Conclusion
There is a large financial incumbency advantage in U.S. legislatures. Depending on the
value of money for electoral security, this advantage may explain a significant portion
of the electoral incumbency advantage. But this advantage does not come equally from
all donors. Instead, while individuals and ideological interest groups support candi-
dates based on a variety of other factors, access-motivated interest groups coordinate
intensively on incumbents. As a result, access-motivated interest groups generate ap-
proximately two-thirds of the financial incumbency advantage.
Uncovering the sources of the financial incumbency advantage also informs theories
of representation. We find that in-state donors respond to incumbency in the same man-
ner as out-of-state donors, suggesting that incumbents do not provide tailored benefits
to local groups through the use of their office, and we find even stronger evidence that
the financial advantage of incumbents does not depend on how long they have served
in the legislature. Although office benefits and seniority are still no doubt important
factors in other parts of the political process—and indeed may still help create the
electoral incumbency advantage—their connection to campaign finance is limited.
On the other hand, strategic interest groups are highly sensitive to incumbency.
Even among these groups, the more regulated and less ideological account for a larger
share of the advantage. By investing in incumbents over time, these interest groups
are able to create long-lasting connections that can pay off in a variety of unobservable
ways. While such an access advantage has long been understood from a theoretical
34We drop the 33 cases in the data in which two incumbents run against each other.
35The logic is as follows. When we compare Democratic winners to Democratic losers, we see that
incumbency, overall, causes a large increase in donations. When we then compare repeat-incumbents
to first-time incumbents, we see that the effect is near zero. Logically, then, the largest increase
must be between the time a candidate runs as a challenger and the first time she runs again as an
incumbent.
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perspective (e.g., Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1960), its precise magnitude, along with
its basis in the modern American campaign finance system, has been obscure.
The electoral incumbency advantage may provide elected officials with poor incen-
tives if it insulates them from reelection concerns and thus leads them to exert less
effort on behalf of their constituents. However, it is also possible that the electoral
advantage we observe is simply the result of incumbents behaving “well” and being
rewarded by voters, in equilibrium. The financial incumbency advantage we uncover is
consistent with the former view. Strategic interest groups with particular goals—like
the policy desires of regulated industries—coordinate to support incumbents financially.
This financial support offers incumbents an amount of electoral security independent
from the actions they take on behalf of their constituents if, as seems likely, strategic
interest groups differ from constituents in their preferences for policy and other forms
of government activity.
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Chapter 4
Who Values Agenda Setters in
American Legislatures?
Theories of legislative politics claim that agenda-setting institutions affect policy. Yet,
data limitations have prevented scholars from assessing the conditions under which
agenda control is valuable to legislators and groups seeking influence on policy. I collect
a new dataset on more than 20,000 committee chairs, vice chairs and party leaders in the
state legislatures (1990-2010) and link it to detailed information on campaign donations.
Using a difference-in-difference design, I assess the price that firms and groups are willing
to pay for access to committee and party leaders and document how it varies across
industries and institutions. I show that firms are particularly sensitive to agenda setters
regulating their industry. Consistent with theories of legislative organization, chairs are
shown to be more valuable when committees can block bills, and party leaders more
valuable when controlling the bill referral process. Finally, the value of party leaders
has increased dramatically in recent years.
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4.1 Introduction
Campaign donors devote substantial resources to candidates running in legislative races.
In the 2014 electoral cycle, donors contributed more than 1.3 and 2.1 billion dollars to
legislative candidates in federal and state elections, respectively.1 Legislators apparently
place great import on these donations: They spend hours every day on the phone
soliciting contributions and participating in other fundraising activities, and campaign
donors are given privileged access when scheduling meetings with legislators (Kalla and
Broockman 2015).
Given the substantial amounts spent on legislative campaigns and the efforts leg-
islators exert to attract their share of donations, it is somewhat surprising that most
studies fail to show that campaign contributions have any influence on how legislators
behave (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Grenzke 1989; Eggers and Hain-
mueller 2013; Langbein 1993; Wright 1990). According to the amassed documentation
of roll-call votes, legislators are not more likely to vote in favor of bills benefiting their
financial supporters. In a review of this literature, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
Snyder (2003: p. 114) conclude:
Overall, PAC contributions show relatively few effects on voting behavior.
In three out of four instances, campaign contributions had no statistically
significant effects on legislation or had the “wrong” sign – suggesting that
more contributions lead to less support.
This puzzling pattern begs the question: If campaign contributions do not influence
voting behavior, what, if anything, do contributors get in return for their financial
support?
In this paper, I provide new empirical evidence suggesting that donors use campaign
contributions to secure access to legislators with institutional control over the legislative
agenda. On the basis of new data, I argue that donations are not used to buy floor
voting coalitions, but, rather, are carefully targeted towards key legislators who may
have the power to influence bills in the pre-floor stage of lawmaking.
The idea that agenda control is a valuable asset, clearly, is not new: Agenda-setting
power is one of the core concepts in political science; extensive theoretical literature
1Source (federal): http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?y=2014&f-core=1&f-fc=1&c-exi=1.
Source (state): http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?y=2014&f-core=1&f-fc=2&c-exi=1
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is devoted to the topic, and in American politics in particular. However, in contrast
to the substantial theoretical literature on agenda setting, and in contrast to the ex-
tensive empirical literature on the financial advantages enjoyed by incumbents relative
to challengers (Fouirnaies and Hall 2014), our empirical understanding of the way that
agenda-setting powers affect the allocation of campaign contributions is relatively lim-
ited. The lack of evidence reflects that the turnover rate for party and committee leaders
is relatively low and that the institutional variation is almost non-existing at the federal
level. Limited variation makes it difficult to assess by whom and under what conditions
agenda setters are deemed valuable.
To get empirical leverage, I exploit the rich variation in the 99 state legislative
chambers. The analyses focus on the two most important institutional assets identified
in the theoretical literature on legislative organization – party leadership and committee
chairmanship (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Shepsle and Weingast 1987;
Wilson 1956). I collected a new dataset of more than 20,000 observations on the identity
of every chairman and vice chairman of all standing and joint committees, as well as
of every minority and majority party leader across the state legislatures for each year
during the period 1990-2010.
Disentangling the value of agenda control from confounding factors is not a trivial
matter. Committee and party leader positions are clearly not randomly assigned, and
na¨ıve comparisons across legislators only yield causal effects under very strong, implau-
sible assumptions. To address various selection issues, I exploit the panel structure of
the data by implementing a simple difference-in-difference design. The basic idea is to
compare the contributions that flow to an individual legislator before and after they
attain a party- or committee-leader position while differencing out general trends across
all legislators in the chamber.
The results reveal three important patterns. First, sensitivity to agenda control
varies substantially among donors, and the most sensitive industries are the ones that
are licensed or regulated at the state level, such as the insurance industry. In particular,
industries value access to committee leaders by whom they are primarily regulated, more
than they value other agenda setters. Second, the campaign-finance value of party
leaders increases when they control the process of referring bills to committees, and
the value of committee leaders increases when institutional rules permit committees to
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block bills from reaching the chamber floor. Thirdly, while the campaign-finance value
of committee leaders has remained relatively stable over the studied period, I show that
the value of party leaders has grown substantially in recent years, suggesting that party
leaders may have become more powerful.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review the existing literature to
discuss the motivation for donating money to committee and party leaders. Second,
I introduce the new dataset and describe the identification strategy. Then, I present
the main results and the results disaggregated by industries. In the two next sections,
I analyze the institutional conditions under which committee and party leaders are
deemed most valuable. After that, I show how the effects have changed over time.
Finally, I conclude.
4.2 Institutional Assets and Campaign Finance
Scholars have long been interested in the market for public policy (McCormick and
Tollison 1981; Peltzman 1976). Many studies of American politics have focused on how
legislative institutions shape the distribution of political capital among legislators and
how interest groups respond to this distribution.
In a seminal study, Denzau and Munger (1986) use a formal model to examine
how legislative productivity affects campaign contributions. They study the interaction
between vote-maximizing legislators, welfare-maximizing voters, and special interest
groups seeking influence in order to derive a supply price for public policy. A key result
is that a legislator’s public policy supply price depends on their productivity, which in
turn is determined by their portfolio of parliamentary rights. In equilibrium, interest
groups will naturally target legislators endowed with important parliamentary rights
because it is less costly for these legislators to influence public policy.
In this paper, I focus on two groups of legislators who, according to the literature,
are particularly productive, enjoying institutional privileges that enhance their ability
to influence public policy: Party leaders and committee chairs.
In the literature concerning legislative organization in American politics, party lead-
ers are considered to be central agents, and one of the central debates revolves around
the question of whether party leaders influence public policy (Aldrich 1995; Cox and
McCubbins 1986, 1993, 2005; Rohde 1991), or whether they are superfluous agents with
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no political influence (Krehbiel 1992, 1993, 2010). The theory of Conditional Party
Government developed by Rohde (1991) and Aldrich (1995) conceptualizes parties as
a floor-voting coalitions. The strengths and weaknesses of parties are determined by
the distribution of preferences within and between the two major parties. The pri-
mary claim is that the willingness of legislators to delegate power to party leaders is
conditional on interparty polarization and intraparty homogeneity in preferences. The
theory of the Cartel Party developed by Cox and McCubbins (1986, 1993, 2005) concep-
tualizes parties as procedural coalitions. In this theory, party strength is explained by
the institutional rules and procedures that allow the majority-party leaders to control
the political agenda. The institutional setup in American legislatures endows majority-
party leaders with certain privileges, such as the ability to appoint committee chairs,
refer bills to committees, and to schedule the legislative agenda. Party leaders use neg-
ative agenda control to prevent bills that are opposed by a majority of legislators within
the majority party from reaching the chamber floor. In return, junior party members
do not vote against the party leadership on important procedural bills.
Consistent with these partisan theories, scholars have documented that lobbyists,
journalists and legislators themselves perceive party leaders as more productive than
other members of the legislature (Miquel and Snyder Jr 2006), and studies have shown
that PACs also value party leadership positions in the US House (Ansolabehere and
Snyder Jr 1998).
Committee chairmen are perceived as crucial agents in the legislative process by most
scholars. Most of the legwork in American legislatures is undertaken by committees. The
committee system allows members to gain knowledge and expertise in their respective
fields via a division of labor and specialization in a variety of policy areas. Committee
chairs are particularly important because they organize most aspects of the committees’
work: Among other things, committee chairs schedule meetings, set the agenda, invite
interest groups to participate in hearings, and draft and amend bills, also deciding if
and when they are to be reported to the floor. Not surprisingly, committee chairs are
amongst the most productive legislators as measured by the number of sponsored bills
reported to the floor and passed by the legislature (Cox and Terry 2008; Frantzich
1979), as well as by opinion surveys of legislators and lobbyists (Miquel and Snyder Jr
2006). Committee and subcommittee chairs are also crucial players in the process of
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distributing of public outlays (Berry and Fowler forthcoming).
Several empirical studies have been conducted on the campaign-finance value of
committee membership and leadership. These studies have shown that at the federal
level lobbyists and donating interest groups value assignments to powerful committees
(Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014; Grier and Munger 1986, 1991; Grimmer and
Powell 2013; Munger 1989; Stratmann 1998; Romer and Snyder Jr 1994; Vidal, Draca,
and Fons-Rosen 2012) and to committee leadership positions (Ansolabehere and Sny-
der Jr 1998). Many studies posit that committee chairs are particularly valuable to
organized interests who operate within the purview of the committee, but due to the
limited variation in committee leadership it has been difficult to substantiate these
claims.
To sum up, there are theoretical reasons for believing that interest groups value
agenda-setting assets such as committee- and party-leader positions. Empirically, how-
ever, we know relatively little about the interest groups who value these assets and the
conditions under which they do so. The intent of this paper is to fill the gap that exists
in the empirical literature. In the next section, I outline how I intend to do this and
describe the empirical strategy employed in the paper.
4.3 New Data on Committee and Party Leaders in the
State Legislatures 1990-2010
To assess how groups value of committee and party leaders, I collected a new dataset
on the identity of committee chairs, vice chairs and legislative leaders in the state
legislatures. The dataset covers all standing and joint committees from 1990 to 2010
across all 99 state legislative chambers, as well as information on the following party
leadership positions: Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Speaker of the House, President
of the Senate, President Pro Tempore, party whips, and floor and caucus leaders from
both parties.
The primary source is quarterly editions of The State Yellow Book published during
the period 1990-2010 (Leadership Directories 2014). In cases where the relevant infor-
mation in these volumes is missing or in other ways incomplete, I supplement it with
information collected from archival material, such as legislative minutes and proceed-
ings, obtained from state legislative archives.
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I start by producing a list of all legislators in a given session. For each legislator in
a given year, I construct two vectors in which the elements are the recorded names of
any committee on which they served as chairman or vice chairman, and a third vector
containing any leadership positions held during the session. Based on name, party
and district number (or district name), I then link the information pertaining to each
legislator in a given session to the unique candidate identifier and election year in the
ICPSR dataset 34297 (Klarner et al. 2013). This will enable other researchers to easily
use the data in future studies of committee and party leadership in state legislatures.
Table 4.1 – # Legislator-session Observations by state and
chamber, 1990-2010.
State Leader Chair Rank-and-file State Leader Chair Rank-and-file
AK 63 215 239 AL 36 280 523
AR 97 155 957 AZ 122 288 490
CA 119 413 468 CO 110 156 558
CT 318 359 1193 DE 73 225 239
FL 126 444 870 GA 128 545 1687
HI 210 213 225 IA 198 270 798
ID 90 239 742 IL 228 439 848
IN 163 278 809 KS 87 273 1050
KY 90 235 865 LA 20 167 368
MA 138 251 1611 MD 127 110 891
ME 90 165 1605 MI 178 300 850
MN 167 329 1313 MO 91 484 1225
MS 18 348 504 MT 107 218 927
NC 136 683 881 ND 73 157 750
NE 7 110 127 NH 178 291 3771
NJ 195 264 581 NM 67 192 608
NV 131 117 278 NY 257 615 1242
OH 132 263 761 OK 234 321 695
OR 144 189 417 PA 72 594 1614
RI 185 153 1010 SC 45 172 1204
SD 178 181 691 TN 119 194 843
TX 31 449 1222 UT 100 189 606
VA 54 233 913 VT 87 236 1477
WA 194 307 723 WI 89 405 662
WV 99 306 765 WY 90 155 524
Total 6091 14175 44220
The data is reorganized such that each row correspond to a legislator, i, in a given
session, t. During the period 1990-2010, we observe approximately 6,000 party leaders,
14,000 committee chairs and 44,000 rank-and-file members. Table 4.1 reports how these
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legislator-session observations are distributed across states.
The next step is to link the data on legislators to information on campaign con-
tributions donated to each legislator, i, during the period of each session, t. The
data on campaign contributions in US state legislatures is obtained from the non-
partisan organization The National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP) via
www.followthemoney.com. This data, which is based on candidate filings to authorities
overseeing state-level campaign finance regulations, contains information on donations
to candidates in legislative races across all 99 chambers. Using categorizations of donors
by NIMSP, I sum up donations based on types of donors to the level of 69 industries.
Since my main interest in this paper is how firms and industry organizations respond
to agenda setters, I exclude donations from individuals, ideological donors as well as
unions. Furthermore, to ensure that the contribution variables do not conflate money
flowing to an individual candidate’s campaign with fundraising on behalf of the party,
I exclude all donations to leadership PACs.
Based on state, party, district, candidate name and election year, I connect the
campaign finance data with the committee and leadership data. To minimize merging
errors stemming from minor differences in the spelling of candidate names in the two
datasets (e.g. matching “William Hanson” and “William Hansen”), I calculate the
Jaro-Winkler distance, a measure of similarity of strings, between the names of the
candidates in the two datasets and match the most similar name strings within a given
district, party and year.2 In the rare cases where a candidate appears in the Klarner
et al. (2013) dataset, but not in the NIMSP data, I code the candidates’ contributions
as zero.3 For some states, the campaign finance data extends back to 1990, whereas for
others it does not start until the middle or late 1990s. Table B.1 in the Appendix shows,
state by state, the period for which data on campaign contributions is available as well
as the total number of observations in the final sample. To ensure comparability across
years, I adjust all campaign contributions to 2014 constant prices using a standard
Consumer Prices Index.4 Table 4.2 reports the basic summary statistics of some of the
2For details on the Jaro-Winkler calculations, see Winkler (1990) and https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Jaro%E2%80%93Winkler_distance
3When possible, I consult the original campaign finance files to confirm that the candidate in question
did not receive any campaign contributions
4The Consumer Price Index can be downloaded from the website http://data.bls.gov/. Series Id:
CUSR0000SA0
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key variables used in the analysis.
To analyze how the campaign-finance value of committee and party leaders vary
across institutional settings, I also collect data on the institutional rules governing the
bill referral process. This information is primarily obtained from annual editions of
Book of the States published by the non-partisan organization The Council of State
Governments during the period 1990-2010 (Council of State Governments 1990). For
each chamber, I record whether the authority to refer bills to committees primarily rests
with the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, the President Pro Tem, the
Majority Leader, a Committee on Referrals, the Rules Committee, or if the authority is
delegated to anyone else. After linking this data to the dataset on committee and party
leaders, I create a dummy equal to one if a given legislator is responsible for referring
bills to committees. In the chambers where the authority is delegated to a committee
(Committee on Rules, Committee on Referrals), I code the variable 1 for the chair of
that committee, and zero otherwise.
Data on institutional rules governing whether or not committees can reject report-
ing bills to the chamber is obtained from Anzia and Jackman (2013). To construct
an indicator for majority-party status, I use the data on the partisan control of state
governments that have been collected and used in a series of papers by Klarner (2003).5
Information on limits on campaign contributions as well as the Squire Index of profes-
sionalization come from Barber (N.d.)’s replication data.
In Table 4.2, I provide basic summary statistics for key variables used in the analysis.
4.4 Empirical Strategy: A Difference-in-Difference Design
In this section, I outline how I use campaign contributions to quantify how different
groups value the institutional powers of committee and party leaders. From a method-
ological perspective, the main challenge is to isolate the institutional value from other
characteristics of committee and party leaders.
First, I define the key treatment variables of interest. In the main analyses, I focus
on two dummies indicating whether a given legislator, i, is assigned a committee chair
or party leader position in a given session, t. The chairman treatment variable is defined
5The data can be downloaded from the following website: http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/
klarnerpolitics.htm
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Table 4.2 – Summary Statistics. The table reports the descriptive
statistics on key variables used in the analyses.
Lower Chambers Upper Chambers
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Chair 0.20 0.40 0.44 0.50
Leader 0.07 0.26 0.19 0.39
Industry Total 34377.14 98715.84 62499.43 1.2e+05
Agriculture 643.25 3147.91 1104.11 4630.63
Commerce 3193.15 15854.11 5573.36 19722.54
Communications 1236.40 6771.72 1841.17 6742.45
Construction 1515.97 6549.28 2731.37 8444.76
Defense 20.31 226.24 41.35 366.50
Energy 1971.85 7326.21 3167.26 9486.51
Finance 4316.69 17902.18 7126.05 20576.61
Health 3575.06 13745.00 6468.26 17543.29
Manufacturing 344.68 2296.15 646.53 9493.08
Transportation 1180.66 4243.67 2011.19 5468.58
Observations 30093 6996
Note: The reported statistics are calculated based on legislator-years. Standard deviations are reported
in parentheses.
in Equation 4.1.
chairit =
 1 if legislatori chairs any committee at time t0 otherwise. (4.1)
Similarly, the party leader treatment is defined as
leaderit =

1 if legislatori is majority leader, minority leader, speaker,
president, president pro tem, or whip at time t
0 otherwise.
(4.2)
If the committee and party leaders positions were assigned to a random subset of
legislators, a simple comparison of means would yield the average causal effect of the
treatments. In the absence of a randomized experiment, a simple comparison of contri-
butions would not, in all likelihood, reflect the causal effect. Committee chairs and party
leaders differ in many systematic ways that could have an influence on campaign contri-
butions. For example, high-quality legislators are more likely to serve as leaders, and,
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presumably, these qualifications also help them to attract campaign contributions. In
this example, a simple OLS regression based on cross-sectional data would overestimate
the true causal effects.
To deal with selection problems like this, I implement a simple panel difference-in-
difference design exploiting the fact that I observe each legislator over multiple sessions.
The idea is to compare the money that flows to an individual legislator before and
after they attain a committee- or party-leader position while differencing out general
trends in contributions in a given year. This design washes out all of the time-invariant
characteristics of a legislator (quality, party, basic ideology, charisma, etc.) as well as
shocks that are common to all legislators (trends in campaign contribution patterns,
mid-term effects etc.). Although the difference-in-difference design is by no means as
ideal as a randomized experiment, it does capture the causal effect based on assumptions
that are much weaker than those employed in the simple cross-sectional design, and there
are good reasons to believe that these assumptions are, in fact, justified in the current
setting.
The difference-in-difference design identifies the average causal effect under the key
assumption that the treated legislators would have followed the same trend as the non-
treated legislators in the absence of treatments. This assumption is likely to be satisfied
in the current setting because legislators cannot self-select into the treatment groups:
Appointments to party- and committee-leader positions are determined by many factors
that an individual legislator could not possibly manipulate single-handedly. Variation
in committee- and party-leader status is typically induced by changes in majority party
or by senior legislators who retire. These are factors are very difficult for an individual
legislator to control.
Based on the panel dataset, which I described in detail in the previous section, I use
OLS to estimate the following baseline equation
log(1 + contributionsit) = αi + δt + β1chairit + β2leaderit + xitθ + εit, (4.3)
where contributionsit measures the campaign contributions allocated to legislator i dur-
ing session t; chairit and leaderit are the dummy variables defined in equations 4.1 and
4.2, respectively; αi denotes legislator-fixed effects that control for time-invariant char-
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acteristics of a legislator; δt represents state-year fixed effects that control for common
shocks among legislators in a given year; xit is a vector of additional covariates; finally,
εit is the error term. β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest.
A priori, there are good reasons to believe that the identifying assumptions are sat-
isfied in this specific setting, but a few concerns still need to be addressed. First, one
might be concerned about selection into the sample caused by retiring legislators. Cam-
paign contributions are only observed for legislators who decide to run for re-election
between session t and t + 1. For obvious reasons one cannot observe campaign contri-
butions to retired candidates, and this might be a cause for concern if the decision to
retire is correlated with the treatments and related to campaign donations. Imagine,
for example, that following a shift in majority power, some of the legislators who pre-
viously served as committee chairs decide to retire. If the legislators who retire are the
ones who expect to receive few contributions without the chairman status, the sample
will be weighted towards the better performing legislators inducing a downward bias in
the chair coefficient. While this story seems plausible and less of a concern because it
biases against the expected findings, it is not possible to characterize, more generally,
the magnitude or direction of the bias without applying additional assumptions about
the motivations for retirement. To address this selection concern, I estimate the effects
using an alternative specification in which the unit of analysis is the district rather than
the individual legislator and report these estimates in Table B.3 in the Appendix. The
results from these statistical analyses are very consistent with the findings presented
in the paper, suggesting that the retirement selection issue is not a major cause for
concern.
Second, one might worry about trending legislators. Imagine, for example, that
legislators gradually become more skilled at fundraising and that senior legislators are
more likely to get promoted to party and committee leadership positions. Since seniority
would be correlated with the treatments and a predictor of the outcome, the parallel-
trends assumption would be violated inducing bias in the estimated coefficients. I deal
with the potential trending concerns in several ways. In the statistical analysis I include
a vector of additional covariates, xit, that allows for certain types of trending behavior.
The vector includes seniority dummies and a majority-party indicator. Furthermore, I
test whether the treatment assigned at time t can predict the outcomes at time t < 0
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and report these results in Figure B.2. These results suggest that the pre-treatment
effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
4.5 Main Results: The Value of Committee and Party
Leadership
The main results are presented in Table 4.3. The results from the baseline model without
additional covariates, presented in column 1, indicate that committee and party leader
positions are highly valuable institutional assets. On average, attaining a party leader
position causes a boost in campaign contributions in the magnitude of 0.32 log points,
whereas a committee chair position leads to a 0.26 log-point increase in contributions.
The results are highly statistically significant.
In the second model, I relax the common trends assumption by including seniority
dummies and a majority-party indicator. The estimated effects of committee chairs and
party leaders are almost identical to the results presented in column 1 suggesting that
trending, at least with respect to seniority and majority status, is not a major cause for
concern.
In model 3, I add a vice chair dummy to the regression in order to explore whether
industries narrowly target committee chairs or funnel money towards ranking committee
members more generally. The coefficient on the vice chair dummy is positive but only
marginally significant. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient on the chairman variable
is approximately 5 times larger than the coefficient on the vice chair variable. This
could indicate that firms and interest groups place great value on the procedural priv-
ileges enjoyed by the committee chairman, while they care less about access to senior
committee members per se.
In column 4, I report the results from a model in which I explore how the value of the
chair positions depends on the type of committee. I add a dummy indicating whether
the legislator chaired one of the committees that are often assumed to be among the
most powerful and prestigious: Rules, Ways & Means, Appropriations, and Finance.
The results indicate that chairs of less prestigious committees experience a boost of
approximately 0.2 log points when they are appointed to lead the committee, whereas
being appointed to chair one of the most the most prestigious committees causes a boost
in campaign contributions of approximately 0.48 log points (0.2+0.28). The difference
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Table 4.3 – Effect of Committee- and Party-leader Positions
on Industry Contributions. Party and committee leaders are
deemed valuable by firms and interest groups.
log(1+Industry Contributionsit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leader 0.32∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Chair 0.26∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vice 0.05† 0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
Chair of Top Committees 0.28∗∗
(0.07)
Majority Member 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 31397 31089 31089 31089
Legislators 9170 9097 9097 9097
Legislator Fixed Effects X X X X
State-Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Seniority Fixed Effects X X X
Note: All models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered on legislators and are reported
in parentheses.
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is substantial in magnitude and statistically significant.
In Tables B.4 and B.3 in the Appendix, I show that the results are robust when
measuring the outcome in percent of total donations instead of logged donations, as
well as when the difference-in-difference estimator is implemented at the level of the
district instead of the individual legislator. In the next section, I examine in details
how different industries value access committee and party leaders.
4.6 Regulated Industries Most Sensitive to Agenda Set-
ters
To explore how sensitivity to agenda-setting institutions vary across groups, I subset
the campaign finance data by donating industries and examine how these industries
respond to changes in institutional power. In particular, I compare how much money
an industry, j, donates to a legislator, i, before and after he attains an institutional
asset at time t. Using OLS, I estimate equations of the form:
log(contributionijt + 1) = αi + δt + β1,jchairit + β2,jleaderit + xitθ + εit, (4.4)
where contributionijt is the money donated to legislator i by industry j at time t; αi
and δt represent legislator- and state-year-fixed effects; chairit, and leaderit are the
variables defined in Equations 4.1, and 4.2, respectively; xit is a vector of additional
covariates including seniority dummies and majority-party status. The estimates of β1,j ,
β2,j , indicate the average value, as measured by campaign donations, that industry j
assigns to committee chairs and party leaders, respectively. In Figure 4.1, I report the
estimates for different industries.6
The figure illustrates that the sensitivity to leaders and committee chairs varies con-
siderably across industries. Some industries appear to be very sensitive to agenda-setting
institutions, while firms in other industries only change their donations marginally when
a legislator rises to power.
Industries that are heavily regulated at the state level appear to be very sensitive
to agenda setters. The insurance industry is perhaps the most notable example of an
6To deal with multiple-testing concerns, I report Bonferroni-adjusted confidence intervals.
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Figure 4.1 – Effect of Attaining Committee- and Party Leader
Positions on (log of) Contributions by Industry. Industries
that are regulated at the state level, such as insurance, health care,
and energy, are more sensitive to state legislative agenda setters than
industries that are less dependent on political decisions at the state
level, such as defense.
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Note: The x-axis shows the estimated effect of attaining a position of party leader and committee
chair on log(1+contributions) from the respective industry indicated on the y-axis. The bars indicate
the 95%-confidence interval. To deal with multiple-testing issues, the confidence intervals are adjusted
using Bonferroni corrections taking into account that I run the regressions for each of the 69 industries,
i.e. the lower bounds are calculated the following way: point estimate −Φ−1(1 − 0.05/69)× standard
error.
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industry which is primarily regulated at the state level. On average, firms and interest
groups in the insurance industry increase their contributions by approximately 0.6 log
points and 0.25 (or equivalently e0.6 − 1 ≈ 80% and e0.25 − 1 ≈ 28%) when a legislator
attains a leadership or a committee chair position, respectively. Similarly, firms and
interest groups in heavily regulated sectors such as health and energy also appear to be
very sensitive to agenda setters when allocating campaign contributions.
The state legislatures are responsible for administrating occupational licensing in a
number of industries (Kleiner and Krueger 2010). For example, the licensing of pharma-
cists, accountants, lawyers, health professionals is organized at the state level in all 50
states (Summers 2007). According to the estimates reported in Figure 4.1, these groups
are noticeably sensitive to agenda setters. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis
that interest groups representing licensed industries are “raising funds from members to
lobby the state legislature, particularly the chairs of appropriate committees” (Kleiner
and Krueger 2010: p. 678).
In contrast, the other end of the sensitivity spectrum is dominated by firms and
interest groups that are less affected by state-level policies, such as industries in the
Defense sector.
Do industries perceive donations to committee chairs and party leaders as invest-
ments in substitutable or complimentary assets? In Figure 4.2, I explore this question
more closely by plotting an industry’s estimated committee-chair sensitivity against its
sensitivity to party leaders. The figure reveals a very clear positive trend indicating
a strong positive correlation between sensitivity to committee and party leaders. This
could suggest that donating firms and interest groups value committee- and party-leader
positions as complementary assets, perhaps because successful lobbying involves control
over both the bill referral process and the committee stages of lawmaking. In the next
sections, I explore these questions more thoroughly.
4.7 Donors with Vested Interests Value Chairs Who Can
Block Bills
The variation across industries reported in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 could suggest that firms
and interest groups are more likely to target party and committee leaders in the state
legislatures when subject to state-level legislation and regulation. Although suggestive,
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Figure 4.2 – Industries Value Committee- and Party-Leader
Positions as Complementary Assets. Industry evaluations of com-
mittee and party leaders are strongly positively correlated, suggesting
that industries perceive the two types of leader positions as comple-
mentary assets rather than as substitutes.
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the results do not make it clear whether industries funnel money towards agenda setters
in an attempt to influence public policy.
To better understand the conditions under which firms and interest groups seek
access to agenda setters, I test two things in this section:
1. Are industries regulated by an issue-specific committee more sensitive to the chair
of that particular committee relative to other committee chairs?
2. Does the sensitivity of donors with interests in a given committee increase when
institutional rules allow committees to prevent bills from reaching the chamber
floor?
I use donations from non-interested industries as a benchmark for evaluating whether
industries with vested economic interests in a particular committee are particularly sen-
sitive to the chairman of that committee. I restrict the sample to ten industries for
which the industry-committee mappings are fairly clear and meaningful in most states:
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Agriculture, Energy, Insurance, Banking, Health, Transportation, Military Affairs, Con-
struction, Education, and General Business. I reshape the data such that each row is
uniquely identified by a legislator (i), committee/industry (j) and time (t).
First, I present a simple graphical difference-in-difference analysis. I define the treat-
ment group as legislators who, at some point in their careers, were appointed to chair
one of the committees listed above. For each legislator in the treatment group, I define
a variable, t, which measures the terms relative to the change in committee-chair status.
This means that the legislator is not chairing the committee when t ≤ 0; the legislator
is serving as chair when t > 0. I can now calculate the average contributions flowing to
legislators from the treated sector in both the pre- and post-treatment period. Further,
I construct a control group using donations to the same legislator from the remain-
ing, non-interested industries. More specifically, I calculate the average contributions
flowing from across all other industries to a legislator and match each of these control
observations with the legislator in a given year. Thus, the treatment group consists of
donations from industry j to legislator i before and after their appointment to commit-
tee chair, whereas the control group consists of the average donations from all other
industries to legislator i in a given year.
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Figure 4.3 – Effect of Attaining Chair Position on Donations
from Industries with Vested Interests. Committee chairs are
given special treatment by industries that are within the purviews of
the respective committees. The effect is most pronounced when in-
stitutional rules allow committees to prevent bills from reaching the
chamber floor.
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The graphical results are presented in Figure 4.3. I split the sample according to
the institutional rule governing whether or not committees can block bills from reaching
the chamber floor. The panels illustrate how chair-status affects money flowing from
industries that operate within the purview of the committee in question to the chair of
that committee. The vertical lines indicate the cutoff separating pre and post-treatment
period. The solid lines represent average donations from firms that are regulated by the
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legislator when t > 0, whereas the dashed lines represent money flowing to the same
legislator from industries that are not regulated by the committee in question.
In panel (a), I report the findings for the chambers in which committees have the au-
thority to block legislation from reaching the chamber floor. We see that the two groups
more or less follow the same common trend in the pre-treatment period: The donations
from the interested and non-interested industries roughly follow each other prior to the
term of the legislator’s assignment to the chair position. By simply eyeballing the graph,
it is clear that legislators experience a substantial boost in contributions from the indus-
tries they oversee immediately after they attain the industry-relevant committee-chair
position. This could suggest that industries may seek access to chairs in an attempt to
influence public policy to their advantage.
In panel (b), I report the results from the same exercise, but based on data from the
chambers in which committees cannot block bills from reaching the chamber floor. In
the periods before the legislator is appointed to the chair position, we see again that, on
average, donations from the affected and unaffected industries run relatively parallel to
one another, suggesting that it is not unreasonable to assume that the treatment and
control groups would have followed the same trends in the absence of treatment. In the
terms following the appointment to the chair position, we observe that donations from
the interested industries increase. Although there is a visible effect on donations from
industries with vested interests in the committee, the increase is moderate compared to
the substantial jump in panel (a).
Overall, the graphical evidence suggests that industries with vested interests in par-
ticular committees target the chairs of those committees, and that this donation pattern
is most pronounced when institutional rules allow committees to kill bills at the com-
mittee stage of lawmaking.
To further understand how the connection between regulated industries and com-
mittees affects the allocation of campaign contributions, I conduct a statistical analysis
with an additional control group. In this difference-in-difference-in-difference design, I
use donations from the industry in question to other legislators as an additional control
group. More specifically, I estimate the following model using OLS based on the data
described above:
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log(1 + contributionsijt) = αij + γit + δjt + β1chairijt + εit, (4.5)
where contributionsijt measures the donations that flow to legislator i from industry j
at time t; αij represents legislator-industry fixed effects that capture all time-invariant
legislator-industry factors, such as prior work experience in the industry, basic policy
preferences relating to industry regulation, etc.; γit denotes legislator-year fixed effects
that wash out all characteristics of a legislator in a given year which affects all industries
in the same way, such as leadership positions, majority status, as well as legislator trends,
etc.; δjt indicates industry-year fixed effects that control for industry-specific trends over
time.
The results are presented in Table 4.4. In the first column, we see that that the
statistical results confirm the graphical analysis. The positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient indicate that, relative to other industries, those that are regulated by a
specific committee funnel substantially more money towards the chair of that commit-
tee compared to the industry’s donations to the legislator before he attained the chair
position. The magnitude suggest that, on average, an industry-relevant chair position
causes a 0.27 log-point boost in donations from the industry to the promoted legislator,
or approximately a 31% increase (e0.27 − 1 ≈ 0.31).
Next, I explore how regulated industries respond towards industry-relevant com-
mittee vice chairs. The committee vice chair plays an important role in many state
legislative committees: The vice chair helps the chair to schedule and organize the work
of the committee, is typically the second-ranking majority party member, and is often
the next in line to chair the committee upon the retirement of the chair. Accordingly,
one would expect that these positions would also be deemed valuable by industries that
are motivated to influence the political agenda. To test this, I add a vice-chair indica-
tor to the estimated equation and present the results from this analysis in column 2.
The coefficient on the vice chair dummy is also positive and statistically significant. In
terms of magnitude, a vice chair position, on average, causes a 0.09 log-point increase
in contributions from industries with economic interests in the committee relative to
other unaffected industries. Presumably, this reflects the fact that vice chairs have
some power to influence the political agenda, but not as much as committee chairs.
In column 3-8, I turn to the prediction that committee chairs are deemed more
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valuable by regulated industries when institutional rules allow committees to block bills
from reaching the chamber floor. Specifically, I augment Equation 4.5 by including an
interaction between the chair indicator and a dummy equal to one if committees control
whether to report bills to the parent chamber.7 The coefficient on the interaction term
is positive and statistically significant suggesting that industries value chairs more in
chambers where the committee can decide whether or not to report a bill to the chamber.
Of course, one has to be careful when interpreting the results since the legisla-
tive institutions are not randomly assigned. The triple-difference design identifies the
causal effects of committee chair positions under relatively weak assumptions, and the
results reported in model 3 show how this effect is correlated with, but not necessar-
ily causally affected by, the bill-blocking institution. However, in columns 4-8, I show
that the basic finding is robust when I control for some of the most obvious potential
confounders. In particular, I interact the treatment variable with a dummy indicating
whether committees can reject hearing bills, the presence of term limits, levels of leg-
islative professionalization as measured by the Squire Index (Squire 2007), population
size (standardized by the standard deviation), and an indicator for state laws permit-
ting unrestricted PAC donations to candidates. Across all models, the coefficient on
the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. The fact that industries
place greater value on committee chairs who reside in chambers where they may block
legislation could suggest that regulated industries target those chairs in an attempt to
influence whether or not a bill is reported to and, ultimately, taken to a vote on the
chamber floor. Consistent with the importance of negative agenda power highlighted by
theories of the procedural Cartel party, the strong findings could indicate that negative
agenda control is deemed valuable by firms and interest groups that have a lot to lose
from changes in state-level policy.
If an interest group seeks to influence the fate of a bill, it is crucial that the bill is
referred to the right committees. In the next section, I explore this aspect of legislative
agenda setting.
7Note that I do not include Block Reporting Billsit as a separate variable because factors that are
constant within chamber-years are washed out by the legislator-year-fixed effects.
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Table 4.4 – Effect of Attaining Committee Chair Position on
Donations from Industries with Vested Interests. Industries
with a vested interest in a committee are most sensitive to the chair and
vice chair. The sensitivity increases in chambers in which committees
can prevent bills from reaching the chamber floor.
log(Contributionsijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Chairijt 0.27
∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.07† 0.06 0.06 0.11∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Viceijt 0.09
∗∗
(0.02)
Chairijt×
Block Reporting Billsit 0.25
∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Chairijt×
Block Hearing Billsit 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Chairijt×
Term Limitsit 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.02
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Chairijt×
Squire Indexit -0.44
∗ -0.71∗∗ -0.42
(0.21) (0.27) (0.30)
Chairijt×
Populationit 0.04
† 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Chairijt×
Unlimited PAC Donationsit 0.07
(0.05)
Observations 314010 314010 314010 312910 312910 312910 312910 257880
Legislators 9171 9171 9171 9135 9135 9135 9135 7927
Legislator-Sector FE X X X X X X X X
Legislator-Year FE X X X X X X X X
Sector-Year FE X X X X X X X X
Note: All models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered on legislators and are reported
in parentheses. Significance levels: † 0.10, ∗ 0.05, ∗∗ 0.01.
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4.8 Party Leaders More Valuable When Controlling Bill
Referrals
To examine whether control over the bill referral process is an institutional asset valued
by donating industries, I use OLS to estimate variations of the following baseline model
log(1 + contributionsit) = αi + δt + β1bill referralsit + xitθ + εit , (4.6)
where bill referralsit is a dummy taking on the value of 1 if legislator i controls the
process of referring bills to committees in session t; all other variables are the same as
defined in Equation 4.3.
I present the results from this analysis in Table 4.5. In the first column, I report
the estimated coefficients from the simple baseline model outlined in Equation 4.6. The
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the bill-referral dummy suggests that
the access to legislators with authority over the process of referring bills to committees is
greatly valued by donating industries. In terms of magnitude, the estimated coefficient
is considerable.
One might be concerned about multiple treatments. In addition to referring bills
to committees, party leaders perform many other tasks that donating industries may
deem as valuable. I deal with this concern in models 2-4. In column 2, I present the
results from an augmented model in which I include dummies for committee and party
leaders. I include these variables to parse out factors that are common across all types
of party and committee leaders. The coefficient of interest is still positive and strongly
statistically significant.
Next, I add an interaction between majority-party status and the leadership indi-
cator to the estimated model. The basic results remain the same: The legislator who
acquire institutional control over the process of referring bills to committees experience
a substantial boost in donations relative to legislators who secure other majority-party
leadership positions.
Finally, in column 4, I exploit that the responsibility for referring bills to commit-
tees varies across and within states in order to wash out effects that are constant across
different types of leader positions. I include dummies for the following types of leader
positions: Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, President Pro Tempore, Chair-
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man of Rules and Chairman of Referrals. The results still support the hypothesis that
firms and interest groups place great value on access to legislators who control the bill
referral process.
Table 4.5 – Industries Value of Institutional Control of Bill
Referrals. Legislators who attain institutional control over the bill
referral process experience a substantial boost in contributions from
donating industries.
log(1+Contributionsit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control of the Bill
Referral Process 0.87∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.46∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20)
Leader 0.27∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Chair 0.24∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Leader × Majority 0.29∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.09) (0.09)
Majority Member 0.07∗ 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 31089 31089 31089 31089
Legislators 9097 9097 9097 9097
Legislator Fixed Effects X X X X
State-year Fixed Effects X X X X
Seniority Fixed Effects X X X X
Vector of Leader Positions X
Note: All models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered on legislators and are reported
in parentheses.
The finding that power over the bill referral process is a valuable institutional asset
is consistent with the theoretical argument outlined by Cox and McCubbins (2005)
in the theory of the procedural Cartel Party. If a legislator introduces a bill which
is supported by a majority of legislators on the chamber floor, but opposed by party
leaders, the leader who controls bill referrals may obstruct the bill by sending it to one
or several committees controlled by legislators who also oppose the bill (Young 1996).
It appears that campaign donors are willing to pay a premium for access to leaders who
can negatively control the legislative agenda.
In the next section, I explore whether the value of committee- and party-leader
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positions has changed over time.
4.9 Party-Leader Positions Are Becoming More Valuable
To examine how the value of committee and party leaders has evolved over time, I
exploit that I observe leaders in multiple states in a given year. This enables me to
interact the committee- and party-leader indicators with dummies for each of the years
in the studied period and estimate the saturated model outlined in equation 4.7 using
OLS
log(1+ contributionsijt) = αi+ δt+
2010∑
t=1990
[β1,tchairit× δt+β2,tleaderit× δt]+xitθ+εit ,
(4.7)
The key coefficients of interests are β1,t and β2,t. These coefficients capture the average
campaign-finance value of committee- and party-leader positions, respectively, in a given
year, t.
To begin, I estimate Equation 4.7 separately for five of the key sectors discussed
above and report these results in Figure 4.4. In the panels on the left and right, I plot
the estimates of β1,t and β2,t, respectively, as a functions of t. The solid line indicates
the point estimates, whereas the dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.
Each of the panels reveal the same basic pattern: The value of attaining a committee
leadership position has remained relatively constant over time, whereas party leaders
seems to have become more valuable. On average, industries boost contributions to
legislators attaining to a committee chair position by approximately 0.15-0.2 log points,
and this effect remains relatively constant over time.
In contrast, the estimated value of party leader positions appears to have increased
over the studied period. The graphs indicate that the campaign-finance value of party-
leader positions grew steadily from around the mid 1990s and onwards. In the early
1990s, donating industries were equally sensitive to committee and party leaders, but
by the end of the 2000s donors increase their contributions much more dramatically to
leaders than to committee chairs.
Next, I explore more formally whether the trends identified in Figure 4.4 reflect a
systematic pattern across all industries. In particular, I test whether the campaign-
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Table 4.6 – The Growing Value of Party-Leader Positions.
On average, the campaign-finance value of party-leader positions has
grown over time, whereas the value of committee chairs has remained
relatively stable over the studied period.
Full Sample Constant Sample Pre-session Donations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leader× t 0.019∗ 0.021∗ 0.024∗ 0.023∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Chair× t 0.005 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.017 0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Leader 0.100 0.056 0.038 0.044 -0.754∗∗ -0.703∗∗
(0.113) (0.112) (0.145) (0.144) (0.215) (0.215)
Chair 0.207∗∗ 0.176∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.303∗∗ -0.156 -0.092
(0.074) (0.074) (0.092) (0.097) (0.143) (0.146)
Majority Member 0.052 0.048 0.036
(0.034) (0.033) (0.062)
Observations 31397 31089 7477 7471 26362 26159
Legislators 9170 9097 2008 2007 8044 7995
Legislator Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State-Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Seniority Fixed Effects X X X X
Note: All models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered on legislators and are reported
in parentheses.
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Figure 4.4 – The Growing Value of Party-Leadership Posi-
tions. The value of committee-chair positions have remained relative
stable over time, while the value of party leadership positions has in-
creased since the turn of the century.
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Chair Leader
Agriculture
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Chair Leader
Banking
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Chair Leader
Business
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Chair Leader
Energy
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Chair Leader
Transportation
Note: In each panel, the y-axes show the estimated campaign-finance value of committee- and party-
leader positions, respectively, as functions of the year indicated on the x-axes. The dotted lines indicated
the 95% confidence intervals.
finance value of committee and party leaders grow following a linear trend over the
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studied period by estimating Equation 4.88
log(1 + contributionsijt) = αi + δt + β1chairit + β2leaderit + β3chairit × t
+β4leaderit × t+ xitθ + εit , (4.8)
The results, presented in Table 4.6, are consistent with the trends identified in the graph-
ical analysis. Across all models, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between
t and the party-leader indicator is positive and statistically significant: On average,
the value of party-leader positions linearly increases by approximately 0.02 log points
each year. The coefficient on the interaction between the chair dummy and the time
variable, on the other hand, is substantially relatively small and statistically indistin-
guishable from zero.
Both the graphical and statistical evidence indicate that the campaign-finance value
of attaining a party leadership position has increased over the studied period, but the
finding may be interpreted in several ways. Before turning to the more substantive
interpretation, however, one might worry that the trend is simply driven by changes in
the sample. As discussed above, the campaign finance data is not available for some
states during the early 1990s, and if donors in these missing states happen to value
leaders more than they do in other states, this would produce a positive trend in the
estimated effect. However, as suggested by the panels in Figure 4.4, the positive trend
is most pronounced from the mid 1990s and onwards; the period during which data is
available for all states. To further substantiate that the identified trend is not a by-
product of changes in the sample, I estimate the effect on the subsample for which I have
data for all years and present the results in columns 3 and 4 in Table 4.6. The estimates
from these models reveal the same trending pattern, suggesting that the increasing value
of party leaders is not driven by sample changes.
Why is the value of party leaders growing over time? One interpretation is that the
return on donations to party leaders has increased over the last twenty years. If firms
and interest groups donate in an attempt to influence policy outcomes, the positive
8To simplify the interpretation of the coefficients, I set the time variable, t, equal to zero in 1990:
t = year− 1990. Note that t does not enter as a separate variable in the regressions because the main
effect is accounted for by the time-fixed effects.
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trend suggest that the expected return on investments in party leaders has grown over
time. This could either indicate that party leaders have become more powerful, or that
they have become more susceptible and easy to sway by campaign contributions.
Another interpretation, however, would emphasize the changing role of party leaders.
Scholars have claimed that over time it has become more common to appoint party
leaders on the basis of fundraising skills (Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson 2006;
Kanthak 2007). While theoretically plausible, the empirical evidence is not consistent
with this explanation. First of all, the analyses are based on contributions to individual
legislators’ campaigns, whereas all donations raised on behalf of the party and other
organizations, such as leadership PACs, are excluded.
To further investigate whether the effect is driven by a growing emphasis on the ac-
tive fundraising role of party leaders, I examine whether the effect is present in months
during which legislators are not, in general, actively working on their re-election cam-
paigns. Immediately following a general election, but before the beginning of the leg-
islative term (in November, after the election date, and December of election years),
very few legislators are actively engaged in raising campaign finance. If the positive
trend in the value of party leaders is primarily explained by the growing importance
of active fundraising, we would expect the effect to be zero for contributions donated
during this period. In columns 5 and 6 in Table 4.6, I report the estimates from this
exercise. The estimated effect on the interaction between time and leadership is posi-
tive and strongly statistically significant. In fact, the estimate is even stronger than the
baseline estimates. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the effect is exclusively
caused by a change in the role of party leaders.
The growing value of party leaders may be related to the increasing polarization
of parties in the state and federal legislatures (Shor and McCarty 2011). If rank-and-
file legislators are more willing to delegate power to their party leaders in times when
parties are polarized, as predicted by the theory of Conditional Party Governance, the
increasing value of party-leader positions uncovered in this section may be one of the
consequence of the polarization of American politics.
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4.10 Conclusion
On the basis of a comprehensive new dataset on committee and party leaders in the
state legislatures, this paper uses a difference-in-difference design to document how the
price that firms and interest groups are willing to pay for access to committee and party
leaders varies across industries and institutional settings.
The results indicate that some industries are much more sensitive to agenda setters
than others, and sensitivity to committee- and party-leader positions appears to be
highly correlated, suggesting that donations to committee and party leaders maybe
perceived as investments in complementary assets. The findings reveal that industries
are extremely sensitive to the committee chairs by whom they are primarily regulated.
Consistent with theories of legislative organization that emphasize the role of negative
agenda control (Cox and McCubbins 2005), industries are more sensitive to committee
chairs when institutions allow committees to obstruct new legislation from reaching
the chamber floor, and party leaders are deemed more valuable when they control the
process of referring bills to committees. Finally, I show that while the value of committee
chairs has remained relatively stable throughout the studied period, the value of party
leaders has increased substantially over the last 20 years.
That some groups enjoy privileged access to the political system has long been noted
in American politics (Schattschneider 1975), but the findings in this paper may suggest
that the bias is more severe and more closely connected to fundamental legislative insti-
tutions than previously assumed. It could be normatively troubling if, indeed, powerful
agenda setters exchange access, or even political influence, for campaign contributions,
all the more so since campaign contributions are likely only the visible tip of an iceberg
of hidden lobbying activities employed by special-interest groups (e.g. Wright 1990). If
committee chairs, in exchange for donations, use their negative agenda control to delay,
obstruct or even prevent certain bills from reaching the chamber floor, it could mean
that campaign finance induces a status-quo bias into the political process. This bias
might be notably problematic in areas such as the Finance, Energy and Agriculture
sectors where the substantial benefits derived from blocked legislation would be con-
centrated within a relatively small group of well-organized producers while groups that
would benefit from the new legislation would face severe collective action problems. Fu-
ture research should examine whether the privileges enjoyed by committee chairs skew
78
the representation of interests in the legislative process and bias public policy.
More generally, the results have implications for our interpretation of the literature
on money in American politics. As noted in the introduction, many previous studies
have tried to show that campaign contributions affect roll-call votes, but have failed
to do so (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Wright 1990). For obvious
reasons, roll-calls are only recorded for bills that reach the floor, and if, as the results in
this paper may suggest, committee chairs prevent certain bills from reaching the floor
in exchange for contributions, the existing literature has systematically underestimated
the influence of campaign donations on public policy in American politics.
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Chapter 5
What Are the Electoral
Consequences of Campaign
Spending Limits?
In half of the democratic countries in the world, candidates face legal constraints on how
much money they can spend on their electoral campaigns and yet, we know little about
the consequences of imposing limits on campaign expenditures. I study these conse-
quences in the context of U.K. House of Commons elections. On the basis of archival
material, I collected a new dataset, covering 99.7% of all candidates running for a seat
over the past 130 years, that records how much money each candidate spent, the legal
maximum they faced, and exactly how they allocated their money across seven different
spending categories. I identify causal effects on various measures of electoral behavior
using instrumental variables exploiting within-constituency variation in spending caps
caused by reforms of the spending limit formula, as well as shocks to formula inputs.
The results indicate that allowing higher levels of campaign spending reduces the supply
of candidates as well as electoral competition; promotes the development of more pro-
fessionalized political campaigns; and benefits incumbents and candidates representing
center-right parties.
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5.1 Introduction
Imposing legal limits on candidate campaign expenditures is one the most common
ways, globally, to regulate money in politics. As illustrated by the map in Figure 5.1,
nearly two-thirds of European and Asian countries, as well as every third country in
Africa, Oceania and the Americas, impose limits on candidate campaign expenditures
in national elections (Ohman 2012: p. 37). In many countries including those, such as
the United States, that do not currently limit campaign expenditures, legal restrictions
have been at the center of passionate debates between prominent politicians, interest
groups, lobbyists, supreme court judges, and political pundits for decades. Scholars
from various fields of the social sciences, among them several Nobel Prize laureates,
have participated in public debates on campaign spending regulation (Becker 2005;
Posner 2005; Stiglitz 2012), and campaign spending limits have been a prominent bone
of contention in lengthy arguments between distinguished political scientists in top
political science journals for many years (Green and Krasno 1988; Krasno and Green
1993; Jacobson 1978, 1980, 1984, 1985, 1992).
Figure 5.1 – Limits on Candidate Campaign Expenditure. Ap-
proximately half of the democratic countries of the world impose lim-
its on the money candidates are permitted to spend on their electoral
campaigns.
Limits on
Candidate Expenditure
No Limits on
Candidate Expenditure
No data
Note: The map is constructed based on data from Ohman (2012).
Scholars have long theorized about the impact of campaign spending restrictions on
electoral competition and on the welfare of voters. Theoretical arguments in opposi-
tion to limits on campaign spending are typically hinged around informational benefits
(Austen-Smith 1987) and asymmetric spending efficiencies (Meirowitz 2008; Pastine
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and Pastine 2012), whereas arguments in favor are often based on ideas denouncing
socially wasteful spending (Mueller and Stratmann 1994), policy biases (Prat 2002a,b)
and asymmetric fundraising efficiencies (Pastine and Pastine 2012).
In light of the apparent importance placed on the institution of campaign expendi-
ture caps, and in contrast to the broad theoretical interest in the topic, our empirical
knowledge about the electoral consequences of spending limits is surprisingly weak.
Only a single study explicitly examines the electoral consequences of campaign spend-
ing limits, and this study only relies on a few recent elections in Canada (Milligan and
Rekkas 2008). The striking void in the empirical literature can be attributed to several
factors. First, the bulk of the research on campaign finance is based on U.S. data, but as
campaign spending restrictions are deemed to be unconstitutional in the U.S., we cannot
study the consequences of spending limits in this context. Second, data on campaign
finance outside of the U.S. is relatively scarce, being available for only a few recent elec-
tions for most countries. Finally, even if one were equipped with the relevant data, it is
not obvious how such a study should be implemented. Comparisons of campaign finance
institutions across different countries might be useful for establishing descriptive facts,
but may not inform us about causal consequences, and although single-country stud-
ies exploiting subnational and temporal variation might prove to be informative about
causal effects, they may raise fundamental questions about their external validity.
In this paper, I study the effect of statutory limits on candidate campaign expendi-
ture in the context of U.K. House of Commons elections. Besides the value of studying
the House of Commons in its own right, there are a number of good reasons to focus on
U.K. elections. First, the U.K. led the democratic world in the introduction of limits on
candidate spending and, to this day, is widely considered to be an archetypal, textbook
example of the spending-cap institution. Many countries, in particular countries with
institutional features adopted from the Westminster system of government and coun-
tries associated with the British empire, copied or were directly influenced by central
aspects of the U.K. system of campaign finance regulation,1 hence this regulatory regime
is sometimes referred to as the “the Westminster model of political finance”(Falguera,
Jones, and Ohman 2014: p. 256). Although the implementation design of spending
limits differs around the world, many of the designs’ fundamental institutional fea-
1This is also indicated in Figure 5.1 by the substantial overlap between countries with candidate cam-
paign spending limits and former British colonies.
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tures can be traced back to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act which was
passed in the U.K. in 1883. In other words, when studying spending limits in House
of Commons elections, we intrinsically study the institutional blueprints upon which
most other countries with campaign spending restrictions have based their approach.
Second, the House of Commons provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of
campaign spending limits over a period of more than a hundred years. Apart from the
historical value of these observations and the trivial appeal of many data points, study-
ing a period of this extent allows me to exploit within-constituency changes in spending
limits induced by reforms of the limit formula and by shocks to formula inputs. To
put it differently, the temporal variation allows me to study how the same constituency
responds to different spending limits. Third, particular features of the U.K. institution
give rise to a variation in cap levels across constituencies. Obviously, spending limits
are not randomly assigned, but set according to a well-defined, mathematical formula
based on the type of constituency and the number of electors. Knowing the exact condi-
tions under which spending limits are assigned, I can very clearly specify and critically
evaluate the assumptions under which causal effects are identified.
The electoral consequences of spending limits is relatively unknown academic terri-
tory, but scholars have long been interested in the role of money in politics in Britain.
Pinto-Duschinsky (1981) and Ewing (1987) describe the historical development in polit-
ical finance in Great Britain, and scholars have used campaign spending as a measure of
constituency-level campaign intensity (Johnston 2014; Pattie and Johnston 2003; John-
ston and Pattie 2007; Pattie and Johnston 2009; Johnston et al. 2011; Johnston, Pattie,
and Johnston 1989; Johnston and Pattie 1995; Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse 1995;
Fieldhouse and Cutts 2009). Although these studies are valuable, they tend to focus
on recent general elections2 or on a limited number of constituencies in earlier general
elections. Of course, this raises questions about the generalizability of their findings.
Furthermore, the institution of campaign finance limits is not the explicit focus of these
studies, nor do any of them move beyond examining aggregate spending by scrutinizing
the detailed composition of campaign expenditures.
To substantiate the study of U.K. limits on campaign expenditures, I offer the
longest-spanning dataset on campaign finance ever collected: Based on archival material
2In particular, but not exclusively, general elections after the Electoral Commission started to publish
campaign spending data in 2001.
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from the House of Commons, I compiled a new dataset that covers approximately 99.7%
of all candidates running in general elections from 1885 to 2010, producing, in total,
more than 61,000 candidate-years.3 For each candidate, I record how much money
they spent on their campaigns and exactly how they allocated their resources across
expenditures for advertisement and printing, public meetings, managers, staff, personal
expenses, rooms, and miscellaneous matters.
Using this unique dataset and applying an instrumental variables approach exploit-
ing within-consituency changes in spending limits induced by quasi-exogenous shocks,
I analyze the electoral consequences of spending limits. The results suggest that higher
spending limits reduce the pool of candidates, restrict electoral competition, promote
professionalized political campaigns, and benefit incumbents and center-right candi-
dates.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, I briefly describe the historical and institutional
background. After that, I introduce the new dataset and describe the major trends in
U.K. campaign finance over the past 130 years. I then describe the empirical approach
and discuss the conditions under which I can plausibly identify causal effects. Following
that, I present the main results. Finally, I conclude with a short discussion.
5.2 Historical and Institutional Background
Corruption is expensive. Up until the late 19th century, general election campaigns in
Britain were, according to modern standards, quite shady and costly affairs (Eggers
and Spirling 2014b; Pinto-Duschinsky 1981). In many constituencies, candidates were
involved in extensive dealings of bribery, voter intimidation, and various other forms of
electoral fraud.
Against the backdrop of a historically scandalous general election in 1880, William
Gladstone’s Second Ministry introduced the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention
Act in 1883. The bill was passed with support from both major parties. The Act crim-
inalized various forms of bribery; imposed limits on candidates’ campaign expenditure;
required candidates to fully disclose and document how they spent their money, with
the back-up of official receipts; and introduced significant fines and punishments for
3The data will be made publicly available upon publication.
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rule violations. Candidates, along with their campaign managers4, who failed to file
the required information to the Returning Officer within a certain number of days after
the election, as well as candidates who filed erroneous information, could be subject to
significant fines, banned from running for office in future, or even imprisoned.
The Act also stipulated that the legal expenditure maximum would vary across
constituencies depending on the type of constituency and the number of electors therein.
The intent of the variation in the caps was to acknowledge the fact that it was generally
more costly to campaign in constituencies with many electors, particularly so if the
electors were thinly distributed across large, rural geographical areas (Pinto-Duschinsky
1981).
The classification between county and borough constituencies was used as a simple,
coarse proxy for population density and urbanization.5 The historically important clas-
sification went back to the territorial organization of England in the 13th century, and
it remained more or less intact until the first Reform Act of 1832 (Rossiter, Johnston,
and Pattie 1999). Boroughs and counties were represented differently in Parliament,
and franchise differed systematically across constituencies, however, many of these fun-
damental differences gradually became less important following a series of franchise and
boundary reforms that were implemented throughout the 19th century.6 This process
of reform culminated in the Representation of the People Act 1884, which was intro-
duced with a declared purpose of equalizing the differences between county and borough
constituencies (Blewett 1965). As a consequence of this Act, the previous distinction
between counties and boroughs, which had mattered tremendously with respect to fran-
chise, no longer served its initial purpose. As Rossiter, Johnston, and Pattie (1999: p.
44) points out:
The final major redistribution of the nineteenth century produced approximately equal
representation, both across regions and between the Boroughs and Counties.
Although boroughs and counties were near equivalent in terms of franchise, counties
were, on average, more rural and thinly populated than were boroughs. In response
4Note that campaign managers are often referred to as “election agents” in the U.K. context.
5University constituencies constituted a third, but less important, constituency type. For historical
reasons, the major universities had their own parliamentary constituencies until 1949. All university
constituencies are excluded from the analyses in this paper.
6These reforms have been carefully studied by scholars e.g. Berlinski, Dewan et al. (2011); Berlinski,
Dewan, and Van Coppenolle (2014); Bronner (2014).
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to these differences, it was deemed that candidates running in constituencies classified
as counties should be allowed to spend more money relative to candidates in borough
constituencies of the same magnitude.
The specific spending limit to be faced by the candidates in a given constituency,
i, in a given general election, t, was determined by a formula based on the interaction
and linear combination of the number of electors and the type of constituency.7 A
generalized version of the formula is outlined in Equation 5.1:
limitit = δt + λtelectorsit + ψtcountyit + φtelectorsit · countyit , (5.1)
where limitit is the legal maximum on expenditures, as measured in British pounds,
faced by any candidate running for the seat in constituency i at time t; δt is a baseline
lump sum amount allocated to all constituencies in year t; λt represents the allowed
spending rate per elector in year t; ψt is an additional lump sum amount allocated only
to county constituencies; finally, φt reflects the additional spending allowed per elector,
again only in county constituencies. The fundamental spending limit formula as initially
described in the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, remained essentially the
same throughout the studied period, but the four policy parameters (δt, λt, ψt, φt) were
modified on 13 occasions. How they were modified is outlined in Table 5.1.
In House of Commons elections, seats are allocated using simple plurality rule: The
candidate who attracts the most votes is declared the winner. During the period between
1885 and 1949, only a few constituencies still elected two representatives, and after
1950, all double-member constituencies were abolished (Butler 1963). The formula for
calculating the spending limit was applied slightly differently for the few double-member
constituencies; for the purposes of this paper, I focus exclusively on single-member
7In some periods, the number of electors was rounded before it was plugged into the formula. During
the period of 1885-1910, it was rounded down to the nearest 1,000. During the period of 1969-1978,
the number of electors was rounded to the nearest 8 electors in boroughs and 6 electors in counties.
The exact formulae are outlined in the Appendix. The practice of rounding the number of electors
could be another potential source of exogenous variation that, in principle, one could use to identify
the causal effect of spending limits, but unfortunately, this practice does not induce sufficient variation
in the treatment to produce strong, reliable first-stage results.
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Table 5.1 – Coefficients in Spending Limit Formula over Time
Period δt λt ψt φt Change in Difference:
(constantt) (electorsit) (countyit) (electorsit · countyit) County vs. Borough
1885 - 1917 350 0.03 300 0.03
1918 - 1928 0 0.0208 0 0.0083 –/+
1929 - 1948 0 0.0208 0 0.0042 –
1949 - 1968 450 0.0063 0 0.0021 –
1969 - 1973 750 0.0063 0 0.0021 0
1974 - 1977 1075 0.0075 0 0.0025 +
1978 - 1981 1750 0.015 0 0.005 +
1982 - 1986 2700 0.023 0 0.008 +
1987 - 1991 3370 0.029 0 0.009 +
1992 - 1996 4330 0.037 0 0.012 +
1997 - 2000 4965 0.042 0 0.014 +
2001 - 2004 5483 0.046 0 0.016 +
2005 - 2010 7150 0.05 0 0.02 +
Note: δt, λt, ψt and φt are the coefficients on the inputs outlined in Equation 5.1. The formulae do
not apply to (Northern) Ireland.
constituencies.8
In the next section, I introduce the new dataset on candidate campaign spending in
House of Commons elections from 1885 to 2010.
5.3 New Data: House of Commons Campaign Spending
1885–2010
As described above, the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 required can-
didates to disclose detailed information on campaign spending immediately after each
general election. To enhance transparency, and as a precaution against the temptation
to submit fabricated information, the campaign expenditure returns filed by candidates
and their campaign managers were compiled by the Home Office in the few months fol-
lowing the election and were made available for all members of the House of Commons
to scrutinize. The dataset introduced in this paper is based on these filings.
Using archival material from the House of Commons, I constructed a dataset in
which each observation is identified by a specific candidate in a given general election
over the past 130 years. In total, this provides me with information on more than 61,000
individual candidate-years. I match each return documented in the archival material to
a unique candidate identifier that is further linked to information on electoral outcomes
8For a detailed discussion of multi-member districts in Britain, see Eggers and Fouirnaies (2014)
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Table 5.2 – Number of Missing Spending Returns
# Missing Total # Pct.
Period Candidate Reports Candidates Missing
1885-1917 19 9818 0.19
1919-1944 9 8682 0.10
1945-1969 9 11341 0.08
1970-1989 80 13703 0.58
1990-2010 91 17667 0.52
Total 208 61003 0.34
Note: Due to the loss of related filings, the election of 1918 is excluded from the calculations.
and that has been used in a series of papers by Eggers and Spirling (2014a,b,c). This
will allow future researchers to connect the campaign finance data with information on
candidates and constituencies, including data on candidate characteristics, their political
careers, and parliamentary speeches given by Ministers and M.P.s.
All campaign spending returns related to the general election of 1918 appear to
have been lost, but otherwise the dataset contains near complete information on all
candidates running for office.9 As reported in Table 5.2, close to 99.7% of all candidates
complied with the regulations and reported their spending in a timely manner. Most of
the 208 candidates who did not report their spending were either non-viable candidates
running as independents or candidates representing minor parties.
As mentioned above, the regulatory system required candidates to disaggregate their
expenditures by various categories and to provide documentation for each expenditure
in the form of a receipt. Therefore, for each candidate in the dataset, I am able to
analyze information on the following seven types of expenditures:
1. Advertising and Printing. This variable sums up the money that a candidate
spent on advertisement, printing and publishing campaign material, issuing and
distributing addresses and notices, stationary, postage, and telecommunications.10
9The House of Commons Library is not aware of how the 1918 filings were lost. However, based
on comparisons with other documents from 1918, they believe that the files were submitted by the
candidates, but never compiled by the Home Office since the 1918 election was held only a month after
the end of WWI, and presumably compiling the expenditure returns was a relatively low priority task
for the British government at the time. As a consequence, I do not think that the missing files induce
any notable bias in the estimates.
10Candidates also faced legal restrictions on permitted types of advertisement. In particular, radio and
television advertisements were not permitted.
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2. Meetings. This variable sums up the money that a candidate spent on organizing
public meetings and debates. This also includes payments to external speakers.
3. Staff. Payments to clerks, messengers, canvassers, and other paid staffers who
worked on the campaign are included in this variable.
4. Managers. This variable denotes the sum of payments made to campaign man-
agers, election agents, sub-agents, polling agents, and other people responsible for
managing key aspects of the campaign.11
5. Personal Expenses. This variable sums up costs personally incurred by the candi-
date for the purpose of the election. For example, expenses associated with travel
and accommodation are included in this number.
6. Rooms. The rental cost of rooms or other places of lodging for the purpose of the
campaign, for example, the leasing of a committee room or campaign headquarters,
is included in this variable.
7. Miscellaneous Matters. This variable sums up all expenses that do not fit into one
of the categories outlined above.
Taken together, these seven categories provide an unprecedented and uniquely fine-
grained account of how House of Commons candidates organized their electoral cam-
paigns. However, to what extent can we trust the integrity of the data? There are three
key concerns one needs to keep in mind when interpreting the results.
Firstly, were candidates incentivized to disclose true and accurate information? The
extensive disclosure requirements and the threat of high fines for reporting erroneous
information would suggest that massive discrepancies between actual campaign activ-
ities and reported spending are unlikely. When interpreting the results, however, one
must recognize that certain types of expenditures are notoriously difficult to audit.
While printing costs and costs associated with organizing meetings and renting rooms
are fairly easy to verify against receipts, it is more difficult, if not to say impossible, to
accurately account for labor. For example, it is a challenge to verify the actual number
of hours a campaign staffer worked for a given given salary. In essence, candidates
11For a detailed account of the roles of the campaign managers in British General Elections, see Fisher,
Denver, and Hands (2006).
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were strongly incentivized to disclose accurate information on “hard” expenditures that
were easily verifiable, but may have had weaker motivations to openly document “soft”
expenditures.
Secondly, does the data accurately reflect the amounts spent by a candidate during
the period of the campaign? The reported numbers reflect candidates’ expenditures
during the period from the day the election is called to the day of the general election.
If a party engages in campaign activities, such as distributing printed materials in a
particular constituency, say, six months prior to the general election, the costs of these
activities do not count against the spending limit faced by the representing candidate.12
Therefore, candidates may strategically rely on early campaigning in order to effectively
relax the constraints on overall spending. This problem is, in all likelihood, most preva-
lent in periods with stable governments, when candidates can more easily predict when
the Prime Minister will call for general election. It seems plausible that the data, for
the most part, correctly accounts for money spent during the actual campaign, but it
may not accurately pick up the full amount of pre-dissolution expenditures.13
Thirdly, is it a problem that the reported spending pertains solely to the individual
candidate and does not take the spending of the national party into account? The spend-
ing limits initially described in the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883
only apply to the individual candidates, not their parties. The major national parties
are, for obvious reasons, keenly interested in winning seats in key swing constituencies
and, as a result, they may intensify their campaign activities in these constituencies.
Due to the nature of the first-past-the-post electoral system, campaigning for the party
in a particular constituency is de facto equivalent to campaigning for the individual
candidate, and this blurs the line between costs incurred by individual candidates and
their represented parties. To the extent that general elections have become more na-
tionalized and centralized affairs over the course of the 20th century, this concern is
ostensibly most relevant in recent decades.
As a consequence of the three caveats discussed above, the reported spending may
12Expenditures before the election date is announced are permitted if they are designed to promote the
local party rather than the individual candidate. For further details, see Pinto-Duschinsky (1981: chap-
ter 9)
13After 2001, the regulation actually distinguishes between a “short” and a “long” campaign to ensure
that candidates do not have the means to hide expenditures by strategically timing their campaign
activities prior to the dissolution of the parliament.
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not fully account for the true costs of campaigning, and one has to keep this in mind
when interpreting the results presented below. However, any reporting issues are pre-
sumably somewhat constant from one year to the next within each constituency or are
common across all constituencies within a given year. Whereas reporting issues like
these may bias estimates in simple cross-sectional studies, they are less likely to do so
in a design leveraging within-constituency variation. I will describe why this is the case
in further detail below.
For the purposes of the analyses in this paper, I take into consideration all observa-
tions pertaining to single-member constituencies, but exclude multi-member and uni-
versity constituencies. I reshape the data in such way that each observation is uniquely
identified by a constituency in a given year. This leaves me with a panel dataset of
approximately 20,000 constituency-year observations. Based on this data, I describe
the main developments in candidate campaign expenditure in the next section.
5.4 Major Trends in Campaign Spending 1885-2010
Figure 5.2 illustrates four key trends in campaign spending from 1885 to 2010. On the
left in panel (a), I plot average candidate spending (in constant 2012 British pounds)
across election years. I focus on the two front running parties and disaggregate spending
by constituency type. The solid and dashed lines represent average candidate spending
in county and borough constituencies, respectively, whereas the vertical lines indicate
the first election following a revision of the spending limit formula. When describing
the pattern, one must be mindful of the considerable uncertainty associated with the
Consumer Price Index in the early years, in particular in those years around the First
and Second World Wars.
The graph shows that candidate spending levels in both types of constituencies were
relatively high in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, then dropped dramatically after
World War I and continued to decrease until they more or less stabilized in the 1960s.
Throughout the studied period, we see that candidates in county constituencies spent
more money, on average, than did candidates in boroughs, consistent with the difference
in spending limits between the two types of constituencies. Furthermore, it is clear that
spending trends in counties and boroughs ran fairly parallel to each other between the
reforms of the spending limits. Consider, for example, the revision in 1918. In the period
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leading up to the elections of 1910 (the last election before the revision in 1918), and in
the period following the revision (starting in 1922), the spending tendencies follow the
same general trend.
Figure 5.2 – Major Campaign Finance Trends 1885-2010.
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(b) Spending Shares by Parties and Types of Outlay
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On the right in panel (a), I show average spending as a share of legal maximum
and, again, I report the findings separately for counties and boroughs. The graph
indicates that candidates, on average, spent somewhere between 60% and 80% of the
legal maximum in most elections. Up until 1950, candidates in boroughs spent closer to
the legal maximum than candidates in counties. From the 1950s and onwards, counties
and boroughs closely followed each other. Once more, it is worth noticing that boroughs
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and counties appear to follow the same overall trends. I will discuss this common trend
across constituency types in further detail in the next section.
On the left in panel (b), I plot the share of total expenditures accounted for by each
of the major political parties. The partisan development in candidate spending reflects
more general political trends. The graph shows that Conservative candidates accounted
for approximately 40-50% of the spending. The Labour party emerged around the turn
of the century and grew stronger in terms of candidate spending over the next few
decades until, in most elections, Labour candidates accounted for approximately 30-
40% of total spending. Spending by candidates from the Liberal party decreased as the
Labour party grew stronger, but regained ground by the end of the 20th century. Inde-
pendents and candidates representing parties other than the three traditional ones have
become more common over the recent years, and this is also reflected in the spending
shares.
In the graph on the right in panel (b), I explore the question of how candidates allo-
cate their campaign expenditures by disaggregating outlays according to the seven main
types of expenditure and by plotting the relative weight of each category against the
election year. The first thing to notice in this graph is that money spent on advertising
and printing appears to be the most important component of total spending throughout
the studied period, and that this category has become noticeably more important over
the years: In the late 19th century this category accounted for approximately 40% of
total spending, whereas by the end of the 20th century, it accounted for up to 80%
of all expenditures. Conversely, the shares of total expenditure allocated to managers,
staff and public meetings, respectively, decreased over the studied period. Outlays for
personal expenses, miscellaneous matters, and rooms remained fairly stable throughout
the period, accounting for approximately 20% of all expenditure.
To supplement the descriptive statistics presented in Figure 5.2, I report summary
statistics on key variables used in the analyses in Table 5.3. In this Table, I disaggregate
the statistics by four different sub-periods as well as by constituency type. In the next
section, I outline the empirical strategy that I apply to the data described above.
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Table 5.3 – Summary Statistics
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Legal Maximum (£1000) 61.55 120.86 41.99 53.32 16.08 18.49 12.62 14.38 30.93 55.01
(13.02) (32.12) (16.63) (21.60) (3.29) (3.50) (0.71) (1.06) (21.77) (48.78)
Lab. Spending 2.08 1.87 19.31 18.34 12.75 13.39 9.48 7.96 11.46 9.93
(10.51) (14.03) (10.97) (12.78) (4.27) (4.98) (3.10) (4.10) (9.73) (11.95)
Lib. (Dem.) Spending 39.24 56.58 14.27 19.15 3.35 5.84 5.37 6.47 13.79 23.66
(26.88) (53.78) (16.21) (20.42) (4.32) (6.02) (6.16) (5.33) (20.24) (37.58)
Con. Spending 51.10 73.79 29.62 35.22 13.21 15.80 8.77 11.09 23.96 35.86
(23.28) (54.01) (16.21) (19.60) (4.90) (5.07) (3.74) (3.96) (20.81) (39.99)
Candidates 1.97 1.76 2.57 2.44 2.94 2.89 5.07 4.79 3.13 2.90
(0.45) (0.49) (0.66) (0.67) (0.96) (0.78) (1.65) (1.37) (1.51) (1.42)
Effective Candidates 1.36 1.28 1.46 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.62 1.64 1.48 1.46
(0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.21)
More than Two Candidates 0.08 0.03 0.52 0.47 0.62 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.57 0.52
(0.26) (0.16) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.50)
Unopposed Candidate 0.11 0.27 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09
(0.32) (0.44) (0.15) (0.25) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.29)
Polling Districts 9.34 19.70 19.71 37.82 32.58 65.03 41.04 65.86 25.41 44.70
(6.76) (10.22) (12.94) (18.70) (15.71) (27.61) (14.81) (29.56) (17.25) (29.38)
Electors (1000) 9.22 10.68 45.23 45.42 57.70 61.87 66.18 68.87 46.66 44.98
(4.22) (4.17) (13.01) (15.07) (11.24) (15.08) (7.93) (9.59) (22.62) (26.07)
Observations 1875 3002 2259 2359 3019 2617 2055 2415 9208 10393
Note: The unit of observation is a constituency in a general election. The table reports means and
standard deviations. All statistics relating to spending are reported in £1000s (constant 2014 prices).
5.5 Empirical Strategy
The ideal way to test how spending limits affect electoral outcomes would be to randomly
assign those limits across parliamentary constituencies. In a hypothetical experiment
like this, one could identify the average causal effect of spending limits by estimating
Equation 5.2 using OLS:
yit = β1limitit + εit (5.2)
Obviously, this is not feasible. In the absence of a viable experiment, the next best
option is to exploit quasi-random shocks that induce variation in spending limits. The
institutional setup in the House of Commons is ideal for this type of study because
the spending limits are deterministically assigned according to a known mathematical
formula with objective, observable inputs. Since all constituencies, without exception,
are subject to the same general formula, the standard self-selection problems that haunt
most campaign finance studies are not a cause for concern in the U.K. setting.
The main challenge, however, is that, in general, the formula inputs are not randomly
94
distributed across constituencies. In Equation 5.3, I substitute Equation 5.1 into 5.2
in order to highlight the endogeneity problem. It is clear from the equation that any
determinant of the outcome that happens to be correlated with the elements in the
square brackets would bias the estimated effect. For example, a geographically large
rural county constituency differs in many systematic ways from a small urban borough
constituency, and one may surmise some of the differences matter for electoral outcomes.
yit = β1[δt + λtelectorsit + ψtcountyit + φtelectorsit · countyit] + εit (5.3)
Equation 5.3 indicates that there are two potential sources of quasi-exogenous vari-
ation: Shocks to the policy parameters (δt, λt, ψt, φt) and shocks to the formula inputs
(electorsit, countyit). I outline below how I intend to exploit both types of variation in
an instrumental variables analysis.
The basic idea is to instrument for spending limits using within-constituency vari-
ation induced by constituency type reclassifications and reforms of policy parameters
while differencing out common trends across constituencies. In other words, the design
is an instrumental variables (IV) approach where the effects of the shocks are identi-
fied using a simple difference-in-difference design. This design identifies a local average
treatment effect (LATE) under the key assumptions that a given shock:
1. has a significant effect on spending limits (relevance);
2. is as-if randomly assigned, conditional on the included covariates (exogeneity);
3. exclusively affects the outcome through the spending limits channel (exclusivity);
4. pushes spending limits in all treated constituencies in the same direction (mono-
tonicity).
If these conditions are satisfied, the IV approach captures a weighted average of treat-
ment effects where the weightings reflect how sensitive spending limits in constituencies
are to a given shock. Since the difference in spending limits between county and borough
constituencies linearly increases with the number of electors (φt > 0, ∀ t), the LATE
estimates are weighted towards constituencies with a greater population of electors.
When multiple instruments are combined, the obtained LATE estimate is, moreover, a
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weighted combination of the individual instruments where the weightings are propor-
tional to the instruments’ first-stage effects on spending limits (Angrist, Graddy, and
Imbens 2000). In the two sections below, I outline in detail how I intend to use admin-
istrative reclassifications of constituency types as well as reforms of policy parameters
to identify the causal effects of spending limits on electoral outcomes.
5.5.1 Shocks to Formula Inputs: Constituency Reclassifications
As suggested by the spending limit formula in Equation 5.1 and by the coefficients in Ta-
ble 5.1, candidates running in county constituencies were granted higher limits relative
to candidates in comparable borough constituencies. There was clearly good reason for
this: County constituencies tend to be geographically larger, thus it is generally more
costly to campaign in these regions. As discussed above, prior to 1884 the differences
between county and borough constituencies were distinct and significant, but over time
many of differences were washed out by franchise and boundary reforms.
An important administrative difference, however, remains. The responsibility for
managing the electoral register and organizing elections lies within each respective type
of local government. In other words, county councils are responsible for the bureaucratic
activities associated with elections in county constituencies, and borough councils are
responsible for those in borough constituencies. To ensure the responsibility for the
practical aspects of elections (organizing polling stations, setting up polling booths,
preparing ballots, etc.) is clear, and to establish a consistent, simple connection be-
tween elected officials at different levels of government, each parliamentary constituency
is mapped to a unique, relevant local authority.14 Following any boundary changes af-
fecting either levels of government, new mappings between parliamentary constituencies
and local authorities must be established. For the majority of constituencies this is a
trivial matter since “local government boundaries provide the template within which
constituencies are defined” (Rossiter, Johnston, and Pattie 1999: p.17).
In some cases, however, boundary reforms result in parliamentary constituencies
with borders that cut across those of local government and, sometimes, cut across
county and borough divisions. In certain instances, perforce, the constituency type has
to be reclassified from county to borough constituency, or vice versa. The reclassifica-
14For a more detailed discussion of the mapping between local authorities and parliamentary constituen-
cies in England, see, for example, Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015)
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tion of constituency type is purely an administrative matter and, as such, is delegated to
the Boundary Commission. The Home Secretary drafts a proposal consistent with the
recommendations of the Boundary Commission, then parliament typically implements
the proposal without much debate or modification since the reclassifications affect rel-
atively few constituencies and are generally considered to be negligible. From 1885 to
2010, approximately 6% of the unique parliamentary constituencies were at some point
reclassified by the Boundary Commission. To be clear, when I refer to a reclassified
constituency, it denotes a constituency for which the boundaries remained fixed while
only the administrative status changed. These reclassifications matter relatively little
overall, but they provide a unique quasi-exogenous shock to the spending limit in the
affected constituencies: A reclassification from borough to county induces a relaxation
in the spending limit, as opposed to a tightening of the limit further to a reclassification
from county to borough.
I exploit this shock in an instrumental variables analysis. The setups in the first-stage
and reduced-form models are similar to a standard panel difference-in-difference design
in which one observes within-constituency changes in the outcome as the treatment
kicks in, while differencing out common effects across all constituencies. The first-stage
and reduced-form models are given by Equations 5.4 and 5.5, respectively:
limitit = β1,1countyit + αi,1 + δt,1 +X
′
itθ1,1 + εit,1 (5.4)
yit = β1,2countyit + αi,2 + δt,2 +X
′
itθ1,2 + εit,2 (5.5)
where limitit indicates the spending limit and yit the observed outcome, respectively,
in constituency i at time t; countyit is a dummy indicating whether constituency i at
time t was classified as a county constituency; αi,1 and αi,2 represent constituency-
fixed effects capturing all time-invariant characteristics of a constituency; δt,1 and δt,2
denote time-fixed effects that capture common trends across constituencies; Xit is a
vector of additional control variables; finally, εit,1 and εit,2 are the error terms. β1,1
and β1,2 capture the effects of the county constituency classification on spending limits
and outcomes, respectively. These coefficients and the ratio between them are of key
interest.
Constituency type reclassifications constitute a sound natural experiment because
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there is justification for the four identification assumptions described above being met
in these particular settings. First, from the parameters outlined in Table 5.1, we know
that the relevance criterion is satisfied: The county classification affects the spending
limit throughout the studied period (since φt 6= 0 ∀ t). The exact magnitude of the
first-stage model depends, of course, on the number of electors in the reclassified con-
stituencies, and on the years in which the reclassifications occurred. Figure 5.3 shows
how reclassifications were distributed in time across the studied period.
Figure 5.3 – Reclassification of Constituency Types. Con-
stituencies have been reclassified periodically throughout the studied
period.
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Second, it seems plausible that the difference-in-difference setup identifies the causal
effect in the first-stage and reduced-form models such that the exogeneity assumption
is met. The causal effect is identified under a parallel trends assumption: In the ab-
sence of a constituency reclassification, from borough to county constituency, (or county
to borough), the reclassified constituencies would have followed the same trend as the
non-reclassified constituencies of the same type. The fact that reclassifications are ex-
ogenously imposed by the Boundary Commission suggests that individual M.P.s do not
have the means to single-handedly manipulate the classification of their constituency.
In other words, self-selection problems are not a major cause for concern.
Furthermore, constituency reclassifications are typically implemented in response to
unintended, administrative consequences of local government reforms, not, as is impor-
tant to note, because the constituencies were trending in certain ways that demanded
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reclassification. Documentation of parliamentary debates on constituency reclassifica-
tions substantiate this claim. Many of the M.P.s who who participated in the debates
appeared to be more puzzled about the arbitrariness of the changes proposed by the
Boundary Commission than they were concerned about their consequences. For ex-
ample, in a debate on the 17th of March, 1948, leading up to the reclassifications
implemented in accordance with the Representation of the People Act of 1948, M.P.
John Parker from Dagenham asks the Home Secretary why
“...there seems to be no particular principle on which the Boundary Commission has acted
in classifying constituencies as either county or borough”.15
Home Secretary James Ede acknowledges that the reclassifications are purely an ad-
ministrative matter with the only notable side effect being that the spending limits in
a few constituencies would change:
I admit that it appears to be very difficult to ascertain why some constituencies have been
put into the county group and some into the borough group, but the answer is that this is
what the Boundary Commissioners recommended, and we felt that in this matter it was
desirable to follow the arrangement which had been made by the Boundary Commissioners.
I think the only difference which really exists, or which matters very much, is the fact that
candidates can spend less money in a borough constituency than they can in a county
division of comparable size.16
The view that constituency classifications are not based on trends in constituency char-
acteristics, but on somewhat arbitrary decisions related to local government reorgani-
zation is echoed in many further parliamentary debates on the issue. For example, in
debates leading up to the changes implemented in 1983, M.P. Gary Waller from Brig-
house and Spenborough points out how the local government reform in 1982 produced
arbitrary, unintended consequences affecting constituency classifications:
Before local government reorganisation, there was an obvious distinction between county
and borough constituencies. That distinction no longer applies. The commissioners found
that very often they were making decisions on fairly marginal grounds [...]. This matter
is important only because the formula for election expenses differs between county and
15http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1948/mar/17/clause-1-constituencies-and-electors-1#
S5CV0448P0_19480317_HOC_558
16 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1948/mar/17/clause-1-constituencies-and-electors-1#
S5CV0448P0_19480317_HOC_558
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borough constituencies. The distinction is really an artificial one.17
These quotes from the parliamentary debates almost give the impression that the re-
classified constituencies were indistinquishable from unaffected constituencies, but of
course this is not completely true. Table 5.4 reports how key variables differ across re-
classified and unaffected constituencies in elections prior to reclassifications. Although
most variables are, in fact, statistically indistinguishable between reclassified and un-
affected constituencies, there are notable dissimilarities, the most apparent being that
the reclassified constituencies seem to be smaller as measured by the number of polling
districts. In the difference-in-difference setup, however, all comparisons are made within
a given constituency and after differencing out general trends affecting all constituen-
cies equally. The causal effect is identified under the relatively weak and justifiable
assumption that the reclassified constituencies were not trending in any particular way.
17http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1983/mar/01/parliamentary-boundary-commissions#
S6CV0038P0_19830301_HOC_280
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Table 5.4 – Comparison of Reclassified and Unaffected Con-
stituencies
Reclassified Unaffected Difference
Polling Districts 27.17 37.30 -10.13
(20.06) (27.00) [0.00]
Polling Stations 59.35 61.01 -1.66
(39.53) (35.67) [0.64]
Electors (1000s) 51.20 50.09 1.11
(33.85) (24.65) [0.64]
Conservative Incumbent 0.41 0.34 0.07
(0.49) (0.47) [0.11]
Labour Incumbent 0.25 0.27 -0.02
(0.44) (0.45) [0.65]
Liberal (Dem.) Incumbent 0.12 0.10 0.02
(0.32) (0.30) [0.55]
Open Seat 0.22 0.24 -0.02
(0.41) (0.43) [0.56]
Total District Expenditure 63.28 57.94 5.34
(54.19) (60.10) [0.35]
Effective Candidates 1.45 1.47 -0.03
(0.16) (0.18) [0.10]
Total 110 7975
Note: Calculations are based on the elections before reclassifications were implemented. I keep all
observations, for both reclassified and unaffected constituencies, pertaining to these years and report
mean values. Standard deviations are reported in (parentheses). P-values from t-tests of equal means
are shown in [square brackets].
Although we cannot directly test for exclusivity, the third identification assump-
tion described above, qualitative and anecdotal evidence does suggest that it might be
satisfied in this particular context. Perhaps the most obvious possible violation of the
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exclusion restriction comes in form of publicity. If people in affected constituencies pub-
licly debated the reclassifications, or if journalists interviewed the affected candidates
about their opinions of the consequences, this could potentially have electoral implica-
tions. It is impossible to completely rule out violations like these. To justify that they
are unlikely, however, I performed a search for the words “county” and “borough” in
major national newspapers for the years in which reclassifications were implemented.
None of the articles explicitly discussed reclassifications.18 Stories about reclassifications
do not appear to be newsworthy.
Another violation of the exclusion restriction could arise from changes in the be-
havior of the central party in response to a reclassification. Suppose, for example, that
the party reacted to a reduced spending limit by planning to campaign more actively
in the constituency, perhaps by organizing visits from ministers or other high-ranking
party members, in an effort to offset the added spending restrictions placed on the con-
stituency’s candidate. This scenario would appear to be plausible, however, according to
the transcribed interviews that David Butler conducted with campaign managers from
the major parties who were responsible for coordinating the link between the national
and constituency-level campaign activities from the 1950s to the 1990s, none of the
campaign managers mentioned reclassifications of constituencies. This could suggest
that the issue was not a major cause for concern and, while this does not rule out a
violation of the exclusion restriction, it makes it arguably less plausible.
Finally, from the spending limit parameters, we know that the monotonicity as-
sumption is satisfied. Regardless of when the reclassification occured during the stud-
ied period, a shift from borough to county status always led to a higher spending limit,
and a shift from county to borough always engendered a lower limit (since φt > 0 and
ψ ≥ 0, ∀ t). To put it differently, although the magnitude of the effect differs across
constituencies and over years, the direction of the reclassification shock is always the
same.
5.5.2 Shocks to Formula Parameters: Spending Limit Reforms
The fundamental spending limit formula essentially remained as initially described in
the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883, but the policy parameters (δt, λt,
18The search was performed on newspapers scanned and made available via the website http://www.
ukpressonline.co.uk/ukpressonline/database/search/advSearch.jsp
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ψt, φt) were modified 13 times over the studied period, as indicated in Table 5.1. The
spending limit reform proposals were drafted by the Speaker’s Conference (a committee
on which all elected parties were represented) before the Second World War and by the
politically independent Boundary Commission after the War. The implemented changes
applied to all constituencies without exception. These reforms constitute an interesting
natural experiment because they induced substantial changes in spending limits from
one year to the next without affecting any of the underlying formula inputs.
Why were these reforms introduced? The official reason, as stated by the Home
Secretary in the parliamentary debates for example, was that spending limits had to be
adjusted in response to changes in other factors influencing the electoral environment.
A number of these factors affected all constituencies (e.g. inflation19 and extension
of franchise20), while other factors affected only some constituencies (e.g. boundary
modifications). However, even though the revised formula apply to all constituencies,
not all constituencies were affected in the same way. The reforms increased spending
limits in some constituencies, other constituencies remained unaffected, and yet others
faced reduced spending limits. Importantly for this paper, the reforms of the policy
parameters affected borough and county constituencies differently.
To simplify the discussion, let us suppose that the policy parameters were reformed
only once during the studied period (at time T ). The basic idea is compare how the
reform, on average, affected county constituencies relative to boroughs. In a difference-
in-difference spirit, I compare within-constituency changes in counties induced by the
reform while differencing out within-constituency changes in boroughs.
The baseline first-stage and reduced-form models are expressed in Equations 5.6 and
5.7, respectively:
limitit = pi1,1countyit · 1[t ≥ T ]t + αi,1 + δt,1 +X ′itθ1,1 + εit,1 , (5.6)
yit = pi1,2countyit · 1[t ≥ T ]t + αi,2 + δt,2 +X ′itθ1,2 + εit,2 , (5.7)
19http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1974/feb/07/representation-of-the-people#
S5CV0868P0_19740207_HOC_240
20http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1928/may/07/clause-5-maximum-scale-of-election#
S5CV0217P0_19280507_HOC_250
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where limitit and yit indicate the spending limit and observed outcome, respectively,
in constituency i at time t; 1[t ≥ T ]t represents a dummy equal to 1 in the years
after time T ; countyit indicates a county dummy; αi,1 and αi,2 denote constituency-
fixed effects capturing all time-invariant characteristics of a constituency; δt,1 and δt,2
represent time-fixed effects that wash out common trends across constituencies; Xit is
a vector of additional control variables; finally, εit,1 and εit,2 are the error terms. pi1,1
and pi1,2 capture the effects of the reform on spending limits and outcomes in county
constituencies relative to boroughs.
Does it seem plausible that the four identification assumptions outlined above are
satisfied in this context? First, regarding relevance, we know from Table 5.1 that all
reforms, with the exception of the reform in 1970, affected boroughs and counties differ-
ently. The reforms up until 1970 reduced the difference between counties and boroughs,
whereas the reforms after 1970 gradually increased the gap. The exact magnitude of
the differences naturally depends on how the electors were distributed across county
and borough constituencies, and I explore this in further detail in the discussion of the
first-stage results below.
Turning to the exogeneity assumption, are the conditions under which the causal
effects are identified in Equations 5.6 and 5.7 reasonable? pi1,1 and pi1,2 capture the
average effect of the reform on the spending limit and the outcome, respectively, under
the key common-trends assumption that county and borough constituencies would have
followed the same trends in the absence of the reform.
A couple of important concerns must be taken into consideration. First, one might
worry that the reform was introduced in response to some kind of trending pattern.
Imagine, for example, that counties experienced a substantial growth in the number
of electors, relative to boroughs, and that the Boundary Commission implemented a
reduction in the legal expenditure per elector in counties to prevent the legal maximum
from skyrocketing in those affected constituencies. As one would expect the size of a
population to affect political competition, the estimates of pi1,1 and pi1,2 would be biased
without properly accounting for this factor. Indeed, the most commonly used argument
in parliamentary debates for modifying the spending limit parameters is changes in the
number of electors. I account for population trends like this by controlling for number of
electors and population density.21 Presumably, the effect of population size on electoral
21As each parliamentary constituency is divided into a number of polling districts, I measure density
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competition has changed over time so I allow the coefficients on electorsit and densityit
to vary flexibly across years.
Another concern is the problem of multiple treatments. In addition to the effect
of the spending limit reform, the coefficient on interaction term, countyit · 1[t ≥ T ]t,
picks up all other relevant policies assigned at time T that affect boroughs and counties
differently. In other words, if another reform that affected boroughs and counties differ-
ently was also implemented in year T , the estimated effect would be biased towards the
effect of the additional reform. One might be particularly worried about the franchise
extension reforms in the first half of the 20th century. For example, the Representation
of the People Act 1918 enfranchised all males over the age of 21 and females over the
age of 30 in the same year in which the first spending limit reform was implemented.
If the age and gender distributions were fairly constant across county and borough
constituencies, and descriptive statistics suggest that they were (Rossiter, Johnston,
and Pattie 1999: p.62), this is not a major problem, especially when one controls for
population density and number of electors. However, it may still be arguable that the
franchise extensions carried unobservable consequences affecting boroughs and counties
differently. To counter this criticism, I show that all results are robust to the exclusion
of multiple-reforms years as instruments.
Third, in consideration of the exclusion restriction, is it reasonable to assume that the
reforms of spending limits exclusively affected the outcomes through the new spending
limits? The two related concerns discussed in the previous section are also relevant here.
If the media reported on the new spending limits, or if the national party organizations
changed their behavior in response to the same, the exclusion restriction might be
violated. To evaluate these possibilities, I performed a search for articles containing the
words “election expenses” in the years during which a reform was implemented, and
read through transcribed interviews with campaign managers in those same relevant
years. I did not discover any mention of campaign managers commenting on the new
spending limits, and although I did find a few newspaper articles that did make note of
the reforms, none of these put more weight on counties than on boroughs.
Finally, with respect to monotonicity, did the reforms in any given year affect all
constituencies in a given year in the same way? More specifically, did any given re-
using the average number of electors in each polling district.
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form exacerbate or amend the difference between counties and boroughs across all con-
stituencies? Or did the reforms effectively push spending limits in different directions
depending on the number of electors in a given constituency? From the last column in
Table 5.1, it is clear that all reforms of the policy parameters, with the exception of the
1918 reform, nudged the difference between spending limits in counties and boroughs
in the same direction. The magnitude of the effect, again, depends on the number of
electors in each constituency, but the direction is always the same.
5.5.3 Econometric Specification
I combine the two sources of quasi-exogenous variation in a 2SLS estimation. As the in-
struments tap into different variations and rely on different common-trend assumptions,
I present all results separately for each of the two groups of instruments, those being
the county dummy and its interaction with post-reform indicators. Equations 5.8 and
5.9 outline the baseline first-stage and reduced-form models, respectively. The variables
countyit and countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t are the excluded instruments.
limitit = β1,1countyit +
∑
ω ∈Ω
(piω,1countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t) + (5.8)
αi,1 + δt,1 + θt,1electorsit + γt,1densityit + εit,1 ,
yit = β1,2countyit +
∑
ω ∈Ω
(piω,2countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t) (5.9)
+αi,2 + δt,2 + θt,2electorsit + γt,2densityit + εit,2 ,
where Ω = {1918, 1929, 1948, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005}, i.e.,
the set of years in which reforms were introduced; countyit denotes a dummy vari-
able taking on the value 1 if constituency i is classified as a county at time t; 1(t ≥ ω)t
represents a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the observation refers to any year
after the reform in year ω; αi,1 and αi,2 indicate constituency-fixed effects; δt,1 and δt,2
are year-fixed effects; electorsit denotes the number of electors, or, in some specifica-
tions, the natural log thereof in constituency i at time t; densityit stands for the average
number of electors per polling district in a given year or, again, the log thereof; finally,
εit,1 and εit,2 represent the error terms.
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In all the tables and figures below, I report robust standard errors that are clustered
at the level of the constituency.
In the next section, I present the results of an OLS estimation of Equation 5.8 and
evaluate the implications of these first-stage results.
5.6 First-Stage Results: Strong Effects on Spending Lim-
its
In this section, I discuss the first-stage results. First, I look at the graphical evidence,
then I turn to the statistical results. To clearly highlight changes induced by reforms
and reclassifications, the graphs illustrate changes in nominal spending limits (in Figures
C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix, I report the corresponding graphs in constant prices and
show that the basic findings are the same).
Figure 5.4 graphically illustrates how constituency reclassifications, on average, af-
fect spending limits. The x- and y-axes show the elections relative to the reclassification
and the spending limit, respectively. The panel on the left illustrates that constituencies
reclassified from borough to county status experienced a boost in the spending limit,
but shows also that the affected and unaffected boroughs followed the same general
trend before and after reclassification. The panel on the right focuses on the reclassifi-
cations from county to borough status, and we see that the reclassified constituencies
experienced a decrease in the spending limit, while the unaffected counties appear to
have remained more or less unaffected in terms of spending limit, as well. In this graph
we can also detect a minor positive trending pattern. Note, however, that the positive
pattern does not appear to be a general trend, but rather a specific shock kicking in
between years -3 to -2. To the extent that it may be a general trend, however, it could
imply an upward bias in the average effect unless one accurately accounts for the specific
number of electors per constituency in the statistical analyses.
107
Figure 5.4 – Effect of Constituency Reclassification on Spend-
ing Limits. Constituency reclassifications from borough to county
constituencies cause an increase in the spending limit, whereas reclas-
sifications from county to borough lead to a drop in spending limits.
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Note: The x-axis represents years relative to the reclassifications. The y-axis represents the spending
limits. In the plot on the left, the treatment-group line reports the average limit faced by constituencies
classified as boroughs in the pre-treatment period and counties in the post-treatment period. The
control group is all unaffected boroughs. Conversely, in the panel on the right, the treatment-group
line reports the average limit faced by constituencies classified as counties in the pre-treatment period
and boroughs in the post-treatment period. The control group in this panel consists of all unaffected
counties.
Turning attention to the effect of reforms of policy parameters, the four panels in
Figure 5.5 illustrate how the reforms in 1918, 1929, 1948 and 1974 impacted spending
limit patterns in counties as well as boroughs. The key thing to notice is how the differ-
ence between county and borough changes as the reforms were implemented. Consider,
for example, the 1918 reform. The graph shows that boroughs and counties appear
to have followed the same trends during the the pre- and post-reform periods, but as
the reform kicked in, the average borough constituency experienced an increase in the
spending limit, while the average county suffered a noticeable reduction, bringing the
two types of constituencies closer together in terms of expenditure gaps. Along the
same lines, and consistent with the discussion in the previous section, the reforms in
1929 and 1948 also appear to reduce the difference in spending limit between counties
and boroughs, whereas the 1974 reform increased the gap between the two constituency
types slightly. Although the two groups appear, for the most part, to run parallel to
one another, there are discernible trending patterns to be noted. In particular, one may
note a positive trend for the county constituencies prior to the reforms in 1918 and
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1948, highlighting the importance of accounting for population trends in the statistical
analyses.
Figure 5.5 – Reforms of Spending Limit Formula. Reforms of
the spending limit formula affect county and borough constituencies
differently.
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Note: The x-axis represents years relative to the spending limit reforms. The y-axis represents the
spending limits. The solid and dashed lines show the average spending limit in county and borough
constituencies, respectively.
In Table 5.5, I present the statistical first-stage results. I report the coefficients on
all potential instruments: the countyit variable, which is identified using reclassification
variation, along with the interactions between county and various post-reform dummies
that are identified using reforms of the policy parameters. log(spending limitit) in the
first three columns and spending limitit in the last three columns are the outcomes,
representing the endogenous variables in the 2SLS estimation. In some specifications,
I linearly control for the number of electors and for population density, allowing the
coefficients to vary across years. In Table C.1 in the Appendix, I show that the results
are not sensitive to controlling for logged rather than linear covariates.
The coefficient on the countyit variable is positive, highly statistically significant,
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Table 5.5 – First-Stage Results. Constituency reclassifications and
changes in policy parameters induce substantial, strong, and statisti-
cally significant shocks to spending limits.
log(Spending Limitit) Spending Limitit (£1000)
Countyit 0.884
∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 82.166∗∗∗ 59.717∗∗∗ 59.934∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.006) (0.006) (2.267) (0.988) (1.035)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1918]t -0.476∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗ -59.142∗∗∗ -47.398∗∗∗ -47.816∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.005) (0.004) (1.301) (0.629) (0.663)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1929]t -0.039∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ 2.382∗ -2.809∗∗∗ -2.889∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.938) (0.088) (0.127)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1949]t -0.092∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -10.088∗∗∗ -7.971∗∗∗ -7.824∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (1.120) (0.170) (0.206)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1970]t 0.043∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.083) (0.057) (0.062)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1974]t -0.035∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗ -0.102 -0.194∗
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.254) (0.073) (0.079)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1978]t 0.047∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.040
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.029) (0.016) (0.051)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1982]t -0.058∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.002 -1.898∗∗∗ -0.183† -0.192†
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.376) (0.095) (0.109)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1987]t 0.004∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.016
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.014) (0.020)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1992]t 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.006
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.014) (0.015)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1997]t -0.018∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.393∗ 0.122∗∗ -0.002
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.181) (0.044) (0.049)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315
Constituencies 1636 1636 1466 1636 1636 1466
Joint instrument sign. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constituency FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
θtelectorsit X X X X
γtdensityit X X
Note: All models are estimated using OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered on constituencies and
are reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
and substantial in magnitude which is not surprising in light of the previous section’s
discussion. On average, the county constituency classification induces an increase in in
the spending limit in the range of 0.69 to 0.88 log points as compared to constituencies
classified as boroughs. This is equivalent to an approximate 70 to 90% increase. In
levels, the average increase in the spending limit is in the range of £60,000 to £80,000.
The difference between the estimates in columns 1 and 2 (and equivalently, in columns
4 and 5) suggests a minor trending pattern in the reclassified constituencies. Once I
account for the number of electors, controlling for density does not appear to matter
much.
Turning next to the coefficients on the interaction terms, it is immediately clear
that most of the reforms, on average, had a different impact on county versus borough
constituencies. Up until the 1970s, the reforms substantially reduced the difference in
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spending limits between counties and boroughs, whereas later reforms increased the
difference, albeit very moderately. Reforms instituted in recent years only marginally
influenced the disparity between spending limits across counties and boroughs.
Given that most coefficients are independently statistically significant, it makes sense
that the instruments are jointly statistically significantly different from zero as well.
In summation, both the graphical and statistical analyses suggest that constituency
reclassifications, as well as reforms of policy parameters, had a substantial impact on
spending limits, thus satisfying the relevance criterion. Therefore, I carry on to discuss
the main results in the next section, focusing on the impact of spending limits on the
supply of candidates and electoral competition.
5.7 High Spending Limits Reduce Candidate Supply and
Electoral Competition
In this section, I examine how campaign spending limits affect candidate supply and
electoral competition. Presumably, the cost of running for office influences the supply
of candidates, in that if elections are overly costly, certain candidates may be deterred
from entering the race, thereby affecting the size and composition of the candidate pool
from which voters are able to select public officials. I measure candidate supply using
the following variables: Unopposed Candidateit is a dummy indicating an instance where
only a single party fielded a candidate, thus winning the general election uncontested;
More Than Two Candidates it is a dummy indicating a situation where at least three
candidates ran for the seat.
Spending limits may also influence the propensity of constituents to concentrate
their votes on one or two front running candidates. The effective number of candidates,
Effective Candidates it,
22 is indicative of the number of candidates, as well as the com-
petition among them. Top Two Vtshit captures the percentage of votes cast in favor of
the top two candidates, a standard indicator of strategic voting behavior(e.g. Hall and
Snyder Jr 2015). Win Marginit, which captures the intensity of the campaign between
the top two candidates, is yet another measure of electoral competition.
Table 5.6 presents the main results from the 2SLS analyses: Columns 1-4 report the
22The effective number of candidates is defined as 1/
∑
c∈C
v2cit, where vcit is the vote share of candidate
c, and C is the total number of candidates running in constituency i at time t
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estimates based only on shocks to policy parameters; columns 5-7 report the estimates
based only on reclassification shocks; in columns 8-11, I report the estimates obtained by
combining the two preceding types of shocks. In Tables C.2 and C.3 in the Appendix,
I show that the results are robust to various econometric specifications and different
functional-form assumptions.
Table 5.6 – Effect of Spending Limits on Candidate Supply
and Electoral Competition. On average, an increase in spending
limits causes fewer candidates to run for office, fosters strategic voting,
and reduces electoral competition.
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Unopposed Candidateit
log(Spending Limitit) 0.16
∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: More Than Two Candidatesit
log(Spending Limitit) -0.16
∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗ -0.30† -0.05 -0.13∗ -0.11† -0.07∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.16∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.16) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Effective Candidatesit
log(Spending Limitit) -0.12
∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Top Two Vtshit
log(Spending Limitit) 4.07
∗∗∗ 6.56∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 14.83∗∗∗ 0.70 2.31† 1.41 1.46† 5.13∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗ 4.27∗∗∗
(1.00) (1.16) (1.38) (3.91) (0.73) (1.19) (1.32) (0.75) (1.10) (1.28) (1.22)
Observations 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 15761 17647
Outcome: Win Marginit
log(Spending Limitit) 3.96
† 4.80† 6.70∗ 10.74† 3.99∗∗ 6.77∗ 6.58∗ 3.93∗∗ 5.58∗ 6.79∗ 6.54∗
(2.15) (2.55) (2.78) (6.05) (1.44) (2.73) (2.99) (1.45) (2.38) (2.67) (2.59)
Observations 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 15761 17647
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t , ∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t , ∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models are estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
In the first panel (Outcome: Unopposed Candidate), I examine how spending limits
affect the probability of an uncontested election. Column 1 presents the results from
the baseline model based on changes in policy parameters and without any covariate
adjustment apart from constituency- and year-fixed effects. Column 5 presents the
equivalent results based on the reclassification instrument. The baseline results are
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that higher spending limits lead to more
uncontested elections. The results are fairly stable when I control for the number of
electors (in columns 2, 6, and 9) and for elector density (in columns 4, 7, and 10), as
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well as when I treat the 1918 policy change mentioned earlier as a covariate rather than
as an excluded instrument.
Across all models, the estimated coefficients are positive, statistically significant, and
substantial in magnitude. A single log-point increase in the spending limit, or approxi-
mately the equivalent of a one-percent increment, causes an increase in the probability
of an uncontested election of approximately 0.1. Estimates based on reclassification
variation are slightly smaller in magnitude compared to those based on policy changes,
but overall, the results are relatively stable across specifications and instruments.
In the second panel (Outcome: More Than Two Candidates), I show how spending
limits affect the probability of a race being contested by more than two candidates.
All these estimates are negative and statistically significant. Most estimates centered
around the -0.15 mark, suggesting that a one percent increase in the spending limit
reduces the probability of an election being contested by more than two candidates by
approximately 15 percentage points. Again, the findings appear to be relatively stable
across econometric specifications.
The results in the third panel (Outcome: Effective Candidates) are consistent with
the findings reported in the two first. These results are also negative across all specifi-
cations, once more, indicating that higher spending limits reduce the effective number
of candidates who run for office. On average, a one percent increase in the spending
limit reduces the effective number of candidates competing in the general election by
approximately 0.1.
Why might candidates be reluctant to run for office when spending limits are high,
as the findings suggest? One might reasonably surmise that candidates, at least to some
extent, strategically forecast how the spending limit will affect their costs and potential
benefits of running for office, taking into account their financial position as compared to
that of their fellow candidate(s). An explanation that is observationally consistent with
the findings is that high spending limits impose too high costs on candidates: Some
candidates may not have the financial resources or the connections needed to raise the
additional funds, or it may be too costly – in terms of time and energy – for them to
raise the money to make it worthwhile. Another possibility is that high spending limits
diminish the expected benefits of running for office for some candidates by reducing
their perceived probability of winning: Even if candidates have the necessary financial
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resources, they may expect to lose the election because, compared to their opponent(s),
they have a low marginal spending efficiency. The ultimate consequence of the above
scenarios may be that some candidates strategically decide not to run at all.
In the fourth panel (Outcome: Top Two Vtsh), I examine the impact of spending
limits on strategic voting as measured by the vote share of the two frontrunners. All
estimates are positive and many are statistically significant. Most of the estimates
are located in the interval between 1 and 5, suggesting that a one percent increase
in the spending limit causes a 1 to 5 percentage-point increase in the percentage of
votes cast for the top two candidates. To put it differently, electors appear to behave
more strategically, and are less likely to waste votes on non-viable candidates when
candidates have the wherewithal to spend more money. One way to interpret this finding
revolves around information: Voters tend to vote more strategically in high information
environments (Hall and Snyder Jr 2015), and, to the extent that campaign spending
leads to better informed voters, high spending limits may induce a concentration of
votes on the front-running candidates.
Finally, in the fifth panel (Outcome: Win Margin), I explore how spending limits
affect the vote share winning margin. All estimates are positive, statistically significant,
and substantial in magnitude. In other words, the winning margin noticeably widens in
relation to the higher amount of money candidates are permitted to spend.
What do we make of these findings? On the one hand, the results are consistent
with a scenario in which some candidates enjoy excessive financial advantages, and in
which those advantages reduce electoral competition to their benefit. On the other
hand, the findings are observationally consistent with an equilibrium in which higher
level of campaign spending help voters to weed out weaker candidates, and in which
low-quality candidates may strategically foresee their defeat and, in response, refrain
from running for office. To shed further light on the channels through which campaign
spending limits impact electoral competition, I explore how the limits affect campaign
strategies in the next section.
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5.8 High Spending Limits Promote Professionalized Cam-
paigns
How do candidates change their campaign strategies when spending limits are raised?
To answer this question, I aggregate spending across candidates within a specific con-
stituency in a given election by each of the seven different spending categories outlined
earlier:
yjit =
∑
c∈C
yjcit , (5.10)
where yjcit is the spending on category j by candidate c in constituency i at time t, and
C is the set of candidates running in the constituency. I then use the seven expenditure
category variables as outcomes and re-estimate the system of equations (Equations 5.8
and 5.9) for each of them. The endogenous spending limit variable and the outcomes
are all measured in levels (total British pounds). In Figure 5.6, I report the results from
a simple baseline model that linearly controls for the number of electors. In Tables C.4,
C.5, and C.6 in the Appendix, I present the full set of results and show that they are not
sensitive to the choice of instrument, econometric specification, or to functional-form
assumptions.
The results suggest that some expenditure categories are much more reactive to
changes in the legal spending maximum than others. In particular, the salaries of
campaign managers appear to be very sensitive to the legal spending limit: When the
limit increases by one pound, the average spending on campaign managers increases by
approximately 40 to 50 pence. This is a substantial leap when one takes into account
that the average spending on campaign managers never exceeds 30% of total spending in
a given year and accounts for less than 15% of total spending in most years as indicated
by Figure 5.2. This finding can be interpreted in a number of ways. One interpretation
is that candidates hire better qualified and hence higher-paid campaign managers, or
increase an existing campaign manager’s hours, when the limits are high. Naturally,
candidates want to run professional and effective campaigns. Hiring experienced, highly
competent managers may help them to achieve this goal. Another interpretation is that
campaign managers, who by law have the authority to approve all expenses, allocate
more money to themselves when spending limits permit them to do so, not because this
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Figure 5.6 – Effect of Spending Limits on Different Types of
Outlays. When spending limits are high, candidates professionalize
their campaigns by allocating more money to campaign managers and
advertisement, and less to expenditure categories associated with face-
to-face campaigning, such as public meetings.
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Note: The graph reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. All estimates were obtained
using 2SLS.
is necessarily the most efficient way of spending the money, but because they control the
campaign budget and simply have the power to allocate the money as they see fit. Yet
another interpretation is that candidates underreport salaries when the spending limit
is low, but truthfully report them when the limit is high as this category of expenditure
is difficult to audit.
The next most sensitive spending category is advertisement and printing. For each
one-pound increase in the spending limit, candidates allocate, on average, 20 to 30
pence on advertisement and printed materials. Unlike door-to-door campaigning, this
type of mass communication facilitates the diffusion of political information on a larger
scale and to a wide range of voters at a comparably low cost. Presumably, the marginal
return on this category of investment is relatively high – all else being equal, it is easier
for voters to remember the name of a candidate whom they see advertised in the local
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newspaper, and whose photo appears on distributed pamphlets and roadside billboards.
Turning to the lower end of the spectrum of estimated effects, we see that candidates
do not appear to increase their spending on public meetings, personal expenses, and
renting of rooms in response to heightened spending limits, or, at most, they only do
so marginally. A common feature of these expense categories is that they are primarily
related to face-to-face campaign strategies in which candidates travel around their con-
stituency to meet with voters in person, by renting rooms for organized public meetings,
for example. Likewise personal expenses, which mainly consists of outlays associated
with travelling and accommodation, are crucial if candidates are to visit voters in all
parts of their constituency.23
Taken together, these findings could indicate that higher spending limits give rise to
more professional electoral campaigns, characterized by the engagement of salaried po-
litical advisors and managers, a greater reliance on mass communications and advertise-
ment, and relatively few resources devoted to personal interaction between candidates
and their constituents.
5.9 High Spending Limits Benefit Center-Right Candi-
dates
Spending limits may not affect all candidates equally. Some candidates have easier
access to financial resources, making it easier for them to respond to changes in the
spending limit, whereas other candidates find it more difficult to acquire the necessary
campaign funds. In this section, I explore how the legal restrictions on spending affect
expenditures across parties. More specifically, I estimate the impact of an increase in
the spending limit on total spending by each party. In Figure 5.7, I report the results
from a simple baseline model that linearly controls for the number of electors, and in
Tables C.7, C.8, and C.9 in the Appendix, I present the full set of results and show
that they are not sensitive to the choice of instrument, econometric specification, or to
functional-form assumptions.
The results reveal a clear and stable pattern across parties. On average, candidates
from the Conservative and Liberal (Dem.) parties increase their spending by approx-
23In particularly, this was important in the earlier part of the studied period where travelling from one
end of a constituency to the other was not a trivial matter in some areas of the country.
117
imately 50 and 40 pence, respectively, for each pound increase in the spending limit;
candidates representing the Labour party as well as minor parties do not, at least on
average, increase their campaign spending at all when the limit is raised.
Although it is probably not surprising that Conservative candidates react more
quickly to hikes in spending limits than do other parties’ candidates, the responsiveness
of the Liberal (Dem.) party and the unresponsiveness of Labour and other parties are
somewhat striking. When interpreting the results, one has to keep in mind that the
estimated effect is a LATE and, as discussed above, weighted towards constituencies
with a greater number of electors. These constituencies have high spending limits to
begin with, therefore the lack of sensitivity among Labour candidates with respect to
spending limits perhaps reflects that the initial, lower restrictions were not binding
for these candidates to begin with. To put it differently, the initial spending limits, in
general, are so high in constituencies affected by the instruments that Labour candidates
do not spend even close to the limit, thus any fluctuation in the limit, either up or down,
does not affect their behavior. However, it seems reasonable that the ranking of the
effects across parties would be fairly similar across constituencies.
How can we account for the pattern across parties? At least up until the 1950s, and
one might suppose still, to some extent, candidates in all three major parties personally
contributed significant amounts to their political campaigns(for a detailed discussion
see Pinto-Duschinsky 1981: ch. 5-7) However, the personal wealth of candidates varies
systematically across parties, or at least it did historically. Conservative candidates
were, in general, more aﬄuent than were Liberal or, in particular, Labour candidates.
The campaign spending inelasticity could be driven by constraints on personal finances
faced by relatively poor Labour candidates.
Another explanation for the spending pattern focuses on the differences in external
funding sources. Throughout the studied period, Labour candidates relied heavily on
financial support from unions, and political campaigns were by necessity closely and
centrally coordinated with these. On the other hand, the Conservative party, and to a
lesser extent the Liberals, being much more decentralized in their organizational struc-
ture, predominately solicited campaign contributions from local businesses and wealthy
individuals. Given the above dynamics between politicians and citizenry, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that unions placed great import on securing a Labour majority while
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Figure 5.7 – Effect of Legal Limits on Spending by Parties.
Spending by Conservative and Liberal (Dem.) candidates is sensitive
to changes in the legal maximum, whereas spending by candidates
representing Labour and minor parties is not.
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Note: The graph reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. All estimates were obtained
using 2SLS.
they cared less about the actual identity of the Labour candidates themselves. Con-
versely, it was presumably important to the many small, local businesses supporting
a Conservative candidate’s campaign that their specific constituency elected the Con-
servative candidate. This distinction between centralised and decentralized sources of
funding for Labour and Conservative candidates, respectively, is somewhat stylized, but
could potentially account for the differences in the spending elasticity. In response to
a rise in the spending limit, it may be easier for a Conservative candidate to solicit
campaign contributions from local businesses than it would be for a Labour candidate
to convince the union leaders to funnel more money towards their constituency.
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5.10 High Spending Limits Benefit Incumbents
In the context of U.S. elections, studies have documented that incumbents benefit
from substantial financial advantages relative to challengers (Fouirnaies and Hall 2014).
Those fundraising advantages may become exaggerated when candidates are allowed to
spend more money on their electoral campaigns. In this section, I explore how expen-
diture limits affect spending differentials between incumbents and challengers.
For each spending category, j, the spending differential is defined as the difference
between expenditures by the candidate representing the party who won the seat in the
previous election and all other candidates:
yjit = y
j
cit|c∈Wit −
∑
c/∈Wit
yjcit , (5.11)
where yjit represents the spending differential on category j in constituency i at time t;
yjcit is the spending on expenditure category j by candidate c in constituency i in election
t; Wit is the set containing the candidate representing the winning party at time t− 1.
To avoid selection problems stemming from the strategic retirement of incumbents, the
incumbency definition is based on the incumbency status of the party and not of the
individual candidate.
Using the spending differentials between incumbents and challengers as outcome
variables, I re-estimate the system of equations outlined above (Equations 5.8 and 5.9).
In Figure 5.8, I present the main results from a simple baseline model with linear
control variables. In Tables C.10, C.11 and C.12 in the Appendix, I present the full set
of results and show that the findings are robust to different econometric specifications
and alternative functional-form assumptions.
The results support the idea that higher spending limits financially benefit incum-
bent candidates: When the spending limit is raised, incumbent candidates outspend
challengers. On average, a single pound increase in the spending limit precipitates an
approximately 5-pence increases in the spending differentials pertaining to advertise-
ment and campaign managers. More to the point, when the spending limit increases,
the incumbent candidate spends more money on advertisement and on hiring profes-
sional political advisors than do all challenging candidates taken together. However,
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Figure 5.8 – Effect of Legal Limit on Spending Differential be-
tween Incumbents and Challengers. Higher legal limits increase
the spending differential between incumbents and challengers on ex-
penditures related to advertisement and campaign managers.
Personal
Staff
Misc.
Rooms
Meetings
Managers
Advertisement
-.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Effect of Limit on Spending Differential
between Incumbents and Challengers
Point Est.
95% Conf.
Note: The graph reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. All estimates were obtained
using 2SLS.
changes in spending limits do not appear to affect the spending differential related to
other types of outlays in any systematic way.
These findings could indicate that high spending limits enable incumbents to run ad-
vanced, professional campaigns that reach broad segments of voters, whereas challengers
with proportionally limited access to financial resources are held back from running more
than basic and unsophisticated campaigns that crucially depend on volunteers.
5.11 Conclusion
Half of the democratic countries in the world impose limits on the amount of money
candidates are legally permitted to spend on their political campaigns. Still, we know
little about the electoral consequences of this widespread campaign finance institution.
This paper examines the consequences of campaign spending limits in the context
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of U.K. House of Commons elections. I offer a new dataset containing disaggregated
information on the campaign expenditures of candidates running for office from 1885 to
2010. On the basis of this data and employing an empirical strategy that exploits within-
constituency changes in spending limits induced by shocks to formula coefficients and
formula inputs, I assess how spending limits influence electoral practices and behaviors.
The results suggest that allowing candidates to spend more money diminishes the pool of
candidates running for office, reduces electoral competition, encourages professionalized
political campaigns, and tends to benefit incumbents and candidates representing center-
right parties.
To what extent can these findings be generalized to other countries? As noted
in the introduction, many countries, globally, are strongly influenced or have wholly
adopted central aspects of the regulatory regime governing campaign finance in the
U.K. House of Commons. This could suggest that the conclusions reached in this paper
may be extended to a broader spectrum of countries. The fact that Milligan and Rekkas
(2008) drew similar inferences (i.e. higher limits lead to less close elections and fewer
candidates) based on Canadian elections supports the idea that these conclusions may
apply to other countries whose electoral processes have been shaped by the Westminster
system of political finance.
The conclusions from this paper could indicate that campaign finance institutions
may have, at a general level, farther-reaching, longer-term consequences for the de-
velopment of political systems and may fundamentally shape political cultures more
than previously assumed. The findings could shed new light on our understanding of
important questions in comparative politics that have long puzzled political scientists:
Why is it the case that Duverger’s law, the claim that plurality rule produces two-party
systems, “appears to work perfectly in the U.S.” (McDonald 2009; Grofman, Blais, and
Bowler 2009: p. 135), while it does a poor job of explaining the number of parties the
U.K. (Gaines 2009), Canada (Johnston and Cutler 2009), and India (Nikolenyi 2009)?
Why does the incumbency advantage appear to be so much stronger in U.S. elections
than it does in the U.K. and Canada (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; Eggers and
Spirling 2015; Gaines 1998)? Why is there no Labor party in the U.S., when the labor
movement was able to secure political representation in the U.K., Canada and in other
countries with Westminster systems of government (Archer 2010; Sombart 1976)? Why
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are U.S. political campaigns more professionalized than are campaigns in the U.K. and
many other countries (Blumler and Gurevitch 2001; Plasser 2000)?
The answers to salient, comparative questions like these are obviously complex and
manifold. The results presented in this paper could indicate that a certain extent of the
explanations may be deeply rooted in the distinct characteristics of campaign finance
institutions around the world.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis examines, empirically, how political power affects the distribution of cam-
paign contributions, and how campaign spending affects the distribution of political
power through electoral competition. More specifically, it addresses the following ques-
tions:
(i) What is the financial value of incumbency status, and who generates it?
(ii) Who values legislative agenda setters, and why do they do so?
(iii) What are the electoral consequences of statutory limits on campaign expenditure?
These questions are each examined in three separate papers, but taken together, the
answers make up a coherent argument: Campaign donors contribute money to the
insiders of powerful political elites in exchange for access to the policy-making process,
and that the power of these elites is sustained, at least in part, due to these contributions.
In the first paper, I use a regression discontinuity design to document that incum-
bents in U.S. state and federal elections enjoy sizeable financial advantages relative to
their challengers. On average, incumbency status fosters a 20 to 25 percentage-point
boost in the incumbent party’s share of total contributions. Examining the heterogene-
ity in the treatment effect, I discuss three explanations for the financial incumbency
advantage commonly referred to in the related literature. Namely, that incumbents are
financially advantaged because they a) exploit office holder benefits, such as the franking
privilege and district offices; b) develop fundraising and networking skills while in of-
fice; or c) are targeted by access-seeking industries more pointedly than are challengers.
The data contains nothing to support the first two hypotheses, but it does produce
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strong evidence in favor of the third. Donors from access-seeking industries, especially
donors from industries subject to heavy regulations, systematically target donations
towards incumbents. On average, these donations generate approximately two-thirds of
the financial advantage enjoyed by those incumbents.
In the second paper, I use a difference-in-difference design to show that, relative to
rank-and-file legislators, U.S. legislators who are institutionally endowed with agenda-
setting powers are given special treatment by campaign donors. Using a new dataset
exhibiting institutional power in the state legislatures, I show that party leadership, com-
mittee chairmanship, and majority-party membership are three valuable institutional
assets, but that they are valued differently by various groups in society: In general,
access-seeking groups with narrow and well-defined regulatory interests value these in-
stitutional assets more than do ideologically driven groups and individuals. Ideologically
driven groups and individuals are most sensitive to party leadership positions, whereas
access-seeking industries are highly sensitive to all agenda-setting assets. Access-seeking
industries appear to target majority-party members in general, but committee chairs in
particular. A chair is held in even higher esteem by regulated industries whose business
activities are overseen by that chair’s committee, and in particular in chambers where
committees have the faculty to block bills from reaching the chamber floor.
Finally, I use an instrumental variables approach in the third paper to study the
effect of statutory spending limits on electoral behavior in the context of U.K. House
of Commons elections. Exploiting within-constituency changes in spending limits in-
duced by administrative reclassifications of constituency types and by reforms of the
spending limit formula, I show that unrestrained spending diminishes the pool of can-
didates, reduces electoral competition, fosters professionalized campaigns, and benefits
incumbents and parties with connections to wealthy individuals and businesses.
6.1 Money in Politics: Problems and Solutions
Chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis outline what might be considered to be, in modern repre-
sentative democracies, intrinsic problems of representation and accountability induced
by campaign finance, while Chapter 5 discusses a potential solution to those problems.
Can we conclude from the findings that the financial advantages enjoyed by powerful
politicians are cause for concern? There are, potentially, two separate but connected
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problems. The first problem is a question of misrepresentation of interests and con-
cerns whether or not campaign finance creates a bias in the policy-making process by
pulling policy away from the preferences of constituents. As suggested by the findings
in Chapters 3 and 4, access-seeking interest groups appear to behave very strategically
when they allocate campaign contributions, targeting substantial amounts towards in-
cumbents in general, and towards agenda setters in particular. Moreover, this behavior
is most pronounced when donors have significant economic interests at stake. In the
long run, the sizeable contributions from these donors would not be consistent with the
notion of profit-maximizing firms unless donors could expect to receive something in
return for their contributions. This could suggest that powerful legislators accept cam-
paign contributions in exchange for political favors or for giving donors privileged access
to the political process. Of course, out-right vote buying is illegal in most countries: the
results from the U.S. could indicate that legislators provide more sophisticated services,
such as negative agenda control, earlier in the political process, making it far less likely
for them to incriminate themselves. Nonetheless, the outcome of unbalanced campaign
finance engender a systematic bias in the policy-making process towards the interests of
access-seeking groups or to maintaining the status quo. If the interests of access-seeking
groups are misaligned with the interests of the broader population, this may be a cause
for concern.
The second problem is a question of accountability. It concerns whether or not
financial advantages electorally insulate privileged candidates to such a degree that
voters find it difficult to hold them responsible for their actions. It is important to stress
that electoral advantages enjoyed by elected politicians are not, in and of themselves,
necessarily normatively troubling. In equilibrium, the electoral advantages may simply
be the result of esteemed conduct, conduct that is justly rewarded with a higher number
of votes. However, to the extent that an electoral advantage is generated by campaign
contributions, a legislator may become insulated from re-election concerns in ways that
weaken the ability of voters to punish poor performance. It is difficult to ascertain the
degree to which campaign finance induces an accountability problem without knowing
exactly how money translate into votes, but it seems plausible that more money injected
into politics would only serve to exacerbate the accountability issue.
In some countries, and most notably in the U.S., statutory limits on campaign
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spending are deemed to be unconstitutional, at least in the simple form discussed in
Chapter 5, hence regulating money in politics using spending limits is not feasible in
these countries. Leaving aside questions of legality or constitutionality, though, could
campaign spending limits be the solution to the problems of policy bias and electoral
insulation induced by campaign donations?
The answer to this question is more complicated. On the one hand, imposing statu-
tory limits on campaign spending has clear advantages. Firstly, imposing limits on
spending implies limiting the extent to which candidates may feel indebted towards
donors. If candidates are prohibited from running expensive electoral campaigns, the
scope for selling political favors diminishes, which in turn may lessen the problem of
misrepresentation.
Secondly, spending limits may level the financial field upon which electoral campaign
battles are fought. The campaign finance system financially advantages incumbent
legislators, in particular legislative agenda setters, and if campaign spending, to some
extent, produces more votes, this benefits these candidates electorally. Imposing a legal
maximum on campaign expenditure would moderate the advantages.
Thirdly, imposing restrictions on campaign spending appears to foster electoral com-
petition. Electoral competition may encourage incumbents to be more responsive to the
demands of their constituents, and it may reduce the potential bias favoring monied in-
terest groups in the policy-making process. Due to the initial electoral advantages
enjoyed by incumbents, access-seeking industries allocate more resources to incumbents
than to their challengers because investments in those candidates yield a higher ex-
pected return than investments in challenging candidates. Electoral competition may
not only reduce the incumbency advantage, making it less attractive for access-seeking
industries to target incumbents, but may also reduce the incumbent legislators’ feelings
of obligation to these interest groups, alleviating the bias in the policy-making process.
On the other hand, there are notable downsides to imposing spending limits. Allow-
ing candidates to spend unlimited reserves on campaign activities may lead to superior
electoral campaigns and, as a result, produce more politically informed voters. As doc-
umented in Chapter 5, one of the consequences of higher spending is that candidates,
with the aim of reaching more voters, run more professional campaigns. To the extent
that these campaigns enable voters to make more informed decisions and to select better
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candidates, high levels of spending may lead to socially desirable outcomes, improving
the welfare of voters and the broader citizenry.
Asymmetries in campaign strategies could mean that spending limits impose con-
strains only on certain types of candidates. More specifically, restrictive limits may
not only reduce the intrinsic disadvantages faced by challengers and parties with poor
financial networks, but may even give them unfair advantages over other candidates.
Typically, challengers and candidates representing left-wing parties, who have relatively
easy access to networks of party activists, grassroots endeavors, unions, etc., often struc-
ture their campaigns around such labor intensive activities as door-to-door campaigns.
Conversely, incumbents and center-right party candidates, who tend to be more closely
connected with wealthy businesses and individuals, more often run capital intensive
campaigns, involving expensive advertising and a wide distribution of printed campaign
materials. While it is difficult to quantify the value of the former type of campaign
activity, the value of the latter is fairly evident and relatively easy to document. As a
consequence, even though all candidates would de jure face the same spending limits,
only those candidates who depend on capital intensive campaign strategies would de
facto be restricted.
6.2 Three Important Academic Contributions
The empirical findings in this thesis add nuances to our current understanding of the
interplay between campaign finance and political power, but three aspects of the project
stand out as particularly significant and highly important academic contributions that
will push the research on money in politics forward.
The first, as well as the most concrete and tangible contributions born out of this
Ph.D. project is the compilation of two new datasets. Many hypotheses on leadership
and committee power contained in the theoretical literature on legislative organization
will not be able to be tested with U.S. House data in the foreseeable future. However,
the more than 30,000 observations in the new dataset on party and committee leaders in
state legislatures permits the empirical testing which has, thus far, been lacking. Upon
publication of the paper in Chapter 4, I will make this new dataset publicly available.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the limited availability of relevant data is presumably
one of the main reasons why the literature on campaign finance revolves primarily
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around U.S. elections. The new dataset on U.K. campaign spending, with over 61,000
candidate-year observations spanning a period of more than 130 years, provides a num-
ber of data points that exceeds the current number of observations from U.S. federal
legislative elections. Besides the obvious value as a source for political and economic
historians, this extensive new dataset will enable future researchers to test whether or
not conclusions drawn from U.S. data may be generalized to Westminster systems of
government. In addition to the low-hanging fruit of replicating U.S. studies based on
U.K data, perhaps more importantly, the detailed and disaggregated information on
different types of expenditures will allow scholars to develop and substantiate new the-
ories around the spending side of campaign finance, a field of study which is currently
underdeveloped relative to other aspects of political research. Once Chapter 5 has been
published, I will make this dataset publicly available, as well.
The second and more substantive contribution resulting from the development of
this thesis is the empirical evidence documenting how the campaign finance system
financially benefits insiders of political elites. While scholars have long been aware
that incumbents, particularly party leaders and committee chairs, raise more money
than challengers, research up until this point has not convincingly disentangled selec-
tion issues from institutional effects. Leaning on much weaker assumptions than those
employed in previous studies, this thesis documents the causal effects of incumbency
status and agenda-setting positions on a candidate’s ability to attract campaign con-
tributions. In other words, the evidence isolates the institutional effects. Furthermore,
while scholars have theorized about the motivations driving political donations, I use
disaggregated campaign finance data, along with information on the identity of donors
and variations in the institutional powers of legislators, to give a detailed empirical
account of why some groups are more sensitive to political power than others.
Finally, the evidence supporting the consequences of statuatory limits on campaign
spending constitute a third academically significant contribution. Many scholars of
campaign finance have theorized about these consequences, but this thesis is the first
major empirical study that identifies the impact of campaign spending caps on electoral
behavior under relatively weak and justifiable identification assumptions. Not only
do the key findings in this thesis challenge core arguments laid out in the literature
on money in politics, the results of it may also help us to improve the institutional
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design of policies that were originally created to uphold the fundamental principles of
representative democracy.
Schattschneider (1960) famously noted that the choir of interests groups sings with
a distinctively upper-class accent. While scholars have long been aware that moneyed
interests may induce bias into the political process, the exact nature of the bias has
been obscure. The evidence provided in this thesis suggests that the root of this bias,
the fundamental reason why the voices of some interest groups ring out more clearly
than others, may be deeply entrenched in the interplay between political power and
campaign finance in modern representative democracies.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Financial Incumbency
Advantage
The appendix consists of two sections. The first section presents results and calculations
that are mentioned but not included in the paper. The second section presents a variety
of robustness checks.
A.1 Additional Results and Calculations
In the paper we mention that the impact of incumbency on total contributions is sub-
stantial. To estimate the average effect of incumbency while taking into account that
the effect could differ across Republican and Democratic incumbents, we reshape the
data such that we have one observation for each party in every election, and estimate
equations of the form:1
Party Levelpi,t+1 = β0 + β1Party Winnerpit + f(Zpit) + pi,t+1 (A.1)
where Party Levelpi,t+1 is the total contributions that go to party p in district i in elec-
tion t. The variable Party Winnerpit is an indicator variable that takes the value one
when district i reelects the candidate from party p in election t. By setting up the
regression this way, we obtain a weighted average of the incumbency effects for Demo-
cratic and Republican contributions. However, results are substantively identical when
choosing instead to focus only on one party or the other. The function f(Zpit) repre-
sents the function of the running variable, the vote share winning margin of party p in
district i in election t. We use a 5 percentage-point bandwidth around the discontinuity.
Table A.1 shows how incumbency affects the level of campaign contributions. The
results indicate that incumbency has a substantial impact on the level of donations. On
average, incumbency approximately causes a $275,000 and $29,000 jump in campaign
contributions in the U.S. House and state legislatures, respectively. Further, the esti-
mates indicate that donations from access-oriented interest groups account for a huge
part of the overall financial incumbency advantage. At the state level, approximately
71% of the overall financial incumbency advantage appears to be driven by the dona-
tions from interest groups, and at the federal level approximately 60% of the average
effect seems to come from access-oriented interest groups.
Table A.2 presents a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of the
financial incumbency advantage on vote shares. The crude idea is simply to multiply
the dollar estimates obtained in this paper with the estimates of the effect of incumbents’
1The level estimates are not sensitive to the specific estimation approach outline below. The estimates
based on Democratic and Republican incumbents are essentially the same.
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Table A.1 – RDD Results: Effect of Incumbency on Total Contribu-
tions and Investor Contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Investor Total Investor
Party Win
(time t) 275.63∗ 165.70∗ 28.26∗ 20.07∗
(55.72) (15.64) (8.31) (2.93)
Constant 512.83∗ 124.65∗ 70.40∗ 20.98∗
(37.99) (9.18) (5.16) (1.29)
Observations 1136 1136 8040 8040
Level Federal Federal Federal Federal
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The reported standard errors are the maximum of robust
and robust standard errors clustered by elections. All models are estimated using OLS with a linear
specification of the forcing variable estimated separately on each side of the discontinuity. The outcome
variables in models 1 and 3 are the party’s total contributions at t+1 (1000 dollars measured in constant
1990 dollars), and the outcome variable in models 2 and 4 are total donations to the party by investor
contributors at t+ 1 (1000 dollars measured in constant 1990 dollars). All models are estimated based
on a 5 pct. bandwidth. ∗ p < 0.05.
campaign spending on vote shares from the literature.
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Table A.2 – Calculation of the Impact of the Financial Incumbency
Advantage on Vote Shares
Author Approach Level Time Period Point Estimate Total Impact Investor Impact
Vote Shares Vote Shares
Jacobson (1985) OLS U.S. House 1972–1982 0.20 % 0.55 % 0.33 %
Green and Krasno (1988) OLS U.S. House 1978 0.10 % 0.28 % 0.17 %
Green and Krasno (1988) TSLS U.S. House 1978 2.20 % 6.07 % 3.67 %
Thomas (1989) OLS U.S. House 1978–1980 1.41 % 3.89 % 2.34 %
Abramowitz (1991) OLS U.S. House 1984–1986 0.42 % 1.16 % 0.70 %
Levitt (1994) Repeat chal. U.S. House 1972–1990 0.10 % 0.28 % 0.17 %
Gius (2010) OLS U.S. House 2006 0.46 % 1.27 % 0.76 %
Magee (2012) Repeat. chal. U.S. House 1980 – 2006 0.13% 0.37 % 0.20 %
Magee (2012) TSLS U.S. House 1980 – 2006 0.23% 0.63 % 0.38 %
Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) OLS State Legisl. 1986 5.00 % 1.41 % 1.00 %
Stratmann (2006) TSLS State Legisl. 1996–2000 2.67 % 0.76 % 0.54 %
Note: The point estimates indicate the estimated (linear) increase in the percentage points of votes
through a $ 100.000 increase (1990 Dollars). For ease of comparison across years, all point estimates
from the literature are a adjusted to 1990 Dollars. The total impact is calculated by multiplying the
point estimates from the literature with 2.75 or 0.29 for U.S. House and State legislatures, respectively
(the effect of incumbency on total campaign contributions (1990 Dollars). Likewise the investor impact
is calculated by multiplying the point estimates with 1.65 and 0.20 for U.S. House and State legisla-
tures, respectively (the effect of incumbency on campaign contributions from investors (1990 Dollars))
Calculations are available from the authors upon request.
A.2 Robustness Checks
The consistency of the RDD estimates obtained in this paper rests on the crucial as-
sumption that all other factors are continuous around the cutoff. Recently, Caughey
and Sekhon (2011) have questioned whether assignment to treatment is random in close
U.S. House elections. To support the claim that our RDD estimates are not biased by
sorting at the cutoff, we conduct a number of robustness checks.
First, we reestimate Equation 3.3 but include additional covariates. In Table A.3,
we include state, year and state-year fixed effects, respectively. In Table A.4, we include
state and year fixed effects and the Democratic Share of contributions in election t and a
dummy variable indicating whether an observation pertains to an upper or lower House.
Both tables indicate that the results are robust to including additional control variables.
Next, in Table A.5 we show that the results are robust to the exclusion of obser-
vations near the discontinuity (the so-called “donut” RDD, see for example Barreca,
Lindo, and Waddell (2011)). This indicates that sorting around the cutoff is not biasing
our results.
Table A.6 replicates the results from the home state vs. out-of-state comparisons
from the paper but uses fixed effects and the donut specification, respectively. It appears
that the home state vs. out-of-state analysis is robust to the different specifications.
While the sorting problem is well-studied in the U.S. House, it does not appear in
the state legislatures. Table A.7 presents the results of estimating our main equation
on the lagged Democratic percentage of all contributions. If “better” candidates are
systematically able to sort across the discontinuity, we should find large imbalances
in lagged money share – indeed, such imbalances, if they are to bias our estimates,
should be the same order of magnitude as our estimated effects. As the table shows,
we find very small differences between winners and losers, and we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that they receive the same share of all contributions.
Figure A.1 presents the same lagged estimate across all bandwidths from 0-10 per-
centage points. Again, we can see that the difference between winners and losers in
pre-treatment contributions is negligible.
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Table A.3 – Robustness Check: State, Year, and State-Year Fixed
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democrat Win
(time t) 22.71∗ 24.85∗ 17.28∗ 20.10∗ 20.11∗ 20.07∗
(3.56) (3.55) (6.69) (1.59) (1.59) (1.63)
Constant 37.15∗ 36.14∗ 41.41∗ 39.25∗ 39.25∗ 39.15∗
(2.31) (2.25) (4.02) (1.12) (1.12) (1.15)
Observations 568 568 568 4020 4020 4020
Level State State State State State State
Fixed Effects State Year State-Year State Year State-Year
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using OLS. The outcome
variable is the Democratic party’s share of total contributions in election t+1 (percentage points). All
models are estimated based on a bandwidth of 5. ∗ p < 0.05.
Table A.4 – Robustness Check: Including Additional Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democrat Win
(time t) 20.62∗ 17.95∗ 24.94∗ 23.66∗ 22.37∗ 21.67∗ 20.04∗ 19.93∗
(4.46) (5.38) (3.50) (3.90) (2.06) (2.04) (1.60) (1.58)
Constant 37.88∗ 33.27∗ 35.71∗ 38.78∗ 37.68∗ 23.52∗ 39.20∗ 23.77∗
(2.97) (5.42) (2.24) (12.80) (1.48) (5.12) (1.12) (4.10)
Observations 329 291 568 501 2421 2421 4020 4020
Level State State State State State State State State
Bandwidth Pct. 3 3 5 5 3 3 5 5
Controls X X X X
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using OLS. The outcome
variable is the Democratic party’s share of total contributions in election t+1 (percentage points). The
following control variables are included: The Democratic Party’s share of contributions in election t,
year dummies, state dummies and a chamber dummy (for the state legislatures). ∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A.5 – Robustness Check: Donut Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democrat Win
(time t) 25.14∗ 24.97∗ 28.28∗ 22.90∗ 22.09∗ 19.39∗
(9.92) (5.41) (3.92) (6.23) (2.42) (1.77)
Constant 32.19∗ 36.44∗ 34.51∗ 35.72∗ 36.88∗ 39.09∗
(7.00) (3.76) (2.55) (4.49) (1.71) (1.22)
Observations 76 297 536 617 2223 3822
Level State State State State State State
Bandwidth Pct. 1 3 5 1 3 5
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using OLS. The outcome
variable is the Democratic party’s share of total contributions in election t+1 (percentage points). In
all models, observations in the interval [-0.25 ,0.25] of the vote share winning margin are dropped. ∗∗
p < 0.05.
Table A.6 – Robustness Check for Home-state and Out-of-state anal-
ysis in U.S. House: Fixed Effects and Donut test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democrat Win
(time t) 32.61∗ 34.15∗ 32.42∗ 0.76 27.83∗ 41.08∗
(5.15) (5.04) (6.65) (20.56) (7.91) (5.59)
Home State Contribution ×
Democrat Win (time t) 6.04 6.82 5.33 10.74 8.22 6.39
(4.13) (4.18) (3.73) (11.83) (5.66) (4.31)
Home State Contribution -9.28∗ -9.37∗ -8.56∗ -10.05 -8.45∗ -9.39∗
(2.75) (2.93) (2.44) (6.94) (3.76) (3.00)
Constant 33.49∗ 32.34∗ 36.18∗ 26.36∗ 34.98∗ 27.76∗
(3.21) (3.22) (4.45) (8.01) (4.32) (3.38)
Observations 713 713 713 108 366 676
Bandwidth Pct. 5 5 5 1 3 5
Fixed Effects State Year State-Year
Donut X X X
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using OLS. The outcome
variable is the Democratic party’s share of total contributions in election t+1 (percentage points) ∗
p < 0.05.
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Table A.7 – State Legislatures: Testing for Sorting
Dependent Variable:
Lagged Dem share of contributions.
(1) (2) (3)
Democrat Win
(time t) 3.569 2.147 2.064
(2.815) (1.582) (1.218)
Constant 49.40∗ 49.53∗ 49.49∗
(1.984) (1.123) (0.862)
Level State State State
Bandwidth Pct. 1 3 5
N 983 2909 4857
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using OLS. ∗ p < 0.05.
-30
-10
10
30
0 2 4 6 8 10
bandwidth
On Lagged Dem Money Share, US States
Figure A.1 – Testing for sorting using the lagged outcome variable.
No evidence is found.
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Finally, it is important to note that the key findings in the paper, such as the contrast
in effect size across donor types, depend upon comparing across RDD estimates. Any
fixed bias from sorting in the RDD is therefore washed out. We can also test for sorting
across donor groups. Table A.8 runs these tests with our usual specifications, using
the lagged percentage of money from each of the 14 types of donors identified in state
legislatures. Remarkably, we reject the null hypothesis in only 2 out of the 42 tests
(4.76% of the time), almost exactly the 5% rate that would be generated under the
overall null of no sorting. This is not the result of using underpowered specifications,
since these are the exact specifications we use to uncover the large effects documented
in the paper.
Table A.8 – Testing for Sorting Across Donor Groups: State Legis-
latures
Bandwidth
Donor Group 1% 3% 5%
Agriculture 4.27 6.60 4.39
(5.97) (3.40) (2.61)
Communications & Electronics 5.87 0.51 1.47
(6.09) (3.46) (2.64)
Construction 8.88 3.97 1.02
(5.15) (2.93) (2.25)
Defense 16.76 2.68 4.37
(24.23) (13.94) (10.87)
Energy & Natural Resources -4.75 0.86 2.59
(5.71) (3.25) (2.48)
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate -2.34 0.41 0.44
(4.82) (2.70) (2.06)
General Business 1.71 2.93 3.58
(4.77) (2.71) (2.09)
Government Agencies/Education/Other 10.80 2.61 1.98
(5.01) (2.84) (2.18)
Health -0.06 1.73 3.03
(5.20) (2.92) (2.23)
Ideology/Single Issue 6.97 0.07 1.05
(6.37) (3.62) (2.77)
Labor 1.60 2.14 2.19
(3.16) (1.78) (1.40)
Lawyers & Lobbyists 3.44 3.54 4.14
(4.31) (2.49) (1.95)
Party 5.65 3.34 3.12
(4.10) (2.33) (1.82)
Transportation -1.83 3.98 3.59
(5.92) (3.34) (2.58)
Each cell is RDD estimate on lagged percentage of contributions
from given donor group, using local linear regression estimated sep-
arately on each side of the discontinuity with the given bandwidth
size.
Only 2 out of the 42 (4.7%) tests reject the null of no sorting; almost
precisely the rate of false positives predicted under the null (5%).
No evidence of sorting is found.
Separate from the sorting concern, we also need to verify that our results are not
driven by the choice of bandwidth and specification. Figure A.2 presents estimated
results for β1 from Equation 3.3 across the full range of bandwidths and four polynomial
148
specifications of the running variable. Estimates are stable across these choices and
never become small or negative.
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Figure A.2 – Stability of the RDD estimates across bandwidths and
specification.
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Appendix B
Appendix: Who Values Agenda
Setters in American Legislatures?
B.1 Additional Summary Statistics
B.1.1 Number of Standing Committees across Legislative Chambers
Figure B.1 – Number of Standing Committees across States.
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Note: The maps in panels (a) and (b) pertain to the state senates and houses, respectively. Darker
colors indicate a higher number of standing legislative committees (the color codes refer to the median
number of committees in a given chamber during the period 1990-2010). The reported number in black
indicate the median number of legislators in the chamber during the period 1990-2010.
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Table B.1 – # observations by state and chamber.
House Senate House Senate
State Period N Period N State Period N Period N
AK 1990-2010 400 1990-2010 117 AL 1998-2010 419 1998-2010 140
AR 2000-2010 500 2000-2010 104 AZ 1996-2010 420 1996-2010 210
CA 1998-2010 480 1998-2010 120 CO 1996-2010 455 1996-2010 122
CT 1998-2010 906 1996-2010 252 DE 2000-2010 205 2000-2010 64
FL 1998-2010 720 1998-2010 140 GA 1996-2010 1260 1992-2010 504
HI 1998-2010 306 1998-2010 85 IA 1998-2010 599 1998-2010 160
ID 1990-2010 714 1990-2010 357 IL 1996-2010 826 1996-2010 236
IN 1994-2010 800 1994-2010 200 KS 1996-2010 875 1996-2004 120
KY 1994-2010 800 1994-2010 152 LA 1999-2007 251 1999-2007 97
MA 1998-2010 960 1998-2010 240 MD 1998-2010 564 1998-2010 188
ME 1996-2010 1057 1996-2010 245 MI 1996-2010 770 1998-2010 152
MN 1996-2010 938 1996-2010 335 MO 1996-2010 1141 1996-2010 119
MS 1999-2007 366 1999-2007 156 MT 1990-2010 1000 1990-2010 252
NC 1996-2010 840 1996-2010 350 ND 1998-2010 336 1998-2010 144
NE .- . . 2000-2010 122 NH 1998-2010 2000 1996-2010 168
NJ 1997-2009 560 1997-2007 160 NM 1992-2010 629 1992-2004 168
NV 1990-2010 420 1990-2010 106 NY 1998-2010 900 1998-2010 370
OH 1996-2010 693 1996-2010 116 OK 2000-2010 505 2000-2010 120
OR 1990-2010 600 1990-2010 150 PA 1998-2010 1218 1998-2010 150
RI 1994-2010 700 1994-2010 348 SC 1996-2010 867 1996-2004 138
SD 2000-2010 350 2000-2010 175 TN 1996-2010 693 1996-2010 116
TX 1998-2010 900 1998-2010 109 UT 1990-2010 600 1990-2010 116
VA 1999-2009 600 1999-2007 120 VT 1998-2010 900 1996-2010 210
WA 1990-2010 980 1990-2010 244 WI 1998-2010 594 1998-2010 100
WV 1998-2010 600 1998-2010 102 WY 1990-2010 604 1990-2010 165
B.1.2 Agenda Setters across State Legislatures
B.2 Robustness Checks
B.2.1 District-fixed Effects
B.2.2 Alternative outcome: Legislators’ Percent of total donations
Over the studied period, some states have imposed limits on campaign contributions
from firms, and this may impose upper bounds on the estimated effects when the out-
come is measured in levels (or the logarithm thereof). To ensure that the results are
not sensitive to this choice, I run a model with an alternative outcome variable, Pct.
of Total Industry Contributions it, which is calculated as legislator i’s percent of total
industry donations in her chamber during session t. These results are presented in Ta-
ble B.4. The estimates indicate that the basic findings are robust to the alternative
definitions of the outcome variable.
B.4
152
Table B.2 – Share of Legislators with Leadership and Com-
mittee Chair Positions by state and chamber.
House Senate House Senate
State Leader Chair Leader Chair State Leader Chair Leader Chair
AK 0.10 0.42 0.18 0.57 AL 0.03 0.25 0.08 0.66
AR 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.33 AZ 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.42
CA 0.12 0.37 0.12 0.71 CO 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.40
CT 0.11 0.16 0.40 0.58 DE 0.10 0.44 0.24 0.64
FL 0.06 0.28 0.23 0.59 GA 0.04 0.18 0.11 0.44
HI 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.62 IA 0.12 0.19 0.31 0.49
ID 0.06 0.19 0.13 0.29 IL 0.12 0.31 0.25 0.36
IN 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.39 KS 0.05 0.19 0.19 0.43
KY 0.05 0.18 0.19 0.43 LA 0.02 0.20 0.07 0.59
MA 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.29 MD 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.23
ME 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.23 MI 0.09 0.25 0.36 0.40
MN 0.07 0.18 0.14 0.27 MO 0.04 0.26 0.18 0.54
MS 0.02 0.32 0.02 0.65 MT 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.40
NC 0.06 0.40 0.12 0.53 ND 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.32
NE . . 0.03 0.47 NH 0.02 0.05 0.39 0.62
NJ 0.15 0.25 0.31 0.43 NM 0.07 0.22 0.12 0.26
NV 0.22 0.26 0.36 0.47 NY 0.09 0.24 0.20 0.51
OH 0.09 0.21 0.27 0.45 OK 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.50
OR 0.16 0.27 0.33 0.49 PA 0.02 0.21 0.11 0.78
RI 0.10 0.09 0.21 0.19 SC 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.32
SD 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.35 TN 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.43
TX 0.01 0.24 0.05 0.47 UT 0.08 0.19 0.28 0.39
VA 0.03 0.20 0.12 0.31 VT 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.39
WA 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.44 WI 0.05 0.37 0.21 0.58
WV 0.07 0.24 0.19 0.56 WY 0.09 0.19 0.21 0.45
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Table B.3 – Robustness to the Use of District-Fixed Effects.
The results are not sensitive to using districts as the unit of analysis
instead of legislators. This suggest that retirement decisions do not
induce any notable bias in the estimates reported in the paper.
log(1+Industry Contributionsit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leader 0.31∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Chair 0.14∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Chair of Top Committees 0.09
(0.07)
Chair of Other Committees
Vice 0.06† 0.06† 0.06†
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Majority Member 0.11∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 29538 28740 28740 28740 28740
Legislators 11189 10979 10979 10979 10979
District-fixed Effects X X X X X
State-Year Fixed Effects X X X X X
Seniority Fixed Effects X X X X X
Note: All models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered on legislators and are reported
in parentheses.
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Table B.4 – Alternative Outcome Variable. The basic results are
the same when the outcome variable is measured as percent of total
contributions instead of logged contributions.
Pct. of Industry Contributionsit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leader 0.77∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.83∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Chair 0.38∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Vice 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Chair of Top Committees 0.57∗∗
(0.13)
Majority Member 0.19∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 31397 31089 31089 31089
Legislators 9170 9097 9097 9097
Legislator Fixed Effects X X X X
State-Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Seniority Fixed Effects X X X
Note: All models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered on legislators and are reported
in parentheses.
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B.2.3 Effect on Pre-treatment Outcomes
To test whether the committee and party leadership treatments assigned at time t affect
the allocation of donations in the pre-treatment sessions, I estimate the following models
using OLS:
log(1+contributionsit) = αi+δt+
3∑
τ=0
[β1,τ chairi,t+τ+β2,τ leaderi,t+τ ]+xitθ+εit, (B.1)
The results are reported in Figure B.2. The estimates indicate that committee and
party leader positions assigned at time t do not have a statistically significant impact
on donations to the legislator in pre-treatment sessions.
Figure B.2 – Effect on Pre-treatment Donations. The effect on
pre-treatment donations is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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Appendix C
Appendix: What Are the
Electoral Consequences of
Campaign Spending Limits?
C.1 Additional Results
C.1.1 Additional Results: First-Stage Models
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Table C.1 – First-Stage Results with Logged Covariates
log(Spending Limitit) Spending Limitit (£1000)
Countyit 0.884
∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 82.166∗∗∗ 58.913∗∗∗ 61.382∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.004) (0.006) (2.267) (1.174) (1.445)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1918]t -0.476∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -59.142∗∗∗ -47.853∗∗∗ -50.952∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.002) (0.005) (1.301) (0.724) (1.027)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1929]t -0.039∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ 2.382∗ -2.263∗∗∗ -1.908∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.000) (0.003) (0.938) (0.240) (0.357)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1949]t -0.092∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -10.088∗∗∗ -7.939∗∗∗ -7.997∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.001) (0.004) (1.120) (0.297) (0.402)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1970]t 0.043∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.083) (0.103) (0.106)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1974]t -0.035∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗ -0.087 -0.439∗
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.254) (0.113) (0.193)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1978]t 0.047∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.101
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.029) (0.028) (0.077)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1982]t -0.058∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.001 -1.898∗∗∗ -0.282 -0.280
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.376) (0.173) (0.190)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1987]t 0.004∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ -0.041 0.020
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.028) (0.035)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1992]t 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.014
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.028) (0.028)
Countyit · 1[t ≥ 1997]t -0.018∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.393∗ 0.188∗ 0.024
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.181) (0.088) (0.086)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315
Constituencies 1636 1636 1466 1636 1636 1466
Joint instrument sign. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constituency FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X
Note: All models were estimated using OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered on constituencies and
are reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Figure C.1 – Constant Prices: Effect of Constituency Reclas-
sification on Spending Limits. Constituency reclassifications from
borough to county cause an increase in the spending limit, whereas
reclassifications from county to borough lead to a drop in spending
limits.
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Note: The x-axis represents years relative to the reclassifications. The y-axis represents the spending
limits. In the plot on the left, the treatment-group line reports the average limit faced by constituencies
classified as boroughs in the pre-treatment period and counties in the post-treatment period. The
control group is all unaffected boroughs. Conversely, in the panel on the right, the treatment-group
line reports the average limit faced by constituencies classified as counties in the pre-treatment period
and boroughs in the post-treatment period. The control group in this panel consists of all unaffected
counties.
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Figure C.2 – Constant Prices: Reforms of Spending Limit
Formula. Reforms of the spending limit formula affect county and
borough constituencies differently.
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Note: The x-axis represents years relative to the spending limit reforms. The y-axis represents spending
limits. The solid and dashed lines show the average spending limit in county and borough constituencies,
respectively.
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C.1.2 Additional Results: Candidate Supply and Electoral Competi-
tion
Table C.2 – Linear-Linear models with Linear Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Unopposed Candidateit
Spending Limitit 0.01
∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00† 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: More Than Two Candidatesit
Spending Limitit -0.00 -0.02
∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02 0.00 -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Effective Candidatesit
Spending Limitit -0.00
∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Top Two Vtshit
Spending Limitit 0.06 0.46
∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.65∗ -0.08 0.19† 0.18 0.01 0.41∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.30) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Observations 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 15761 17647
Outcome: Win Marginit
Spending Limitit 0.14 0.38
† 0.42† 0.80 0.23∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.59∗ 0.20† 0.45∗ 0.48∗ 0.64∗
(0.13) (0.22) (0.22) (0.58) (0.11) (0.25) (0.26) (0.11) (0.21) (0.22) (0.25)
Observations 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 15761 17647
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtelectorsit X X X X X X X X
γtdensityit X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.3 – Linear-Linear models with Logged Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Unopposed Candidateit
Spending Limitit 0.01
∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: More Than Two Candidatesit
Spending Limitit -0.01
∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.05† -0.01 -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Effective Candidatesit
Spending Limitit -0.01
∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Top Two Vtshit
Spending Limitit 0.33
∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗ 0.07 0.25† 0.24† 0.18∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.67) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
Observations 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 15761 17647
Outcome: Win Marginit
Spending Limitit 0.30 0.39
† 0.52∗ 1.95 0.43∗∗ 0.73∗ 0.64∗ 0.36∗ 0.45† 0.47∗ 0.71∗
(0.19) (0.23) (0.25) (1.22) (0.15) (0.29) (0.31) (0.15) (0.23) (0.24) (0.30)
Observations 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 17647 15761 17647 17647 15761 17647
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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C.1.3 Additional Results: Effect on Different Types of Spending
Table C.4 – Linear-Linear models with Linear Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Manager Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.32
∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Printing Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.37
∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.13 0.42∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Personal Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.01
∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Room Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.04
∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01† 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01† 0.01†
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Meetings Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.02
∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Staff Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.14
∗∗∗ 0.02† 0.03∗ 0.15 0.16∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Misc. Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.07
∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtelectorsit X X X X X X X X
γtdensityit X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.5 – Linear-Linear models with Logged Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Manager Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.50
∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Printing Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.23
∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ -0.13 0.33∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Personal Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.02
∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗ -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Room Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.02
∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Meetings Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.01
∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01† 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Staff Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.06
∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Misc. Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.08
∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.6 – Linear-Log models with Logged Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Manager Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 56443.04
∗∗∗ 60554.04∗∗∗ 58344.33∗∗∗ 30941.44∗∗∗ 35324.14∗∗∗ 45714.74∗∗∗ 44962.88∗∗∗ 38461.57∗∗∗ 52537.17∗∗∗ 48122.21∗∗∗ 43659.29∗∗∗
(2954.06) (2810.93) (3106.48) (2537.62) (1948.91) (2773.72) (3293.78) (2439.85) (2762.23) (3166.20) (2491.04)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Printing Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 25301.02
∗∗∗ 13520.48∗∗∗ 22168.49∗∗∗ -2938.84 30740.70∗∗∗ 14998.67∗∗∗ 21496.77∗∗∗ 29780.21∗∗∗ 13813.54∗∗∗ 20408.96∗∗∗ 13279.45∗∗∗
(3450.20) (3837.68) (4590.13) (5736.87) (3056.43) (4019.09) (4879.19) (3034.90) (3578.25) (4371.65) (3713.62)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Personal Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 2512.97
∗∗ 3443.97∗∗∗ 2609.36∗ 258.46 171.76 1421.91 732.15 531.47 2427.84∗∗ 1274.43 1330.37
(827.44) (987.11) (1222.91) (1095.00) (687.36) (1016.08) (1220.60) (699.02) (937.37) (1136.57) (923.65)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Room Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 2014.92
∗∗∗ 556.38 1298.98∗ 1015.80 2661.82∗∗∗ 387.70 856.26 2570.44∗∗∗ 536.15 987.46† 539.89
(477.69) (535.18) (599.10) (871.25) (457.28) (553.13) (646.13) (445.10) (496.82) (571.50) (505.47)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Meetings Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 1297.31
∗∗∗ 977.71∗ 1865.55∗∗∗ 4368.32∗∗∗ 1822.78∗∗∗ 1074.61∗ 1535.42∗∗ 1688.23∗∗∗ 1072.06∗ 1705.55∗∗∗ 1325.44∗∗
(382.26) (453.73) (531.72) (978.61) (317.16) (496.56) (579.43) (315.36) (436.90) (518.05) (467.70)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Staff Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 6894.07
∗∗∗ 1598.37 5238.29∗∗ 3194.60 9994.34∗∗∗ 1737.17 4580.17∗∗ 9461.17∗∗∗ 1825.29 4702.88∗∗ 2113.69
(1407.49) (1547.72) (1656.15) (2641.06) (1462.12) (1408.75) (1667.56) (1423.84) (1359.19) (1506.35) (1304.99)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Misc. Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 9237.29
∗∗∗ 9206.81∗∗∗ 9142.04∗∗∗ 11526.45∗∗∗ 8375.59∗∗∗ 8199.98∗∗∗ 8297.08∗∗∗ 8473.90∗∗∗ 8800.69∗∗∗ 8622.37∗∗∗ 8537.92∗∗∗
(833.84) (998.78) (1123.21) (1339.21) (590.51) (993.30) (1110.16) (601.92) (929.32) (1032.58) (903.73)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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C.1.4 Additional Results: Effect across Parties
Table C.7 – Linear-Linear models with Linear Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Conservative Spendingit
Spending Limitit 0.52
∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.15 0.53∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Liberal (Dem.) Spendingit
Spending Limitit 0.38
∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.32 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.21) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Labour Spendingit
Spending Limitit 0.06
∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Outcome: Other Party Spendingit
Spending Limitit 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03
† -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 18478 16584 18478 18478 16584 18478
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtelectorsit X X X X X X X X
γtdensityit X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.8 – Linear-Linear models with Logged Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Conservative Spendingit
Spending Limitit 0.50
∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Liberal (Dem.) Spendingit
Spending Limitit 0.41
∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.30∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Labour Spendingit
Spending Limitit 0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.02
† 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Other Party Spendingit
Spending Limitit 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.12
† 0.01 -0.04∗ -0.04† 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04†
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.9 – Linear-Log models with Logged Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Conservative Spendingit
log(Spending Limitit) 56554.86
∗∗∗ 48779.87∗∗∗ 52017.35∗∗∗ 21428.57∗∗∗ 48557.16∗∗∗ 40364.53∗∗∗ 43728.05∗∗∗ 49680.77∗∗∗ 44177.93∗∗∗ 44693.30∗∗∗ 38575.02∗∗∗
(3740.48) (4029.46) (4439.05) (5893.52) (3007.46) (3968.75) (4590.34) (2998.91) (3708.38) (4172.58) (3643.55)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Liberal (Dem.) Spendingit
log(Spending Limitit) 46059.01
∗∗∗ 41565.55∗∗∗ 44229.13∗∗∗ 14690.29∗ 37307.65∗∗∗ 35683.40∗∗∗ 37852.87∗∗∗ 38517.59∗∗∗ 37860.96∗∗∗ 38385.91∗∗∗ 33112.83∗∗∗
(4329.94) (4655.69) (5252.63) (6812.87) (3294.35) (4500.01) (5223.80) (3319.37) (4254.45) (4812.80) (4130.19)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Labour Spendingit
log(Spending Limitit) 225.98 829.58 3190.80 4124.52 1862.29
† 735.87 2472.26 1428.13 886.77 2822.15 1101.05
(1523.56) (1711.91) (2394.95) (4583.18) (1128.13) (1767.18) (2308.99) (1139.58) (1609.25) (2183.64) (1686.82)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Outcome: Other Party Spendingit
log(Spending Limitit) 798.33 -1536.12 -400.50 6240.24
† 640.83 -4094.29∗ -3047.50 786.40 -2410.94 -1572.86 -2840.92
(1825.11) (2025.01) (2736.62) (3200.62) (1090.89) (1911.73) (2417.57) (1166.75) (1817.40) (2341.67) (1753.79)
Observations 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 18478 16315 18478 18478 16315 18478
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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C.1.5 Additional Results: Incumbents-Challengers Differential
Table C.10 – Linear-Linear models with Linear Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Manager Differentialit
Spending Limitit -0.00 0.03
∗ 0.03∗ -0.05 -0.01 0.03† 0.03† -0.00 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 15100 16783
Outcome: Printing Differentialit
Spending Limitit -0.02 0.04
∗ 0.04† -0.02 -0.03† 0.04† 0.04 -0.02 0.04∗ 0.04∗ 0.05†
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 15100 16783
Outcome: Personal Differentialit
Spending Limitit -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 15100 16783
Outcome: Room Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 15100 16783
Outcome: Meetings Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.00 0.00
∗ 0.01∗ 0.01† 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00† 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 15100 16783
Outcome: Staff Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 15100 16783
Outcome: Misc. Differentialit
Spending Limitit -0.01
† -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01∗ -0.00 0.00 -0.01∗ -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 16783 15100 16783 16783 15100 16783
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtelectorsit X X X X X X X X
γtdensityit X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.11 – Linear-Linear models with Logged Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Manager Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.02
∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.04∗ 0.03† 0.02† 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.04∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Printing Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.02 0.05
∗∗ 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.06∗ 0.05 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.04† 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Personal Differentialit
Spending Limitit -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Room Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Meetings Differentialit
Spending Limitit 0.00
† 0.00∗ 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01† 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00† 0.01†
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Staff Differentialit
Spending Limitit -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Misc. Differentialit
Spending Limitit -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04
∗ -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.12 – Linear-Log models with Logged Controls
Policy Change IV Reclassification IV Combined IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome: Manager Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 2667.64
† 3336.75∗ 3810.57∗ -2788.29 1302.25 3667.16∗ 3668.39∗ 1446.17 3173.60∗ 3270.78∗ 2727.85†
(1364.12) (1549.25) (1628.59) (1752.88) (1045.00) (1586.05) (1847.39) (1053.75) (1439.14) (1635.99) (1440.27)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Printing Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 2560.13 4977.92
∗ 3689.46 2006.29 828.42 5618.83∗ 4452.88 1041.36 5066.61∗ 4062.29 5008.84∗
(1766.23) (2004.63) (2636.44) (4220.86) (1542.29) (2486.96) (3158.66) (1504.60) (2006.82) (2745.58) (2284.31)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Personal Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) -542.06 -571.53 -142.37 -829.33 -453.13 -574.17 -181.52 -443.67 -545.59 -155.39 -533.37
(443.08) (514.07) (728.23) (933.53) (428.02) (620.33) (799.04) (411.46) (518.05) (718.30) (567.82)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Room Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 12.65 -34.16 316.58 -53.17 195.61 280.78 465.79 140.97 60.46 365.35 148.90
(232.43) (262.68) (320.60) (658.57) (189.98) (331.00) (388.94) (186.84) (264.05) (334.24) (302.02)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Meetings Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) 373.62
† 380.38 388.52 -515.87 187.75 478.70† 372.82 204.31 360.91 326.82 299.83
(206.80) (248.73) (321.83) (648.46) (168.29) (285.45) (336.93) (167.08) (246.28) (308.86) (266.91)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Staff Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) -537.38 -849.77 -966.27 -417.61 356.33 -4.50 -235.97 203.34 -484.09 -464.85 -118.23
(669.95) (766.27) (1019.71) (2216.11) (550.77) (939.60) (1128.27) (539.57) (760.21) (988.91) (868.20)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Outcome: Misc. Differentialit
log(Spending Limitit) -486.57 -224.62 -28.99 -2390.39
∗ -473.76 122.40 238.46 -482.90 -124.62 27.59 -133.34
(459.18) (548.94) (690.48) (1089.96) (342.04) (617.25) (738.13) (340.42) (529.21) (658.77) (562.18)
Observations 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 16783 14834 16783 16783 14834 16783
Constituency FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X X
θtlog(electorsit) X X X X X X X X
γtlog(densityit) X X X
Excluded Instruments:
countyit X X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω X X X X X X
countyit · 1[t ≥ ω]t ,∀ω > 1918 X X
Note: All models were estimated using 2SLS. Standard errors are clustered on constituencies and are
reported in (parentheses). Significance levels: † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
170
C.2 Spending Limit Formulae over Time
limit1885i = 350 + 300 · Countyi + 30 · b
popi
1000
− 2c · (1 + Countyi) (C.1)
≈ 350 + 300 · Countyi + 0.03popi + ·0.03Countyi · popi
limit1918i =
5
240
· popi + 2
240
· Countyi · popi (C.2)
≈ 0.021popi + 0.008 · Countyi · popi
limit1929i =
5
240
· popi + 1
240
· Countyi · popi (C.3)
≈ 0.021popi + 0.004 · Countyi · popi
limit1949i = 450 +
1
160
· popi + 1
480
· Countyi · popi (C.4)
≈ 450 + 0.006popi + 0.002 · Countyi · popi
limit1969i = 750 +
1
20
· b3 · popi
24
c+ 1
20
· bpopi
24
c · Countyi (C.5)
≈ 750 + 0.006popi + 0.002 · Countyi · popi
limit1974i = 1075 +
3
50
· b3 · popi
24
c+ 3
50
· bpopi
24
c · Countyi (C.6)
≈ 1075 + 0.0075popi + 0.0025 · Countyi · popi
limit1978i = 1750 + 0.015 · popi + 0.005 · popi · Countyi (C.7)
limit1982i = 2700 + 0.023 · popi + 0.008 · popi · Countyi (C.8)
limit1987i = 3370 + 0.029 · popi + 0.009 · popi · Countyi (C.9)
limit1992i = 4330 + 0.037 · popi + 0.012 · popi · Countyi (C.10)
limit1997i = 4965 + 0.042 · popi + 0.014 · popi · Countyi (C.11)
limit2001i = 5483 + 0.046 · popi + 0.016 · popi · Countyi (C.12)
limit2005i = 7150 + 0.05 · popi + 0.02 · popi · Countyi (C.13)
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